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PART I

CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER TRIAL
PROCESS AND NOT:CE

Process
Service Upon Non-Resident Motor Vehicle Owners
The Florida Statutes provide a procedure for substituted service of
process upon non-resident

motor vehicle owners in actions arising from

the operation of their motor vehicle within the state. The act of turning
*

The material in this survey includes the cases reported in 96 So.2d (Fla. 1957)

through Ill So.2d (Ma.

1959)

inclusive and related enactments of the 1959 Florida

legislature.
* Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review.
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on the ignition and pressing the starter of an automobile constitutes
"opcrating" a motor vehicle within the state of Florida, for the purpose
of service of process on non-resident motor vehicle operators or owners.1
Service of process upon non resident engaging in business in state: Method

The Florida Statutes provide for substituted service of process upon
the Secretary of State in lieu of personal service upon non residents
carrying on a business or business venture in Florida. This statute is
strictly construed and the plaintiff must bring himself clearly within
its provisions in order to render an effective substituted service of process
against a non resident defendantY The suprcme court recently held that

the purchase by defendant of Florida land and the entering into a
construction contract with the intent to convert it into rental income
producing property for its benefit constituted the first substantial steps
towards a business venture in Florida.3 "The trend is clearly discernable
towards expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and over non residents. In part this is attributable to the
'4
fundamental transformation of our natural economy over the years."
In an action brought in New York on a Florida judgment the
federal court of appeals held that a foreign corporation is not "doing
business" within Florida solely because it owns or holds stock of a
subsidiary corporation that is "doing business" within the state. 5 The
federal court paid lip service to the recognition of the fact that under
the Florida statute the term "busincss venture" would appear to encompass
fact situations which would not constitute "doing business" in Florida.
The majority of the court argued that the Florida legislature by the use
of the term "business venture" did not intend to overrule the Cannon
rule and extend its jurisdiction to foreign corporations merely because
it owns and controls a subsidiary doing business in Florida. However,
as the dissent points out the Cannon rule would appear to be an attempted
extension of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on activities
of its subsidiary within the state and not, as in the instant case, apply to
1. Ilurte v. Lane, 166 F. Supp. 413 (N.D. Fla. 1958). FLA. STAT. § 47.29 (1957).
2. FLA. STAT. § 47.16, 47.30 (1957). [he Supreme Court of Florida has upheld

the constitutionality of the statute, State ex ret Weber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619 (Fla,

1953); and New York has held that maintenance in Florida of suits against non-residents

with the contacts with Florida as required by the statute does not offend traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice, Bieck v. Radmin, 14 Misc.2d 416, 178
N.Y.S.2d 983, aff'd, 181 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1958).
the same as the N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 229(b).

The Florida statute is substantially

3. FLA. STAT. §§ 47.16, 47.30 (1957). Strasser Constr. Corp. v. Linn, 97 So.2d
458 (Fla. App. 1957). See also Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. Cornelius,
Inc., 104 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958); State ex relGuardian Credit Indem. Corp. v.
Harrison, 74 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1954); Rorie v. Stilwell, 101 Fla. 4, 133 So. 609 (1931).
4. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (l957).
5. Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957), affirming,

142 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. N.Y. 1956). The rule stated is known as the "Cannon rule,"
Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing, 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (the two corporations had
separate identities and all activities within the state were actually carried on by the
subsidiary).
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situations where the plaintiff contends that the activities of the foreign
defendant corporation in reference to the establishment, control and support
of its local subsidiary constituted a "business vcnturc" within Florida as
per its non-residcnt service statute, It appears questionable that a Florida
court, in considering the following established facts of the instant case
would conclude that the non-resident defendant corporation was not
carrying on a business venture in Florida irrespective of defendant's stock
ownership in the subsidiary: the facts; (1) the defendant corporation
did own all the stock of the local subsidiary, (2) the officers of both
corporations were the same, (3) the defendant operated a central buying
service for its subsidiary, (4) the dcfendant corporation was organized
for the sole purpose of establishing subsidiary retail stores in various states,
(5) the defendant corporation negotiated eight months for a lease
for its subsidiary and then guaranteed it. 6 It seems that the actual question
presented by the facts of the case and not answered by the court is,
"does the promotion, organizing and establishment of a profit-making
corporation (or any business) within a state by a foreign corporation (or
individual) for its bcnefit constitute a "business venture" within that
state by the non-resident?"
Process: Interstate extradition of witnesses
The Supreme Court of Florida has held the Florida Statute authorizing
the state to seize non-residents visiting the state and compel their appearancc as a witness in another state unconstitutional as an abridgement
of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; the
state is without power to issue process effective beyond its.borders. The
court also decided that proceedings for the interstate extradition of witnesses are civil and not criminal in nature and appeal is the proper method
to review such proceedings. 7 ]'he right is not absolute and the Florida
court indicates that the result would be different if the defendant were
a fugitive from justice. 8
Process-Suhstituted Service in Alimony Action Unconnected with Divorce
The statutory provision for service of process by publication in a
divorce action does not include actions for alimony unconnected with
divorce and service by publication is not available in such an actionY
6. Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 246 F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1957) (dissent).

Compare Crockin v. Boston Store of Ft, Myers, Inc. 137 Fla. 853, 855, 188 So. 853,
858 (1939); State ex rel Weber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 1953) (the court
recognized a vast difference between the words "a business" and a "business venture"
as used in section 47.16 of the Florida Statutes).
7. Application of the People of New York, 100 So.2d 149 (Fla. 1958),
declaring unconstitutional FLA, STAT. § 942.02 (1957), rev'd sub. nom., People v. O'Neill,
79 Sup. Ct. 564 (1959).
S. Application of the People of New York, 100 So.2d 149, 154 (Fla. 1958),
rev'd suib. norm., People v. O'Neill, 79 Sup. Ct. 564 (1959).
9. Greenberg v. Greenberg. 101 So2d 608 (Fla. App. 1958); F1L. STAT.
§§ 48.01, 48.07, 65.09 (1957); FLA. R. CiV. P. 1.11(b); FED. R.C.P. 12.
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Return of Service-False Return
The burden is upon the defendant to prove by substantial evidence
that a return of process showing personal service is false. But where an
alleged service of process is made upon co-defendants and the evidence
establishes the falsity of the sheriff's return as to one defendant, it logically
follows that in the absence of distinguishing circumstances the validity
of the companion return is likewise overcome; otherwise the burden upon
a party seeking to prove non performance of an official act, particularly
10
within the knowledge of the public officer, would be too great.
Return of Service-Executed and Non-Executed-Necessary for Effective
Service
An original summons was never returned to the issuing court, but
subsequcntly an affidavit was filed by the serving officer that he had
served defendant and executed a return and mailed it to plaintiff's attorney
who apparently never received it. The district court of appeal granted
defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the return of the writ or
summons to the court that issued it is necessary for an effectual service
on defendant and that proof of service is insufficient for that purpose.
Statutory Note: Service of Process
Service of Process upon Non-Resident Operator of Water Craft. This
new section of the Florida Statutes provides for the service of process
upbn non-residents operating water craft in the state. It provides that the
operation of a water craft by a non-resident is an appointment of the
secretary of state as his agent for service of process, and provides the
method for such service of process. It in effect makes the provisions in
of motor vehicles
relation to service of process upon non-resident operators
2
applicable to non-resident operators of water craft.'
Service of Process on non-residents doing business in state. This act
provides for the service of summons and other process on non-resident
natural persons and partnerships doing business in this state by service upon
certain agents of such persons or parterships in this state. Includible in
this list of serviceable agents are those soliciting orders for goods or
3
services on behalf of the principal sought to be served.'
Service of process on non-resident. This is an amendment to
Section 47.30 of the 1957 Statutes and provides that the plaintiff or his
10. McIntosh v. Wibbeler, 106 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1958) (three dissenters felt that
the trial judge ruled on the evidence against defendant and upper court should not overrule
his findings). FLA. STAT. § 47.13 (1957).
11. Klosenski v. Flaherty, 110 So.ld 685 (Fla. App. 1959). See FLA. STAT.
§§ 47.48, 47.49 (1957); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3(c) (d); 42 Am. JUR. Process § 117 at 104
(1942).
12. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-148; FLA. STAT. § 47.161 (1959).
13. Fla. Laws 1959, ch, 59-280.
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attorney may personally or by mail serve the secretary of state in attempting

to effectuate a proper service on a non-resident. The act further provides
that "proof of service of process on the secretary of state shall be by a
copy of notice of said secretary accepting such process." 14
Service of process on corporations.The 1959 legislature has re-enacted
Section 47.17 of the 1955 Florida Statutes which provided for the service
of process on private corporations. The act details upon whom process
may be served in relation to service of process on private corporations
and specifically states that the act will not apply to service of process
upon insurance companies.15
Notice
The notice of suit: Form
The notice of suit is required to describe the real property if any
is to be proceeded against and if not done, the court is without power to
award to plaintiff the defendant's interest in real property located in the
state in lieu of a lump sum of alimony. 16
Effect of Notice of Lis Pendens
The purchaser of the subject matter of pending litigation takes
subject to the decree subsequently rendered when a notice of lis pendens
has been filed. However, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied
to protect an innocent purchaser and bar the effect of the filing of ]is
7
pendens.'
VENUE

Good Faith affidavit not jurisdictional
Suits may be brought against resident defendants only in the county
where he resides or the cause of action accrued, or where the property
in litigation is located. If suit is begun in a county where the defendant
does not reside the complaint must be filed with an affidavit that the
suit is being brought in good faith and with no intention to annoy the
defendant. This affidavit of good faith is directory and not jurisdictional
and thus the failure to actually file it with the complaint but subsequent
thereto will not per se necessitate a dismissal of the cause.' 8
Defendant cannot elect Venue
The statute gives to a natural person in a personal injury action the
privilege of being sued either in the county of his residence or where the
14. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-382; FLA. STAT. § 47.30 (1959).

15. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-46; FLA.

STAT. § 47.17 (1959).
16. Torchiana v. Torchiana, 11ISo.2d 103 (Fla. App. 1959); FLA. STAT. §§ 48.04,
48.08 (1957).
17. Doyle v. Tutan, 110 So.2d 42 (Fla. App. 1959); FLA. STAT. § 47.49 (1957).
18. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1957); Peterson v. Kirk, 103 So.Zd 656 (Fla. App. 1958).
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action accrued, but this does not give the defendant the right to elect
whcre he shall he sued. However, the right to sue the defendant in
personal injury actions in a county other than his residence is exceptional,
and to do so the plaintiff must meet the requirements of the statute."
Suits against municipalities for damages and injunction

Thc statute does not give an absolute right to sue in any of the
three venues mentioned. It is subject to limitations imposed by various
other statutes and common law rules. The word "only" contained therein
indicates a limitation on possible proper venues and does not express,
either directly or indirectly, an intent to change the common law rule
that actions against municipalities must be brought in the county where
the municipality is located. Thus, an action against a municipality for
an injunction and damages arising from the pumping of water from land
located in a county other than that in which the municipality was situated
was held maintainable only in the county where

the municipality was

located.20
Suits against state agencies to quiet title
But where a suit against a state agency to quiet title to land claimed
by plaintiff was brought in the county where the land was situated and
not where the agency was located, the court held venue to bc proper
even though the complaint also sought to enjoin the defendants from
conveying or otherwisc encumbering such land. Apparently in this instance
the court felt that the statute dictating that suits to quiet title are
maintainable in the circuit court of the county wherein the land lies
governed over the rule that a state agency is suable only in the county
where its central office is located or wherever else the legislature may
provide as long as the suit to quiet title is brought in good faith and not
21
as a mere subterfuge.
Suits against defendants residing in different counties
Suits against defendants residing in different counties may be brought
in any county in which any defendant resides. However, in a personal
injury suit wherc an individual defendant is joined with a foreign corporation defendant and the latter resides in two or more counties, including
that in which the individual defendant resides, the defendants do not
reside "in different counties" within the meaning of the statute. In such
a situation the individual defendant does not lose his privilege of being
19. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1957) (requirement of the affidavit of good faith and
proper intentions as stated above in text). Peterson v. Kirk, 103 So.2d 656 (Fla. App.
1958); Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1957).
20. City of St. Petersbtrg v. Earle, 109 So.2d 388 (Fla. App. 1959).
21. Paxson v. Collins, 100 So.2d 672 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA. STAT. § 66.41 (1957).
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sued in the county of his residence unless the plaintiff is able to meet
the statutory requirements creating the exception to this privilege. 22
Statutory Note-Venue-Transfer of cases
This is an act which provides for the transfer of any case laid in
the wrong venue to the proper court in any district or county where
the case might have been laid in accordance with the venue statutes
of this state. If timely objection is not made, the court may proceed
to a final disposition that is binding upon the parties. Criminal prosecutions
are excepted from this statute..231
PARTIES AND ABATEMENT

Parties
Actions surviving death of party-Punitive damages
In an action under the survival statute some substantial actual or
compensatory damages must be shown before any punitive damages will
be allowed. The question of whether punitive damages are in fact recoverable at all under the survival statute has not been answered.2 4
Actions by husband and wife
The joinder by a husband with his wife to recover damages arising
from the same incident is permissive, but if he does join he must claim
all his damages; those arising from the damage to his wife and those
personal to himself. "[A]ll damages sustained or accruing to one as the
result of a single wrongful act must be claimed or recovered in one action
or not at all." 25
Abatement
Reinstatement of action: Good cause necessary
The purpose of the abatement statute is to expedite litigation and
to keep the court dockets as current as possible. An order denying a
proper motion to dismiss under this statute which does not state any
basis for the denial is erroneous. The cause may be reinstated after
22. Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1957) (in the instant case the plaintiff
did not file an affidavit and the individual defendant resided in the county where the
cause of action had also accrued, thus there was no way in which the plaintiff could
bring himself within the so-called exceptions to the privilege of a defendant being sued
in the county where he resides). FL.A. STAT. §§ 46.01, 46.02, 46.04 (1957).

23. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-30.
24.

FLA.

STAT.

§ 45.11 (1957).

Fowlkcs v. Sinnanon, 97 So.2d 626 (Fla. App.

1957), cert. denied, 101 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1958).
25. FLA. STAT. § 46.09 (1957). Goldman v. Kent Cleaners & Laundry, Inc.,
110 So.2d 50 (Fla. App. 1959). The quote is from the supreme court's opinion in

Minis v. Reid, 98 So.2d 498, 500 (Fla. 19.57).
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dismissal upon timely motion as prescribed in the statute, but the party
seeking reinstatement has the burden to show that good cause exists for
the granting of his motionY26 The fact that a party was a non-resident
or was absent from the state for long periods and that his attorney was
busy with other clients and ncglected his action (or cause) does not
constitute the "good causC" necessary
for the reinstatement of a cause
27
dismissed for lack of prosecution.
The statute applies to all actions in law or equity but is not applicable
to criminal prosecutions

8s

Failure to prosecute-Statute not self-executing

The Florida Statute providing for the abatement of an action if no
affirmative prosecution of the cause has taken place in over one year
is not self-executing. It requires the moving party to seek dismissal
subsequent to the period for abatement, but prior to any affirmative action
in the prosecution of the cause which may have been taken after the
expiration of the statutory period which in effect would revive the running
of the statute.2?
Statuton' Note: Abatement
Abatement of an action upon motion of the court. This statute has
been amended to authorize a dismissal of an action for non-prosecution
upon the court's own motion as well as upon the motion of any interested
0

party.3

PROCEDURE:

AC'TONS A'

LAW AND L QUITY

Scope and application of the rles

The Rules of Civil Procedure arc to be used as tools for obtaining
the just as well as the speedy determination of causes.-, The appellate
court will not disturb the trial court in its authorized exercise of discretion
in procedural matters except in a clear case of mistake or hardship or
unless an abusc of discretion is plainly made to appearOb The rules of

civil procedure do not control in criminal cases. - °c
26. May v. State ex rel Ervin, 96 So.2d 126 (Fli, 1957).
27. Miller v. Hartley's, Inc. 97 So.2d 211 (Fla. App. 1957). Schreyer v. Liniado,
100 So,2d 199 (Fla. App. 1958), the fact tint party was a resident of State of California,
that she had not been present in the state for five years and that she was a housewife
without means to come to Florida, all to the knowledge of the defendant, failed to show

"good cause" for re-instatement; FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1957).
28. Loy v,. Grayson. 99 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1957).
29. Pollock v, Pollock, 110 So.2d 474 (Fla. App. 1959); FLA, S'ra, § 45.19 (1957).
30. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1957).
30a. Glassman %'.I)eauville Enterprises, Inc., 99 So.2d

641

(Fla. App.

1958).

FMA. R. Cv. I). A.
30b, Robins v. Jones, 101 Fla. 1086, 132 So. 840 (1931); Demos v. Walker,
99 Fla. 302, 126 So. 305 (1930); O'Gara v. Hancock, 76 Fla, 1, 79 So. 167 (1918).
30c. Long v. State, 96 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1957).
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When Action is Commenced: Docket
When action commenced-for purposes of limitations
The plaintiff's complaint for usury did not allege that it was wilfully
charged as required by the applicable statute.3 Subsequently, the court
permitted an amendment instanter to add the word "willful." On appeal
the defendant urged that in determining whether the period of limitation
3
had run '2
the court should consider that the action was begun on the date
the amended complaint was filed since the original complaint failed to
state a cause of action until amended.5 3 Held, for the purpose of limitations
that the cause of action is considered commenced on the date of the
filing of the original pleading setting forth the claim of the party initiating
the action

a4

Docket-Equity suits for Declaratory Decrees
Rule 1.2 (c) of the 1954 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that "unless otherwise specifically provided by statute, special
statutory proceedings shall be entered in the common law docket"3' 5 does
not prevent the filing in equity of suits for declaratory decree under
chapter 87 of the Florida Statutes.30 The references in the statute to
decrees as well as judgments and the express provisions concerning equitable
rights and relief3 7 indicate that proceedings under the statute may be
either legal or equitable.3 8

31. WenCk v. Insurance Agents Fin. Corp.. 99 So.2d 883 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA.
STAT.

ch. 687 (1957).

32. See FI.A, STAT. § 95.11(6) (1957). The statute provides a two year statute
of limitations for actions upon a statute for penalty or forfeiture.
33. See FLA. S'rAr. § 687.04 (1957). The statute applies to forfeitures and penalties
in cases of excessive interest charges.
34. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.2(a). "Ever' suit of a civil nature shall be deemed as
commenced when the complaint is filed . . . . Rule 1.15(c). Whenever the claim or
defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct transaction or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
shall relate back to the date of the original pleading."
35. This follows Rule 1.2(b) which directs the clerk to keep both a common law
docket and an equity docket and says, "ie shall enter all cases as they are commenced in
the appropriate docket."
36. City of Miami v. Miami Transit Co.. 96 So.2d 799 (Fla. App. 1957).
37. See FLA. STAT. § 87.01 (1957) which expressly authorizes "decrees, judgments
or orders." Section 87.08 permits submission to a jnry of "issues of fact triable by a
jury" and is followed by a provision that it shall not be "construed as requiring a jury
to determine issues of fact in equity cases." Section 87.11 states that the purpose of
the chapter is to afford "relief from insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights
status and other equitable or legal relations." Section 87.12 states: "when a suit for
declaratory decree is filed as provided in this chapter the court shall have power to give
as full and complete equitable relief as it would have had if such proceeding had been
instituted as a suit in equity."
38. For examples of suits brought tinder Chapter 87 on the equity side of the court
see Taylor v. Cooper, 60 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1952); Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term
Crand Jury, 56 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1952); Lockleer v, City of \West Palm Beach, 51 So.2d

291 (Fla. 1951).
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Service and Filing of Pleadings and Papers: Notice
Service of Pleadings and Papers-Failureto serve a basis for default
In Pan American World Ainays, Inc. v. Gregory'0 defendant filed
notice of filing a petition for removal of plaintiff's complaint for personal
injuries to the federal court. Defendant's answer and plaintiff's reply thereto
were served and filed in the federal court. Upon plaintiff's motion the
court remanded the cause to the state court on April 13, 1956. In
accordance with the federal practice the clerk did not transmit the answer
or reply to the state court. 'Thedefendant did not file his answer in the
state court. Subsequently, plaintiff's counsel filed a praecipe for default
which certified that defendant had not filed any pleading directed to
plaintiff's complaint. The clerk entered default and without further proceedings the cause was tried before a jury on the single issue of damages
which were assessed at $50,000. Defendant appealed from the final judgment
which was based upon the default and the failure to file an answer. The
court of appeal held that the rules clearly designate the failure to serve
a pleading as the basis for a default"' and that the clerk was without
authority 2 to enter a default where an answer had been served but not
filed in a court inwhich he was a clerk. The court noted that the mere
service of pleading would not be enough to present the pleading to the
court and that under Rule 1,4(d) the pleading should be filed with the
court to bring it to the court's attention. However, the court did not elect
to discuss the results of a failure to comply with this rule. On the issue
of whether or not defendant was entitled to notice of the trial on the
issue of damages, the court held that although Rule 2.9(b) 43 does modify,
it does not abrogate the long established rule that after default in a
tort action the defendant has a right to put in proof and be heard upon
the question of damages.4 4 The court thus concluded that even in a

40. 96 So.2d 669 (fla. App. 1957).
41. FiA. R. Civ. P. 2.9(a). "ifa party fails
to serfc a pleading at any time
provided by these rules, or fixed by the court, an adverse party may cause a default
to be entered by the court or by the clerk on a day subsequent to the day on which
such default occurs ...-(Emphasis added.) ILA. R. Civ. 1. 1.4(d). "All original papers,
copies of which are required to be served upon parties, shall be filed with the court
either before service or immediately thereafter." Rule 1.4(a). "Every pleading subsequent
to the initial pleadings, unless the court otherwise orders . . . shall be served on
each party affected therby ...."
42. Th clerk is an officer of the court whose duties are minisierial and as such
he does not exercise any discretion, State v. Almand, 75 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1954).
43. FLA. R. Civ, P. 2.9(b).
44. Judgments, final, consequent upon the entry of default, for want of proper
pleading, may be entered on the same day that the default is entered as well as any
subsequent day. Wilhelm v. South Indian River Co., 19 Fla. 54, 124 So. 729 (1929);
Watson v. Seat & Crawford, 8 Fla. 446 (1859).
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default case the defendant is entitled to be heard upon the amount of
damages even if not upon the merits of the claim.",
Effect of timely objections to improper filing
Defendant's motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits
were served oI plaintiff more than ten days prior to the tearing, but the
originals were not filed with the court until the morning of the hearing."
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure require that all original papers served
after the complaint "shall be filed with the court either before service or
immediately thereafter. "4 7 The plaintiff did not object on this point to
the trial court but on appeal challenged its authority to recognize the
subject pleadings on the ground that they were not filed in compliance
with the rule quoted above. The district court of appeal held that plaintiff's
contention was without merit in that any advantage sought for violation of
the rule must be presented by tiuely objection to the trial court. Moreover,
the court declared it would not concern itself with an assignment of error,
the nature of which is not shown to be harmful. This decision apparently
indicates that the results of partial or complete non-compliance with
Rule 1.4(d) is nil and within th6 judicial discretion of the court. For
example, in Gilmer v. Rubin,48 the clerk entered a default against two
of several defendants for "failure to file answer or other. pleadings" since
more than twenty days had passed since the defendants had been served. 9
The defendants filed an answer to the complaint on the following day
to which there was attached an affidavit that a copy of the answer had
been sent to plaintiff's counsel on the day that the default was entered.
The court of appeal held that the defendants were not in default under
the rule penalizing failure to serve a pleading 0 inasmuch as the answer
was served before a proper request for default was made and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default.
Notice of Hearing on a Single Issue
It is error and a denial of due process of law for a trial court to set
a cause down for trial on the single issue of unclean hands without giving
45. In Moore v. Boyd, 62 So.2d 427, 430 (Fla. 1952) the Supreme Court of
Florida
stated the
righttoof trya defendant
to contest
issue the
of damages
after plaintiff
default:
"if a plaintiff
desires
an unliquidated
claimthebefore
Court, such
must await the calling of the docket at the next term or give the defendant notice
of the assessment of damages before the Court, so that defendant may be given an

opportunity to be heard upon the amount of damages." See also Security Fin. Co. v.
Gentry, 91 Fla. 1015, 109 So. 220 (1926).
46. Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So.2d 307 (Fla. App. 1958).
47. F.A. R. Civ. P. 1.4(d).
48. 98 So.2d 367 (Fla. App. 1957).
49. FI.A. R. Civ. P. 1.11(a). "A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after service of the summons and complaint upon him, or not later than the
date fixed in a notice by publication ...
50. Ft. R. Civ. P. 2.9(a). The court cites as authority
for its conclusions
2
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Gregory, 96 So.2d 669 (H
a. App. 1957) which
is reported on pages -..--- of the text supra.
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notice to opposing counsel of the hearing on the motion to sever the
issue.5

Extending the time to file pleadings
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure vest wide discretion in the
trial court in granting extensions of timc or enlarging the time for the
filing of pleadings or the doing of required acts. The only prohibition
upon the exercise of the court's discretion is in the extending of the timc

for making motions for a new trial or directed verdict or for taking an
appcal.52 Thus the chancellor upon stipulation of the parties can set

3
aside a decree pro confesso and permit the filing of defensive pleadings
However, once the chancellor has exercised his discretion and allowed
the pleadings it is error, in the absence of a subsequent default, for the
court of its own motion to strike the pleadings on the ground they are
4
untimely and to proceed ex parte in the matter.6

Pleadings
Pleadings allowed
In Florida, the only pleadings allowed are a complaint, an answer,
and a reply if the answer contains a counterclaim or crossclaim. "No
additional pleadings other than motions provided by these rules shall
be allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer."5 5

The Complaint
Uncertainty of type of relief not grounds for dismissal. The complaint
in a statutory action for rescission, accounting and other equitable relief
against a corporation and individuals thereof 'a was replete with conclusions
and was without allegations of ultimate facts which made it uncertain as
to what relief, if any, the plaintiff might ultimately be entitled. The trial
court dismissed the action as to the individual defendants as being wholly
without equity.5 7 On appeal, reversed. Facts which lie more within the
51. Brooker v. Smith, 101 So,2d 607 (Fla. App. 1958). See also Town of Lake
Hamilton v. Hughes, 160 FlIa. 646, 36 So.2d 260 (1948); Mayflower Investment
Co. v. Brill, 137 Fla. 287, 188 So. 205 (1939), lF'Y. R. Civ. P. 1.4(d).
52. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.6(b).
53. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 102 So.2d 729 (Fla. App. 1958).
54. Id. at 730. Generally, "the opening of judgments is a matter of iudicial
discretion and 'in a case of reasonable doubt, where there has been no trial upon the
merits, this discretion is usually exercised in favor of granting the application so as to
permit a determination of the controversy upon the merits.' 31 Aiju . Judgments,
Section 717 .... ." For a similar pronouncement see Pan Am. World Airways v.
Gregory, 96 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. App. 1957); Coggin v. Baffield, 150 Fla. 551,
552, 8 So.2d 9, 11 (1942). FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.10 provides for the setting aside of
a judgment entered on a decree pro confesso "upon such conditions as to the court
may seem equitable and just .
"
55. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.7(a).
56. FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1957).
57. Williams v. Ahrenholz, 108 So.2d 304 (Fla. App. 1959).
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knowledge of an opponent may be averred generally"8 and "every complaint
[is]... considered to pray for general relief," 5 wherein the useless shall
not vitiate the useful. Therefore, even though the plaintiffs were not
entitled to relief under the statute, it was not certain that they would
not be entitled to have other applicable law applied to the facts as they
may have bcen established under the allegations of the complaint, especially
where it appeared that they might be entitled to have the law of constructive trust applied. However, where an amended complaint in equity was
dismissed because it failed to allege facts sufficient to justify the specific
relief praycd, only those categories consonant with the allegations were
considered as a basis for possible equitable relief, and any other basis of
possible equitable jurisdiction could not be considered. 0
Demand for relief-Jurisdictional amount. A claim for relief must
contain allcgations of facts sufficient to show the jurisdiction of the courtY'
The amount involved for jurisdictional purposes is the amount claimed
in good faith and put in controversy and not the amount claimed or
actually rccov'erable." -' Attorneys' fees are not includible in the computation
of the jurisdictional amount as an item of damages unless there is liability
therefor under a eontract or statute. 3
Deficiency decree against non-party. A complaint is considered to pray
for general relief and a deficiency decree may be granted under a prayer
for general relief; but this does not authorize a deficiency decrec as against
4
one not a party to the suit, especially where it is a dissolved coqporation."
The answer
General denial requires good faith in defendant. General denials are
not favored and should be used only when dcfendant in good faith attempts
to controvert each averment in the complaint including the basis of the
court's jurisdiction. 65
A general denial in the defendant's answer put in issue every fact upon
which the plaintiff sought to recover and thc fallacy of this answer was
demonstrated by subsequent sworn admissions which virtually admitted all
of the material allegations of the complaint."" The answer was controverted
and the allegations of the complaint were considcrcd established without
denial.
58. Adelman v. M & S Welding Shop, Inc., 10i So.2d 802 (Fla. App. 1958),
41 Am. luit. Pleading § 32 (1942).
59. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b).
60. Revell v. Crews, 97 So.2d 336 (Fla. App. 1957). lA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b).
61. FYA. R. CiV. P. 1.8(b).
62. Richter Jewelry Co. v.Harrison, 147 Fia. 732, 3 So.2d 387 (1941).
63. Gannett v. King, 108 So.2d 299, 302 (F]a. App. 1959).
64. R bin v. Kapell, 105 So.2d 28 (Fla. App. 1958). FA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b).
65. FA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(c). See United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443, 444

(1).Neb. 1950).

66. Fink v. Powsner, 108 So.2d 324 (Fla. App. 1958).
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Ansver standing over to amended complaint. Plaintiff voluntarily filed
a second amended complaint after defendant had filed his answer to
the first amended complaint.NT Defendant failed to plead to the second
amended complaint within ten days after his motion to dismiss was
denied. 8 The court rcndercd a final default judgment against defendant
for his failure to so plead. Ilie district court of appeal held that tie
present rules did not abrogate the common law rule that an answer may
stand over to an amended complaint " and therefore the defendant's answer
to the first amended complaint which was on file at the time the default
was entered was responsive to the claim as reworded and was sufficient
to prevent a default for failure to answer the second amended complaint.
Admissions in answter-effect. An admission in an answer does not
extend beyond the scope of the allegations in the complaint and the
complainant may not base his claim for relief on an admission contained
in an answer unless the fact admitted was substantially alleged in the
complaint2 0
The Reply: Equitable Plea Allowed in Action at Law
In a personal injury action, defendant's answer alleged that the
plaintiff had executed a release of all claims arising out of an automobile
accident.7' The circuit court allowed the plaintiff to reply but struck it
as insufficient and refused to allow plaintiff to amend his reply to present
an equitable plea. Held, reversed, the plaintiff should have been allowed
to file the amended reply and have been given an opportunity to prove
its allegations. Section 52.21 of the Florida Statutes permits a plaintiff
by reply to set out facts "which would avoid such answer upon equitable
grounds." The rules recognize defenses on equitable grounds in law actions.7 2
An equitable reply to an alleged release is allowable in a law action
regardless of whether the alleged fraud is fraud in the execution or in
the inducement; the plaintiff is not required first to seek relief in equity
merely because the plea charges fraud in the inducement."3

67. Craver v. Ramagli Realty Co,, 109 Sn.2d 187 (Fla. App. 1959).
68. This is required by FLA, R. Civ. P. 1.11 (a).

69. The rule that an answer may stand over to an amended complaint was
recognized in Florida well before the present rules were adopted. Jordan v. John
Ryan Co., 35 Fla. 259, 17 So. 73 (1895); Butler v. Thompson, 2 Fla. 9 (1848).

See also cases collected in 41 AM. JuR. Pleading § 312 (1942); 71 C.J.S. Pleading
§ 314(c) (1951).
70. Meadows So. Constr. Co. v. Pezzanti, 108 So.2d 499 (Fla. App. 1959).
See also 19 Armi. Jij. Equity § 275 at 205 (1939); 30 C.J.S. Equity § 347 at 763 (1942).
71. McGill v. Henderson, 98 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1957).
72. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(g). "A party may also state as many . . . defenses as he
has .. . whether based on legal or on equitable grounds, or both."'

73. McGill v. Henderson, 98 So.2d 791, 794 (FIa. 1957).
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Motion to Dismiss and Affirmative Defenses
Motion to dismiss must specify grounds

The rule provides that "an application to the court for an order shall

be by motion and shall state with particularity the grounds therefor."7 3 8
Therefore, a general motion to dismiss "for failure to state a cause of
action" is not sufficient to challenge the equity court's jurisdiction over
the subject matter as affected by the proofs."", On the contrary, it tends
to admit that the subject matter is within the court's jurisdiction. Once
failing to intcrposc a timely challenge to the chancellor's jurisdiction, a
party cannot attack the decree affording the relief sought on the ground
of adequacy of the remedy at law.?3S
Motion to dismiss cannot raise affirmative defenses

The trial court dismissed a complaint with prejudice in a divorce
action upon a motion to dismiss which raised the affirmative defense of
res judicata and/or estoppel by judgment.3 The court of appeal held
that the lower court was in error. The primary purpose of a motion to
dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of an adversary's pleading prior
to the required responsive pleading; it accepts as true those matters well
pleaded in the complaint and points out wherein the complaint is legally
deficient or has failed to state a cause of action. 74 The specific grounds
upon which a motion to dismiss will lie are enumerated in the rules.5
Estoppel by judgment and res judicata are not included but may be
affirmatively set forth in a pleading to a preceding pleading? 6 In effect,
the defendant in the instant case sought to render the complaint legally
insufficient by supplementing it with additional facts by way of a motion
to dismiss; this practice is not authorized by the rules. Such a motion also
may be a denial of due process in that it fails to put a party on notice that
he will be called upon at the hearing on said motion to defend against
the introduction of evidence establishing an affirmative defense.7"

73a. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.7(b). See Stone v. Stone, 97 So.2d 352 (1-la. App. 1957);
Connolly v. Sebeco, 89 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1956).
73b. Ganaway v. Henderson, 103 So.2d 693 (Fla. App. 1958).
73c. Id. at 696, 697. See also dissent at 697-704.
73d. Stone v. Stone, 97 So.2d 352 (Fla. App. 1957).
74. Id. at 354.
75. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11 (b); (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack
of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5)
insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a cause of action, (7) failure
to join indispensable parties.
76. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d) (g). See Olin's, Inc. v. Avis Rental Car, Inc., 104 So.2d
508 at 510 (Fla. 1958).
77. Stone v. Stone, 97 So.2d 352 at 354 (Fla. App. 1957). The court indicates
that the motion to dismiss could not operate in this instance as a substitute for a
motion for summary decree because to do so would deny the opposing party the
benefit of notice and opportunity to reply provided for by the summary decree rule.
See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36.
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Effect of the Admissions Contained in a Motion to Dismiss
The admissions contained in a motion to dismiss which is overruled
for substantive or for merely formal reasons cannot be relied on as a basis
for holding that no cause of action has been stated for declaratory relief.
Such admissions arc dcncd to drop out of the case upon the overruling
of the motion as in the case of any pleading which is successfully attacked
by an adversary. When this happens, the record is left in the same condition as if no such pleading or motion had ever been offered."'

Motion to dismiss-cornplaint stating cause other than that relied on.
Where facts set forth in a complaint wcre insufficient in an action of defamation but stated a cause of action on another ground, a motion to dismiss
which admits the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint should be
overruled.7 0

Effect of Filing motion to dismiss-Jurisdictionof the Person
The filing of a motion to dismiss an alimony action by a non-resident

defendant upon the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the person,
insufficiency of process and the service thereof, does not constitute a
general appearance and thus a waiver of errors. 80 Nor did the filing of the
above motion require a special appearance by the defendant as a protective

measure. This is a result of the clear intent of the Florida rule which
seeks to abolish the former distinction between general and special
appearances!"
Affirmative Defenses
Affirmative defenses in hearing on summary judgment. Under the
rules, affirmative defenses must be raised in a pleading to a preceding
pleading and if not so raised, are deemed waived.8 2 Thus, where the
defendant madc no requcst to amend his answer the trial court properly
rejected his attempt to assert an affirmative defense into the hearing on
motion for summary judgment, as it was beyond the scope of the issues
raised by pleadings.,,
78. Olin's, Inc. v. Avis Rental Car, Inc., 104 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1958).
79. Regan v. Davis, 97 So.2d 324 (Fla. App. 1957). FLA,. R. Civ. P. 1.8(b),

1.11 (b) (6).
80. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 101 So.2d 608 (Fla. App. 1958).
81. FIA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(d) "no defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion."
Florida rule is taken from FED. R. Civ. P. 12; the intent of both rules being the

same. See Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.
1944). cert. denied, 322 U.S. 740 (1944), See also 2 MooRE, 'EDERAl, PRACTICE
2260-2264 (2d ed. 1948).
82, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(e)(d).
83. Fink v. Powsner, 108 So.2d 324 (Fla, App. 1959). See FED. R. Civ, P. 8(d);
Carroll v. Paramount Pictures. 3 F.R.I). 47 (1DD.C. 1943); Dicks v, Colonial Finance
Corp., 85 So.2d 874 (Ha. 1956).
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defenses not

indicated on the face of the complaint must be plead by the defendant
in answer and cannot properly be raised on a motion to dismiss.8 4 These

defenses cannot be raised by motion because the plaintiff should not
have the burdcen of anticipating a defense and then also overcoming it
in his initial pleading.
Affirmative defenses presented as question of fact. Ratification and
waiver is also an affirmative defense generally required to be set up in
the answer and not available upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action. However, where this defense is submitted to the court
as a question of fact by the consent of the parties, the appellant cannot
complain on appeal from an order dismissing the complaint that the
court erred in deciding the defense of ratification and waiver since it
belonged in the answer and was not available on a motion to dismiss.85
by plaintiff-reply. An action was brought to
automobile.80 Defendant contended, in a suppleplaintiff did not specifically plead the doctrine
defendant's answer which alleged superior title
the plaintiff cannot enjoy the benefits of that
doctrine and the court erred in applying it against the defendant. The
Affirnwtive defenses
recover possession of an
mental brief, that since
of estoppel or reply to
and right to possession,

supreme court affirmcd the trial court. Generally, estoppel is an affirmative
defense which is waived if not specifically pleadcd. 7 lowever, the rule is
only applicable where the defendant sceks to avail himself of the defense
of estoppel, but fails to plead it in his answer. This factual distinction is
nmaterial. In the instant case, defendant's answer contained nothing which
84. Binz v. Helvetia Fla. Enterprises, Inc., 104 So.2d 124 (Fla. App. 1958);
lough v. Menses, 95 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1957); FLA. R. CiV. P. 1.8(d), 1.11(b). See
also Flye v. Jeffords, 106 So.2d 229 (Fla. App. 1958), case involves affirmative defense

of laches. Such defense must be incorporated in the answer rather than in a motion
to dismiss subject to the exception of when complaint shows the defense on its face.

In considering a motion to dismiss the complaint the court is restricted to the four
corners of the complaint. For purposes of passing upon a motion to dismiss complaint,
court must assume all facts alleged in the complaint to be true and motion must be

decided on questions of law only. Generally, affirmative defenses such as laches, res
judicata, etc., under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d) are required to be incorporated in an
answer rather than in a motion to dismiss. Chambers v. Chambers, 102 So.2d 171
(Fla. App. 1958), husband's complaint for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and
constructive desertion contained

no allegations

affirmatively showing,

either directly

or by inference, that grounds for divorce sued upon had been formerly adjudicated
in any other jurisdiction, defense of res jodicata could not be raised by motion to

dismiss. Braz v. Professional Corp., 101 So.2d 594, 595 (Fla. App. 1958); Gelb v.
Aronovitz, 98 So.2d 375 (Fla. App. 1957), facts alleged in the complaint did not show
on their face accord and satisfaction and this was the grounds upon which amended
complaint was granted. Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense which, under
the rules, must he affirmatively pleaded; Rule 1.8(d). Therefore the court reversed the
lower court's granting of the motion to dismiss. Stone v. Stone, 97 So.2d 352 (Fla.
App. 1957).
85.
86.
87.
88.

Toffel v, Baugher, Ill So.2d 290 (Fla. App. 1959). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8(d).
Jarrard v. Associates Disc. Corp., 99 So,2d 272 (Fla. 1957).
Dicks v. Colonial Fin. Corp., 85 So,2d 874 (Fla. 1956).
Jarard v. Associates Disc. Corp., 99 So.2d 272, 275 (Fla. 1957).
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could have been construed as a claim for relief and under the rules the
plaintiff was not allowed to file a further pleading and the court did not
order the filing of a reply. The court concluded:
[T]herefore under Rule 1.11(b) the plaintiff could "assert at the
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief." While
Rule 1.11 (h) provides that a party shall be deemed to have waived
any defense which he does not present by motion, or in his answer
or reply, when construed with Rules 1.7(a) and 1.11(b) we do
not feel this should be held to preclude a party from asserting at
the trial a defense not raised in the pleadings, when such defense
was not required to be so pleaded. To hold otherwise would
require, in a situation such as now before us, that the plaintiff
anticipate the defense of the defendant and plead estoppel in
his complaint. 89
Although finding no procedural error, the court advised that it would
be the better practice for plaintiffs who wish to assert an affirmative
defense against matter contained in an answer to request leave of court
to file a reply to the answer.
Res judicata and estoppel by judgment. The claims of several automobile passengers against defendant taxi cab driver and company for
injuries arising out of a single accident were consolidated for trial. Two
of the plaintiffs took a non suit, the other passenger continued the
litigation and suffered an adverse final judgment. This final judgment
was held not to constitute an estoppel by judgment, nor was it res
judicata as to the non-suited passenger in a subsequent suit by them
against the same defendants on the same claim. 0
The court enumerated the following essential requirements for the
application of the doctrine of res judicata; identity in the thing sued for;
identity of the cause of action; identity of the persons and the parties
to the action; identity of the quality in the person for or against whom
the claim is made. 9 ' In the situation being discussed the identity of the
persons and the parties was different in the various actions; this element
of identity of parties is also required to invoke the defense of estoppel
by judgment.9 1'

89. Jarrard v. Associates Disc. Corp., 99 So.2d 272 at 276 (Fla. 1957). It should

be noted that the court points out that the case of Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Ferguson,

59 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1952) is directly opposite to the view expressed in the instant case,
but that case was decided under the Florida common law rules and since then the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure have been adopted and thus tinder the rules mentioned
su/ra, the decision in the Gulf Life Ins. Co. case is not applicable.
90. Martin v. Arrow Cabs, Inc., 107 So.2d 394 (Fla. App. 1958).
91. Id. at 396.
91a. Martin v. Arrow Cabs, Inc., 107 So.2d 394, 396 (Fla. App. 1958); Youngblood
v. Taylor, 89 So.2d 503, 505 (Fla. 1956); Shearn v. Orlando Funeral Home, 88 So.2d

591 (Fla. 1956).
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Incidentally, it should be noted that the party who evokes and relies
on the defense that a former adjudication was res judicata by issues raised
has the burden of proof to establish the former adjudication. 2
Alternative Pleading
Joinder of causes of action-alternative pleading of liability
The rules specifically provide for allegations of liability in the alternativeY3 Thus, a complaint by a jitney passenger involved in an intersectional
collision with an automobile was sufficient, notwithstanding that it alleged
alternatively negligence of motorist, of jitney driver, or of both as joint
tort-feasors. It was proper to submit the cause to the jury to determine
which one was negligent or whether both were negligent. 4
Personal injuries and property damage-single act-single cause of action
Plaintiff sued for personal injuries and property damages arising from
an automobile accident.95 The parties by consent dismissed the claim for
property damage and thereupon a settlement as to the personal injuries
was reached, judgment was entered and promptly satisfied. Prior to the
entry of the consent judgment, plaintiff instituted a separate action against
defendant for the use and benefit of his insurer to recover property damages
arising from the same accident. Defendant answered that the suit was
barred because it violated the rule against splitting a cause of action
and was res judicata. Plaintiff replied that the insurance company had
reimbursed him for the property damage sustained and that he had
delivered to the insurance company a loan receipt as per the provisions
of his insurance policy. Plaintiff further alleged that by virtue of the loan
receipt the insurance company had a separate cause of action in itself
which it could maintain despite plaintiff's previous action. Held: The
Supreme Court of Florida aligned itself with the majority rule, i.e.; if the
wrongful act is single, the cause of action is single and different injuries
occasioned by it are merely items of damage resulting from the same wrong
and must be claimed and recovered in one action or not at all. 0
Pleading special matters
Pleading special matters-Special damages
Special losses or injuries which do not naturally or ordinarily result
froin the negligent act alleged may be shown only when the defendant
92. Shirley v. Shirley, 100 So.2d 450 (Fla. App. 1958).
93. FLA . R. Civ. P. 1.8(g). "A party may . . . state as many separate claims

as he has regardless of consistency.
94. Ringler v. McVeigh, 109 So.2d 606 (Fla. App. 1959).
95. Mims v. Reid, 98 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1957).
96. Id. at 500, 501. See also Gaynon v. Statum, 151 Fla. 793,795, 10 So.2d
432, 433 (1942).
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has becn advised thereof by specific allegations in the complaint.97 In
Ephrem v. Phillips,"" plaintiff sued for pain and suffering resulting from
injuries sustained by her in an automobile accident. Liability was admitted
and the cause was tried solely on the issue of damages. At the trial plaintiff
was allowed to show that her pain and suffering resulted in and was
aggravated by a miscarriage or abortion. The complaint contained no
specific allegations as to her pregnant condition at the time of the accident
or her subsequent miscarriage. Judgment was for the plaintiff, Defendant
on appeal contended that a claim for damages resulting from an abortion
arising out of injuries occasioned by the negligent act of another is an
item of special damages which must be specifically alleged in the complaint
to permit recovery. Held, contrary to what appears to be the prevailing
view,"" that damages resulting from an abortion or miscarriage arising
from the injuries alleged in the complaint are not special damages and
need not be specifically alleged.
Pleading special matters-foreign judgment or decree
When an action is brought on a foreign judgment, it is sufficient to
aver the judgment' 0° of the court without showing its jurisdiction to
render it. The lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court is a defense which
should be invoked by the answer. I however, if the complaint alleges
jurisdictional facts upon which the foreign judgment was obtained, then
the sufficiency of the iurisdictional allegations may be attacked by a
01
motion to dismiss.
Attaching cop)' of cause of action and exhibits
"The intent and purpose of tlis rule' ' is to avoid unnecessary recitals
of documents not particularly germane to right of action but to require
attachment of those documents upon which cause of action rests or is
dependent; and where contract upon which the action was brought was
attached to complaint, The other documents related solely to the repreFia. R. Civ. P. 1.9(g). See
618 97.
(1912)
98. 9 9So.2d 257 (Fla. App. 1957).

Varficld v. Hepburn,

62

Fla. 409, 57 So.

99. Id. at 262. Chief Judge Sturges concurring specially: "I wish to emphasize,
however, that in my opinion the result so reached is in light of the facts producing
a reasonable and propcr exception to what I take to be the prevailing and soond line
of authority holding that an abortion most be specially pleaded if the claim for damages
is in any manner
dependent thereon or related thereto. Both the letter and the spirit
9

of Rule 1. (g) . . . compels this conclusion.' See also Town of Florence v. Snook,
20 Colo. App. 356, 78 Pac. 994 (1904); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Roney, 2 Ky. L. Rep.
1326, 108 S.V. 343 (1908);
Valquist v. Kansas City Ry., 292 Mo. 34, 237

S.W. 493 (1922).
100. Fri.. R. Civ. P. 1.9(e).
101. Futterman v. Gerber. 109 So.2d 575 (Fla.

App. 1959); Milligan v. Wilson,

107 So.2d 773 (Fla. App. 1958). See also Pacific Mills v. lillman Garment, Inc.,
87 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1956). FLA. S'm,. § 92.031 (1957) governs judicial notice of
foreign laws.
102. FLa. R. Csv. P. 1.10.
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sentative right of the appellant to bring the action. We therefore conclude
on this point there has been a substantial compliance with the rule."'10 3
(Footnote added.)
Motion for judgment or decree on the pleadings-generally
A motion for judgment or decree on the pleadings is contemplated as
a pre-trial step.' 0 For the purposes of this motion, all material well
pleaded allegations of the opposing party are taken as true and those
of the inovant which have been denied are taken as false and conclusions
of law are not deemed admitted. Since under Florida Rule 1.8(e) the
allegations in an answer are deemed denied where no reply is required, a
defendant may not obtain a judgment on the pleading based on allegations in his answer; thus lie may not move on the basis of an insufficient
denial in the plaintiff's reply of the allegations of his answer where the
reply was not ordered or required by the court. The motion should be
granted only if on the facts as so admitted and supplemented by any
facts of which the court takes judicial notice, the moving party is clearly
entitled to judgment."
Counterclaims
No third party actions in Florida court
'clic court was without jurisdiction to entertain a so-called crossaction against a surety where he was not a party to the original suit and
the action was not connected with a counterclaim against the original
plaintiff or a cross-claim against any co-party in the original action." The
Florida rules" °7 relating to this situation contain no provision similar to
the federal rule"' s which permits bringing in additional parties without
need for a counterclaim or cross-claim against the then cxisting parties
(third party practice).
Rule 1.13(8) 1954 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure . . . makes
provision for joining additional parties in connection with the
counterclaim (against a plaintiff) or on a crossclaim (against
103. Braz v. Professional Ins. Corp., 101 So.2d 594, 595 (Ma. App. 1958).

104. Nystrom v. Nystrom, 105 So.2d 605 (Fa. App. 1958); City of Miami v.
Miami Transit Co., 96 So.2d 799 (Fla. App. 1957). FLA. R. CiV. P. 1.1(c). "After

the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial any party
may move for judgment or decree on the pleadings." Rule 1 .11(d) "Motion for judgment
or decree . . . shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party,
unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof shall be deferred
until the trial."
105. Paradise Pools, Inc. v. Genauer, 104 So.2d 860 (Fla. App. 1958). The court
adopts the comment found in 2 MOORE PRACTICE., 2269 (2d ed. 1948) which comment
was addressed to Fim. R. Civ. P. 12(c) and 8(b) which correspond to Florida Rt.ules
of Civil Procedure 1.11(c) and 1.8(e) respectively.

106. Pan Am. Stir. Co. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 99 So.2d 726 (Fla. App. 1958).
107. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13(8).
108. FLr. R. Civ. P. 14. See also Florida Fucl Oil, Inc. v. Springs Villas, Inc.
95 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1957).
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a co-party in the case). The Florida rule is similar to Rule 13(h)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .

. .

. Federal Rule 14

permits bringing in additional parties without need for counterclaim or crossclaim against existing parties, which it designates
as 'Third Party Practice'. That rule would have permitted what
was done here. But the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure contained no provision equivalent to Federal Rule 14 for such Third
Party Practice. Therefore, the court was without jurisdiction in
the case then pending before it, to entertain the third party
proceeding which resulted in the judgment appealed from .... I'l
Dismissal of attempted third party action not res judicata. It was
error to enter an order of summary judgment in favor of defendant on the
ground of res judicata and to construe "such dismissal as being with
prejudice and an adjudication . . . pursuant to rulc 1.35(b). . . ." where
the prior action of the plaintiff against the defendant was dismissed
because the court was without jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's attempted
third party action against the defendant.' 0 9
Pending compulsory counterclaims allowed by amendment to answer
The original defendant in a civil action could not circumvent the rule
requiring compulsory counterclaims" 0 to be stated when the answer is
filed by a motion for an order amending the pleadings to include the
claim where the claim was not put in issue and tried by the express or
implied consent of the parties.' However, the court noted that had the
claim been put in issue and tried by the express or implied consent of
the parties although not pleaded, justice would have required the allowance
of the amendment irrespective of the rule regarding the pleading of
compulsory counterclaims."12
Amended and supplemental pleadings-allegata et probata
Allegata et probata need not coincide-necessity of express or implied consent
It is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit
an amendment of the pleadings to conform to the proof where evidence
has been introduced without objection as to facts not presented or
insufficiently presented by the pleadings."" The rule that the allegata et
109. Pan. Am. Sur. Co. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 99 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla. App. 1958).
109a. City of Boca Raton v. Sharp, 107 So.2d 271 (Fla. App. 1958).
110. F . R. Civ. P. 1.13(i) Compulsory counterclaim. 'The defendant, at the
time of the filing of his answer, shall state as a counterclaim, any claim, ...
which
he has against the plaintiff....
111. Fearing v. De Lugar Nuevo, 106 So.2d 873 (Fla. App. 1958).
112. Id. at 874. FILA. R. CM, P. 1.15(b). "Amendments to conform with the
evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings." See Edwards v. Young, 107 So.2d 244 (Fla. App. 1958) (lack of consent).
113. Fearing v. De Lugar Nuevo, 106 So.2d 873 (Fla. App. 1958). Amendments
are authorized and encouraged when in the discretion of the court justice so requires.
Dworkis v. Dworkis, 111 So.2d 70 (Fla. App. 1959). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(a)(e).

1959]

CIVIL PROCEDURE AND APPELLATE REVIEW

257

probata was required to coincide was abolished by the 1954 Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure.' If evidence is objected to at the trial on grounds that
it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to be amended. In the absence of such objection where the
cause is tried as if the issue had been raised, an amendment is not
imperative. If the proofs actually made present a meritorious claim the
failure to prove the cause stated in the complaint will not necessarily
defeat recovery by the plaintiff.' 5 But this exception to the general rule
of allegata et probata was not applicable where defendants in a personal
injury action could not tell until the conclusion of all of the plaintiff's
evidence that they were not proceeding on the basis of the acts of negligence alleged in their amended complaint. 11 The fact that the defendants
at the first opportunity moved for a directed verdict on the ground that
the plaintiffs had failed to prove the grounds of their amended complaint
indicated that they had not consented expressly or impliedly to a different
ground for the action being proven or attempted to be proved by the
plaintiffs.
Amendment may only raise issues supported by evidence
It is error to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint where he
has not presented sufficient evidence which would, prima facie, support
an affirmative finding on the issues suggested by the motion to amend." 7
Thus, where a proposed amendment of plaintiff's answer to defendants
counterclaim sought to interpose several affirmative defenses in the nature
of confession and avoidance, it was not error for the trial court after the
taking of evidence had been closed, to deny plaintiff's motion to amend
as there did not appear to be substantial competent evidence in the
record to support the issues sought to be raised by plaintiff's amendments. s
Amendability of insufficient complaint-existence of possible cause of action
The allegations of negligence contained in a complaint sounding in
tort were clearly insufficient and the trial court denied the plaintiff the
privilege to amend and dismissed the cause with prejudice. Held, reversed;
although insufficient, the allegations did not preclude the existence of a
cause of action. Leave to amend should be freely granted and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of following amendments unless and until it
114. FLA. R. Civ. P. .1(b).
115. Robbins v. Grace, 103 So.2d 658 (Fla. App. 1958). The federal rules are
similar in effect to Section 1.15(b). It has been held that the plaintiff was not bound
by his pleadings, but could offer his proof on the presentation that the merits of the
action would be subserved thereby. Newman v. Zinn, 164 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1947).
See also Shirley v. Shirley, 100 So.2d 450 (Fla. App. 1958).
116. Edwards v. Young, 107 So.2d 244 (Fla. App. 1958).
117. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc. v. Sommer, 111 So.2d 743 (Fla. App. 1959).
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.15(b).
118. Parker v. Parker, 109 So.2d 893 (Fla. App. 1959).
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appears that the privilege to amend will be abused. This is true even though
the court is of the opinion that the amendments would not result in the
statement of a cause of action, but this rule does not preclude a dismissal
where the complaint is clearly not amendable." 9
Amendments supersede original pleadings-imperfect dropping
of parties-correctproceeding
An original pleading is generally superseded by an amendment which
does not express an intention to save any portion of the original pleading.12 0
Thus an amended complaint addressed to only one of three defendants
named in the original complaint is considered an imperfect dropping of
the unnamed defendants as of the date of the amended complaint. Since
the action is deemed terminated, the only proper judgment that can be
entered as to the unnamed defendants is to drop them from the action
without prejudice to plaintiff's claim.' 2 ' In such a situation if the plaintiff's
claim against the defendants has not been considered on the merits, its
dismissal with prejudice wonld not be "on such terms as are just" and
would be error.' 2 There are two courses open in the trial court to a
plaintiff when it is not clear whether his amended complaint intends to
drop a defendant named in the original complaint, 23 If he did intend to
drop the defendant, he can complete the deletion by moving for an order
of the court "on such terms as are just." If such a "dropping" was not
intended, the proper action would be to place in the amended complaint
a rc-assertion of the proper allegations of the original complaint as to
the particular defendant so that the action can proceed to a dctc-nination
on the merits. If a severance of claims is desired, it can be effected by
1 4

XVhere neither of these procedures is followed, the filing of
the amended complaint will be considered an improper dropping of the
25
unnamed defendant or defendants.
1motion -

Amendment of complaint allowed after verdict
The trial court properly exercised its discretion after verdict was
rendered in permitting an amendment to a complaint in order to conform
119. Fouts v. Margules, 98 So.2d 394 (Fli. App. 1957).

FLA.

R. Civ. P. 1.15.

Richards v. West. 110 So.2d 698 (H-a. App. 1959). The advent of modern rules of
procedure has brought with it the policy of allowing litigants to amend pleadings freely
in order that causes may be tried on their mcrits. Granting leave to amend rests on

the sound discretion of the trial court. See also Wenck v. Insurance Agents Fin. Corp.,
99 So.2d 883 (la. App. 1958): Jacksonville Coach Co. v. Early, 78 So.2d 369, 371
(la. 1955); Golden v. Morris, 55 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1951).
120. Watkins v. Sims, 81 Fa. 780, 88 So. 764 (1921). See 41 Am. Jun. Pleading
§ 313 (1942).
121. Shannon v. McBride, 105 So.2d 16 (Fla. App. 1958).
122. Ibid, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.18,
123. Shannon v. McBride, 105 So.2d 16 (Fla. App. 1958).
124. Procedures suggested are aithorized by FI.A. R. Civ. P. 1.18.
125. Shannon v. McBride, 105 So.2d 16 (la. App, 1958).
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to the established evidence, which evidence although outside the issues
raised by the pleadings was not beyond the scope of the issues as established
by pre-trial discovery proceedings and stated in the pre-trial order which
1 20
was to govern the conduct of the trial.
Pre-trial Procedures: Orders-Sumrnmary Judgment
A pre-trial order controls the subsequent course of an action unless
it is modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.12' This rule serves
to expedite litigation by simplifying and narrowing the issues to be tried.
Thus, where a trial judge entered a pre-trial order over three weeks before
the trial that defendant was an independent contractor and there was no
motion to modify the pre-trial order, such order controlled the subsequent
128
course of the action.
A trial judge may enter summary judgment on his own motion at a
pre-trial conference, but such procedure should be employed with extreme
caution 120
Depositions and Discovery
Depositions
Depositions-generally. Depositions are not a part of the evidence
before a court unless made so pursuant to rules of evidence and rules of
court. A motion to strike depositions from the record and portions of brief
and appendix quoting from such depositions will be granted if the record
does not show that the depositions were introduced into evidence. If the
deposition is evidentiary in nature, it is admissible even though it contains
10
different or inconsistent prior statements.
Motion for deposition to perpetuate testimony pending appeal verification not necessary. The chancellor without exercising his discretion denied
defendant's motion for leave to take a deposition finding that the motion
itself was legally insufficient in that it was not verified.' 3' Held, the
motion was improperly denied on the ground that it was not verified. The
requirement for verification is contained in that portion of the rule providing
that depositions before the action may be had by petition.2 2 When the
depositions may be had pending an appeal the reference is to a motion
126. Atlantic Coastline RR. v. Bracewell, 110 So.2d 482 (Fla. App. 1959). FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.15(b). Amendments may be made at any time.
127. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.16.
128. Vaughn v. Smith, 96 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1957).
129. Best v. 17545 Collins Avenue, Inc., 98 So.2d 490, 492 (Fla. 1957). "As
we said in Hillsborough County v. Sutton, 1942, 150 Fla. 601, 8 So.2d 401, 402. . . . If
the conference (pre-trial)

progresses to the point of eliminating all questions of fact

then the court may give judgment according to law on the facts before him ..
"
130. Parker v. Parker, 109 So.2d 893 (Fla. App. 1959); Gidney Auto Sales V.
Cutchins, 97 So.2d 145 (Fla. App. 1957). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21; 10 FLAJUR. Depositions
§ 45 at 218 (1956).
131.Chaachou v. Chaachou, 102 So.2d 820 (Fla. App. 1958). Motion was made
pursuant to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.22(b),
132. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.22(a),

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIV

and there is no requirement for verification. I3 In the latter situation the
motion should be granted as a matter of course unless the court finds that
for some reason the preservation of the testimony would not be proper.
Statutory Note: Depositions

Under a 1959 act to be cited as the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act,
the testimony of a witness may be compelled in this state under process
13 4
issued in another state in the same manner as in local proceedings.
Discovery
Limits of insurance liability not discoverable. The rules permitting
discovery with respect to matters relevant to the subject matter involved
in a pending action is applicable only to matters admissible into evidence,
or calculated reasonably to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence
concerning a pending action. Following this reasoning the Supreme Court
of Florida held in a case of first impression that discovery cannot be had
the liability insurance of the defendant in an automobile
of the limits of
35
case.'
accident
Work product not available. In the absence of a showing that the
information sought is essential for justice or that its absence would unduly
prejudice the requesting party or some other good cause, the work product
of a party is not subject to discovery. The intent of the rule is to permit
discovery of facts as opposed to law or opinion. a
A municipality can have a work product the same as any other litigant. 7
Discovery may not be prenzature-must be established. It was error
to order discovery by requiring the production of the records of insurance
policies in a suit for the dissolution of an insurance agency partnership
prior to the determination upon the merits of the issues upon which
plaintiff's right to such information would depend. The information sought
was not relevant or necessary in the trial on that part of the case involving
plaintiff's status and his right to a dissolution or an accounting and such
discovery is "objectionable as premature."'3 s
FLA. It. CI,. 1'. 1.22(b). See MooRE, I'IS)ERAI. PRACTICE 1942 (2d ed. 1950).
Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-250.
Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21(b).
Boucher v. Pure Oil Co., 101 So.2d 408 (Ma. App. 1957). Defendants sought
to discover what plaintiff or her attorney knew of any statute, ordinance or regulation
involving the subject matter of the pending litigation. This decision follows the federal
decisions in interpreting FED. R. Civ. P. 26 from which the Florida Rule was copied
in toto. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.21(b), 1.27.
137. City of Sarasota v. Colbert, 97 So.2d 872 (Fla. App. 1957). Plaintiff here
sought to ascertain whether defendant had caused an investigation to be made of his
potential claim against city and if there wcrc written reports of the investigation to
obtain copies of such reports. The Court in holding such reports to be a work product
refused to draw a line as to whether the report contained information obtained prior
to or after notice of the claim had been filed. See also City of Lake Worth v. First
Nat'] Bank in Palm Beach, 93 So.2d 49 (Fla. App. 1957).
138. Cooper v. Fulton, 107 So.2d 798 (Fla. App. 1959). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.28,
1.24(d), Rule 1.28 provides for the production of furnishing of documents forto inspection
all other
"upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice

133.
134.
135.
1 6.
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There are times when a suit is triable in separate parts, one
affecting the right or liability and the other affecting the measure
of recovery. In suits of that order a discovery as to damages
will commonly be postponed until the right or liability has been
established or declared. As a general thing it will be useless to
decree it any earlier and may even be oppressive. Thus a suit
to establish a partnership or to restrain the infringement of a
patent culminates, if successful, in an interlocutory decree which

will be followed by an accounting and discovery of documents.
the
In these and like cases the
39 accounts will not be probed until
right has been adjudged.
In suits for an accounting the plaintiff cannot, by interrogatories obtain
discovery as to
the accounting until his right to an accounting has been
40
adjudicated.1
Requiring Production of Docuinents: Good Cause Necessary Under

Any Procedure. Upon motion of any party showing good cause, the court
may order any other party to produce documents for discovery purposes. 41
This same showing of good cause is necessary before another party will
be required to produce documents under the subpoena duces tecum procedure
142
allowed by the rules.

Physical and Mental Examination of Parties
Order Lies Within Discretion of Court: Accessibility of Hospital Records

The granting of an order for the physical examination of an injured
plaintiff is within the discretion of the trial court.143 There is no abuse
parties, and subject to provisions of Rule 1.24(b)." Rule 1.24 relates to "orders for
protection of parties and deponents," tinder which "upon motion seasonably made"
the court may dispense with, limit or control the discovery process as the necessity
and justice of the parties and the matter involved may require.
139. Id, at 800, The court cites with approval this statement by Justice Cardozo
found in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petro. Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 693, 694 (1933).
140. Cladman v. Hallam, 104 So.2d 46 (Fla. App. 1958).
141. F.. R. Civ. P. 1.28.
142. Brooker v. Smith, 108 So2d 790 (Fla. App. 1959). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.34(d).
See North v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 10 F.R.D. 38, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1950). "The normal
method of obtaining inspection of a document is under Rule 34. Rules 26 and 45 afford a
practical, and under proper conditions permissible short-cut. This, however, is merely
another, and often more convenient, method of accomplishing the same end and, regardless
of the fact that those two rules do not contain the express limitation of Rule 34, they
are, I think, necessarily subject to it. I cannot believe that the Supreme Court, having
required good cause for production under Rule 34, intended that a party could become
entitled, as a matter of right, to the production of the original of a document, without
any showing of the propriety or necessity of such production, merely by adopting an
alternative method. If a showing of good cause was considered a proper and reasonable
limitation upon the right to a preview of the opposing party's papers and documents,
it must have been intended to obtain, whatever process may be resorted to."
143. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.29(a). Order forExamination. In any action in which the
mental or physical condition of a party or injury to property is in controversy, the court
in which the action is pending may in advance of the trial order such party to submit
to a physical or mental examination. . . . (Emphasis added.) Pepsi.Cola Bottling Co.
of Miami v, Modesta, 107 So.2d 43 (Fla. App. 1958); Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. v.
Grady, 99 So.2d 871 (Fla. App. 1958); Martin v. 'lindell, 98 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959 (1958).
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of discretion by the refusal of the court to appoint more than one type
of physician or in denying a compulsory examination of the plaintiff where
he was treated for injuries at a hospital partly supported by the defendant
who had access to the hospital records and could have obtained the desired
information.144

Appointment of Only One Physician-Not Abuse of Discretion
The denial of a mental examination of plaintiff whose alleged injuries
are both mental and physical is not an abuse of discretion when the court
alternatively orders only a physical examination of the plaintiff. 45
Requests for Admissions-Improper Answer
An improper answer to a request for admissions is deemed an admittance of the matter requested? 46
Voluntary and Involuntary Dismissal of Actions
Two Dismissal Rule
The Rule in General. Rule 1.35(a)(1)

of the Florida Rules of

Civil Procedure authorizes the voluntary dismissal by plaintiff of his suit
"at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment or decree, whichever first occurs . . .
Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation the
dismissal shall be without prejudice except that a dismissal shall operate
as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in any court of the State an action based on or including
the same clain."
Application of the rule: Distinction Between Action and Claim. In
Cnmp v. Cold House Restaurants,'47 plaintiff sought an accounting,
appointment of a receiver, damages and the dissolution of the defendant
corporation on the ground of fraud and mismanagement. Defendants'
motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that the
voluntary dismissals of two prior suits by plaintiff seeking to enjoin
activities of defendant directors barred this suit under the two dismissal
144. Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. v. Grady, 99 So.2d 871 (Fla. App. 1958).
145. Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1957), cert, denied, 355 U.S. 959 (1958).
146. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.30. Wider v. Carraway, 101 So.2d 13 (Fla. App. 1958).
Sec the following federal cases: llcivering v.Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Woods v.
Robh, 171 F.2d 59, 541 (5th Cir. 1938)I United States v. Kcellert, 101 F. Supp. 698,
699 (1). Conn. 1951); Beaslcy v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 518, 527 (E.1).S.C. 1948).
"The usual statute or rule on admissions requires affirmative action to constitute the
admission, but under this rule affirmative action is required to avoid the admission.

There must be, therefore, a sworn statement specifically denying the fact which the
other party requests should be admitted or the admission will be deemed to have
taken place. .. "
147. 96 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1957).
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rile. Plaintiff on appeal contended that the rule was not applicable in
the instant case because the prior suits were not based on and did not
include the same claim as now asserted and the defendants had filed an
answer and motion for surnnarv judgment in the first suit prior to the
voluntary dismissal of that suit. Held, reversed. The supreme court, in
considering the appellant's first contention was guided by the federal
court decisions interpreting their Rule 41 which is almost identical with
our Rule 1.35. "Rule 41(a)(1) provides for the voluntary dismissal of an
'action' not a 'claini'; the word 'action' as used in the Rules denotes the
entire controversy, whereas 'claim' refers to what has traditionally been
termed 'cause of action.' ,,48
They then concluded that the first suit which sought an injunction
was not on the same cause of action as the subsequent suits alleging fraud
and misnmanagenient and seeking an accounting in that the facts necessary
to the maintenance of the different suits were not essentially the same.
The court also agreed with the plaintiff on his second point of appeal.
'The plaintiff's voluntary dismissal on the first suit was taken after an
answer had been filed by defendants and thus they could not invoke the
"two dismissal" rule because under it, the dismissal relied upon must
precede the answer or a motion for summary judgment, which ever occurs
first. "" Therefore, under the applicable rule, the dismissal in the first
suit could be given proper legal effect only "upon order of court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper."' 50 It should be
noted that the two dismissal rule being in derogation of a previously
existing right is strictly construed and that a voluntary dismissal obtained
by an order of court will not be counted against a plaintiff under the two
dismissal rule. Thus in effect, a plaintiff is entitled to one free dismissal of
his suit before a subsequent voluntary dismissal, taken under the proper
section of the nile,15' will operate against him as an adjudication on the
merits.
Effect of Involuntary Dismissal Caused by Sunmary Judgment

\Vhen an involuntary dismissal occurs under the circumstances outlined
in section 1.35(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the entire
controversy is dismissed and all the parties are carried out of court as
distinguished from a dismissal of individual parties, or of a claim against
one or more, but less than all of the defendants. Therefore, such an
involuntary dismissal as to one of several joint tortfeasors dismisses all
of the parties, but a dismissal entered pursuant to a motion by a joint
148. Id, at 218. The Florida court citing with approval from Harvey Aluminum,

Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1953).
149, FLA. P.. CIv, P, 1.35(a)(1), Sec also Robertshaw-rFulton
Noua Elec. Corp., 10 F.R.D. 32, 35 (D.C. Md. 1950).
150. FLA., I. CIv. P. 1.35(a) (2).
151. FI,A. It. Civ. P. 1,35(a) (1).

Controls Co. v.
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tortfeasor for summary judgment does not have such an effect on joint
12
defendants.
Evidence-Adverse witnesses
"An 'adverse party' is not necessarily a party to the suit who is aligned
in the pleadings in opposition to the party calling him .a
Correction of judgments, decrees and proceedings-finality
Final decrees cannot be changed, added to or taken from except that
the court may correct clerical mistakes or mistakes arising from oversight
or omissions at any time. The expiration of the period
within which to
4
filc a petition for rehearing renders a decree final .1
Transfers of actions erroneously begun
If at any time a complaint fails to state a cause of action within the
cognizance of the side of the court chosen it is subject to dismissal.
However, if it appears that the complaint would be sufficient on the

opposite side of the court, the dismissal is without prejudice and the
cause "shall be transferred to the proper side and proceeded with without
interruption."1 55
For example, an equity suit was brought to establish a statutory or
equitable lien and in the alternative a decree for money damages.15 .6 The
defendant filed an answer incorporating a motion to dismiss, following
which he moved for a judgment or decree on the pleading. At the hearing
the defendant's motions were granted and the chancellor dismissed the
cause with prejudice. On appeal the reviewing court held that the trial
court did not commit error in refusing to retain jurisdiction in the equity
suit for the trial of the claim for a money judgment because the evidence
failed to show any basis for a statutory or equitable lien; but the legal
152. Osborne v. Shell Oil Co., 104 So.2d 670 (FIa. App. 1958). The involuntary
dismissal must be under the circumstances outlined in lLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35(b), See
also State ex rel. Croker v. Chillingworth, 106 FIa. 323, 143 So. 346 (1932); Whitaker v.
Wright, 100 Fla. 282, 129 So. 889 (1930). A judgment may be properly entered as to
one or more of several joint defendants in an action for conversion, Home Insurance
Co. v. Handley, 120 Fla. 226, 162 So. 516 (1935); Shaw v. Saunders, 79 Fla. 846,
85 So. 162 (1920).
153. Rubin v. Kapell, 105 So.2d 28, 32 (Fla. App. 1958). See Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Kador, 225 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Uarte, 175 F.2d 110
(9th Cir. 1949). A suit was brought under Louisiana's direct action statute, the trial
judge permitted plaintiff, over objection to call as adverse party the defendant's assured
who was not even a nominal party to the proceeding. His ruling was affirmed on appeal.
154. Batteiger v. Batteiger, 109 So.2d 602 (Fla. App. 1959); Cortina v. Cortina,
98 Sn.2d 334 (Fla. 1957). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38.
155. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.39(b). Brown v. Fine, 102 So.2d 830 (Fla. App. 1958);
Concrete Block & Wall Co. v. Knap, 102 So.2d 742 (Fla. App. 1958); Braz v.
Professional Ins. Corp., 101 So.2d 594 (Fla. App. 1958); Commercial Eng'r &
Contracting Co. v. Beals, 99 So.2d 882 (Ha. App. 1958); Staiger v. Greb, 97 So.2d
494 (Fla. App. 1957); Miller v. Rolfe, 97 So.2d 132 (Fla. App. 1957).
156. Commercial Eng'r & Contracting Co. v. Beals, 99 So.2d 882 (Fla. App. 1958).
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claim should not have been dismissed but should have been transferred
to the law side of the court. 15 7
PROCEDURE: ACTIONS AT

LAW ONLY

Motions for new trial and for directed verdict
Motion for new trial
Motion for new trial as to a part of the issues. In an action where
there has been a trial by jury, a new trial may be granted as to all or a
part of the issues.""' An order granting a new trial as to the issue of
damages in an automobile and train collision case was proper where it
appeared that the jury applied to the plaintiff passenger the statutory
comparative negligence doctrine which is applicable only in actions for
the driver's injuries.'5 9
New trial on courts initiative: grounds necessary for review. Within
tendays after verdict the trial court of its own initiative may order a
new trial. For the purposes of review all orders granting a new trial must
specify the specific grounds upon which the new trial is awarded.'8
Motion for directed verdict
General considerations: withdrawal of case from the jury. The considerations and legal principles involved in a reserved motion for a directed
verdict and those involved in granting a new trial are not by any means
the same. A verdict should never be directed unless under no view that
the jury might lawfully take of the evidence could a verdict for the
adverse party be sustained. The movant admits not only the facts shown
by the evidence but every reasonable inference favorable to his opponent
that might be fairly and reasonably arrived at from the evidence. The law
requires that where there is substantial evidence tending to prove the issue
or issues that it be submitted to the jury. The court is without authority,
under such circumstances, to take the case from the jury and pass upon it as a
question of law. If the jury fails to agree on a decision but there was
substantial evidence on which the jury could have justifiably reached a
decision, the court should deny the parties' motions for a directed verdict
and instead should submit the case to another jury.161
157. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.39(a) provides for the transfer of actions erroneously begun.
158. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Teuton, 110 So.2d 485 (Fla. App. 1959);
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Bracewell, 10 So.2d 482 (Fla. App. 1959). FLA. R. Civ.
P. 2.8(a).
159. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Teuton,

110 So.2d 485

(Fla. App. 1959).

R. Cxv. P. 2.8(a).
160. Baxley v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.. 110 So.2d 487 (Fla. App. 1959);

FLA.

Means v. Douglas, 110 So.2d 88 (Fla. App. 1959). FA. R. Civ. P. 2.6(d), 2.8(c);

FLA. STAT. §. 59.04, 59.07 (1957).
161. FLA. R. CIv. P. 2,7(b): Cutchins v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 101 So.2d 857

(Fla. 1958). See Hilkzneyer v. Latin Am. Air Cargo Expediters, Inc., 94 So.2d 821
(Fla. 1957).
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Directed Verdict-CircumstantialEvidence
In Florida a case should go to the jury only if "the circumstantial
evidence amounts to a preponderance of all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from the circumstances and evidence to the end that
evidence is not reasonably susceptible of two equally reasonable inferences,"
A verdict should be directed when due to the nature of the evidence
a jury's verdict would be based only upon guess or conjecture. 02
Offering evidence after denial of motion-rule not applicable in

equity suits. A party who moves for a directed verdict is permitted to
offer evidence if his motion is denied. This rule is applicable only to jury
trials in actions at law and not to probatc proceedings, which are traditionally governed by equity practice. " ' In equity the complaint cannot
be dismissed at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence unless the defendant
elects to submit the cause for entry of a final decree on only the plaintiff's
64
proof.
Effect of failing to prove complaint by preponderance of the evidence.

A directed verdict in favor of defendant is not necessarily correct merely
because the plaintiff failed to prove the allegations of his complaint by
a preponderalice of the evidence. 5
Procedural aspects of various types of possible motions for directed
verdict-post trial motion-pre-requisite of post evidence motion. In a

case of first impression, the Florida court held that in the absence of a
reserved ruling by the court until after the close of all the evidence or until
after the verdict on defendant's motion for directed verdict made at close
of plaintiff's evidence "only those litigants who have moved for a directed
verdict at the close of all the evidence are in a position to renew their
motion after verdict."'0 4 One of the sound reasons for this rule is that if a

party does not move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence
he must think that the evidence makes a case for the jury and lie should
not be permitted to impute error to the court for sharing that view The
Supreme Court of Florida in quashing a writ of certiorari as to the
instant case carefully reviewed the following facts of the case and stated
the theoretically correct law applicable in the present situation in an
effort to clarify a complex procedural area. 0 7
162. McNamara v. American Motor Corp., 247 F.2d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 1957);

Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hamilton, 143 F.2d 726, 732 (5th Cir. 1944).
163. In re Mollard's Estate, 98 So.2d 814 (Fla. App. 1957), opinion clarified
and re-hearing denied, 101 So.2d 880 (Fla. App. 1957).
164. Ibid. See 30 C.J.S. Equity § 579 at 972 (1942). Pearce V. Tharpe, 118 Miss.
107, 79 So. 69 (1918).
165. Slavin v. Kay. 108 So.ld 462 (F1.
1958). FLA. SrAT. § 54.17 (1957).
166. 6551 Collins Avenue Corp. v. Millen, 97 So.2d 490, 492 (FIa. App. 1957),
cert. denied, 104 So.2d 337 (Fa, 1958).
167. Ibid. F.A R. Civ. P. 2.7(a)(b). FI.A. SrAT. § 54.17 (1957).
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The facts of the instant case. Defendant moved for a directed verdict
at close of plaintiff's case and the trial court reserved ruling thereon.
At the close of all the evidence, he failed to renew his motion for directed
verdict, but after an unfavorable verdict, he filed a post-trial renewal of
his motion for directed verdict made at the close of plaintiff's case. He
did not include a motion for a new trial.
The various conclusions reached by the supreme court. It is clear that
a defendant is in no position to make a post-verdict motion for judgment
in accordance with his motion for directed verdict on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence made at the close of plaintiff's case which
was denied and not renewed at the close of all the evidence. The denial
of such an unauthorized post-verdict motion cannot be assigned as error
on appeal.1S The Supreme Court of Florida held that a trial judge may
on the basis of statutory authority reserve his ruling on a motion for
directed verdict made by defendant at close of plaintiff's case although
not expressly authorized or provided for in the rules.'0 9 If such a reservation
is made by the trial judge, lie may then at the close of all the evidence
and upon his own motion direct a verdict for the defendant. A ruling
on such motion may also be reserved until after the verdict. Upon a clear
reservation of the decision of such a motion until after verdict, it is
unnecessary for the defendant to renew his motion at the close of all the
evidence in order to avoid a waiver of his prior motion. In such a situation
the trial court could properly rule upon the defendant's motion after a
mistrial or after a verdict for the plaintiff. In these situations the trial
judge's ruling would obviously be based on a consideration of all the
evidence and therefore the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
could properly be considered by the appellate court on an assignment of
error directed to the trial judge's ruling thereon. It should be noted that
when a defendant moves for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's
case, the burden is upon him to make sure that the legal question presented
is preserved for consideration by the trial judge after verdict and by the
appellate court on appeal. If such motion is denied, it must be renewed
at the close of all the evidence. If a ruling is reserved on such motion
the movant should secure an affirmative statement as to the reasons for
the deferral; thus, in the instant case where the record did not affirmatively
show that the trial judge reserved his ruling on defendant's motion for
the purpose of considering it in the light of all the evidence either at
close of all the evidence or after verdict, or that lie did in fact consider
all the evidence before making his ruling the defendant could not raise

168. 6551 Collins Avenue Coil). v. Millen, 104 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1958), Accord.
Boston Ins, Co, v. Fisher, 185 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1951); United States v. 363 Cases,
143 F. Supp,. 219 (\V.D. Ark. 1956), rev'd, 247 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1957).
169. FLA. STAT. § 54.17 (1957); FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.7(a).
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on appeal any question concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to
70
support the verdict.'
Instructions to the Jury
Request for desired charge necessary
When a judge in charging the jury specifically inquires of counsel
as to the adequacy of the charge as made and no request for additional
instructions is made and no objections are entered, the appellant cannot
raise objections to the charge for the first time on appeal.'
Charge to the jury-last clear chance doctrine
The judge's charge to the jury is not a stereotyped one to be given
in all actions involving the negligent operation of automobiles. There does
not appear to be any definite view that can be stated with reference to
factual situations in which the charge should or should not be given.
Each case must be judged on its own merits and the trial judge must
to interfere with the
make the decision. The reviewing court is hesitant
72
decisions of a judge as to his charges to the jury.1
Entering of Default Judgment
Judgment-Default
The trial judge, where authorized, may enter a default "to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." He also
has it within his discretion to set aside the default."S
Garnishment: Traverse of garnishee's answer-denying indebtedness
to judgment debtor
Garnishment will not lie where the amount of indebtedness owing
by garnishee to judment debtor is contingent or uncertain. The failure to
traverse a garnishee's answer which denies any indebtedness to the judgment
debtor will generally discharge the garnishee from liability. But if the
answer of a garnishee indicates that he had or should have had some
assets of the judgment debtor in his hands he cannot be discharged
170. 651 Collins Avenue Corp. v. Millen, 104 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1958). See
Sattler v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 18 F. R. D. 271 (W.D. La 1955); Stevens v.
G. L. Rugo & Sons, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 61 (D. Mass. 1952), rev'd on other grounds,
209 F.2d 135 (1st Cir. 1954).
171. Board of Commrs of State Institutions v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co.,
108 So.Zd 74 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.6(a)(b).
172. Falness v. Kaplan, 101 So.2d 377 (Fla. App. 1958) (the court did not err
in rejecting charge); FLA. STAT. § 54.17 (1957). The court did not err in refusing
the charge, Ippolito v. Brenner, 72 So.2d 802 (Fa. 1954). The court did not err in
refusing the charge, Yousko v. Vogt, 63 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1953). The court erred in
rejecting the charge, Miller v. lingar, 149 Fla. 79, 5 So.2d 598 (1941).
173. FrA. R. Civ. P. 2.9(a). Pan American World Airways Inc. v. Gregory,
96 So.Zd 669 (Fla. App. 1957); Coggin v. Barfield, 150 Fla. 551, 8 So.2d 9 (1942).
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from liability until a proper disposition is made, notwithstanding the
fact that the answer also denied any indebtedness to the judgment debtor
and that this was not traversed by the judgment creditor as required by
17 4
the rules.
PROCEDURE: SunTs AT EQUITY ONLY

Interventions
Intervention Raising New Issues Allowed in Order to Avoid Irreparable
Damage
Under special circumstances, such as insolvency and non-residence, an
intervention which raises a new issue will be allowed in order to avoid
irreparable injury.' 75 Such special circumstances are not present where the
apparent purpose of intervention in a cause is to stop the progress of the
case until the determination of an appeal to the supreme court taken
by the intervenor in another case. The trial court does not abuse its discretion
by denying such intervention even though the decision of the supreme court
could be determinative of the equities of the case in which intervention
7 6
is sought.
Interest in Pending Litigation Gives Right to Intervene
In a suit wherein certain parties were contesting their respective rights
in and to certain realty, it was error to deny the intervention of a party
who had an interest in the litigation by virtue of a contract of purchase
and sale executed in his favor by one of the litigating parties in view
of the court's proposed approval of a sale of the property by a receiver.
The determination of the rights of the original litigants would have
a direct effect on the contractual rights of the party seeking intervention
and he should be allowed to assert these rights to avoid irreparable injury
7
and multiplicity of suits.
Time for Taking Testimony-When Cause is Deemed at Issue
Expiration of Time for Taking Testimony Necessary to set Cause
Down for Hearing on Bill and Answer
The time for taking testimony may be fixed and limited by order
of the court when the cause is at issue and it is not set for trial, but where
that is not done, a two-month limit for taking testimony is imposed. 78 After
174. Chaachou v. Kulhanjian, 104 So.2d 23 (Fla. 1958); FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.12;
§ 77.06 (1957).

FLA. STAT.

175. Ibid. Switow v. S1er, 136 Fla. 284, 186 So. 519 (1939).
176. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Morales, 101 So.2d 900 (Fla. App. 1958).
177. Morkelhouse Corp. v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1957); Morgareidge v. Howey,

75 Fla. 234, 78 So. 14, 15 (1918). FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.4.
178. Fx. R. Civ. P. 3.13.
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the time for taking testimony has elapsed, a party may seek a final hearing
and decree on the merits by moving to set the cause down for final
hearing on bill and answer."" A party who so moves after the expiration
of the time for taking testimony obtains a valuable procedural advantage
which should not be set aside except upon clear grounds of equity and
right. This motion should be distinguished from the cases where the
motion is for a decree on the pleadings which is a pre-trial step."'
The action of the trial court in reference to the fixing of the time
for taking testimony and on a motion for decree upon bill and answer
is discretionary, but the time for taking testimony should not be extended
beyond that allowed by the rules, unless clear and ample reason is
submitted.""
The equity rule limiting time for taking testimony in chancery causes
8 2
is applicable in an action for a declaratory decree.'
Effect of Reservation of Motion to Dismiss on Cause Being at Issue
In an equitable action, the cause is deemed at issue at the expiration
of twenty days from the service of the answer or from the service of the
reply if a counterclaim has been filed. However, if a motion permitted
by the rules is served within such twenty-day period, the cause shall not
be considered at issue until the court rules on the motion.) 8 ' However, a
reservation until trial of a ruling on a motion to dismiss or the pendency
of a motion for leave to amend does not prevent a cause from being at
issue and in cffect suspend the time for taking testimony, because:
179. City of Miami v. Miami Transit Co., 96 So.2d 799 (Fla. App. 1957). See
Strong v. Clay, 54 So.2d 193, 195 (1951). In discussing Equity Rule 46 which is now
FLA. It. Civ. P. 3.13, the court said: "under Equity Rule 46, where a cause has not
been set for trial before the court, and the court has not entered an order fixing the
time within which the testimony of the parties shall bc taken, a period of two months

from the time the cause is at issue, and no longer, is all the time allowed for the
taking of testimony. When that period has expired, either party has the right, under
Equity Rule 416, to set the cause down for final hearing on the pleadings and thus
bring the cause to conclusion. . . . At such a hearing all the proper allegations of the
bill not sufficiently denied by the answer are to be taken as true and all allegations

in the answer of new or affirmative matter are to be deemed denied. Moreover, where
issues are made by denials in the answer, the decision at the hearing must be against
the party who has the burden of proof according to the rules of evidence.

(Emphasis added.) See also Muller v. Maxcy, 74 So.2d 879, 881 (Fla. 1954).
180. Nystrom v. Nystrom,

Miami Transit Co., 96
181. Glassman v.
Glassman v. Deauville
court found an abuse

105 So.2d 605 (Fla. App. 1958).

City of

Iiaumi v.

So.2d 799 (Fla. App. 1957). FIA. R. CIv. P. 1.11(c).
Deauville Enterprises, Inc., 101 So.2d 432 Fla. App. 1958);
Enterprises, Inc., 99 So.2d 641 (Fla. App. 1958). The reviewing
of discretion in the lower court's denial of the appellant's third

motion for hearing on bill and answer where the plaintiff had not moved in any of
the three instances when time was extended until after the expiration of the time

and after the defendant had moved for a decree and also he did not know why, or a
sufficient reason why, testimony had not been taken. For other cases discussing these

rules and their interrelationship, see Nystrom v. Nystrom, 105 So.2d 605 (Fla. App.
1958); Tropicaire Eng'r Serv. Corp. v. Chrysler Airtemp Sales Corp., 97 So.2d 149
(Fla. App. 1957); City of Miami v. Miami Transit Co., 96 So.2d 799 (Fla. App.

1957); Muller v. Maxcy, 74 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1954). See also FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.8,
3.13, 1.11(e)(d).
182. City of Miami v. Miami Transit Co., sura note 181.
183. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.8, 3.13, 1.11(b).
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[It] is clear that the provision in rule 3.8 to the effect that a
suit will not be deemed at issue until a pending motion to dismiss
is ruled upon by the court, has reference to instances where answer
has not been served and the ruling ou the motion is to precede

the requirement to answer. But that provision does not operate
where the court avails itself of the procedure furnished by
rule 1.11(d) of postponing ruling on the motion to dismiss

until the final hearing or trial. This is so because it is the practice

where ruling is reserved until trial on a motion to dismiss for
the court to fix the time for answer and to require answer to be
served and filed. When answer is served or in the case of a
counterclaim where a reply thereto is served then after a further
lapse of twenty days the equity suit becomes at issue, by force
of an express provision of rule 3.8. Then rule 3.13 operates,
limiting the time for taking testimony. 1 4
Thus, a party can only benefit from the rule when issues have been
created by a complaint and answer. A cause is not deemed at issue while

there is an undisposed of motion for a decree pro confesso. 8 5
Default-Setting Aside Decree Pro Confesso

A chancellor upon stipulation of the parties may set aside a decree
pro confesso and permit the filing of defensive pleadings. 86
Trials and Evidence-Masters
Trial Judge Not Required to Make Findings of Fact
The trial judge in an equity suit or a 'non-jur , law action is not
required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required of
federal judges. However, the inclusion of such findings in a decree aids
18 7
both the attorneys and the reviewing court.
Referral of Case to a Alaster: When Consent of Parties Needed
A chancery case may be
special master for the taking
consent or over the objection
the privilege of presenting his

referred in its entirety to an examiner or
of testimony, but not in the absence of
of one of the parties who elects to have
cause to the chancellor. Particular aspects

184. Tropicaire Eng'r Serv. Corp. v. Chrysler Airtemp Sales Corp., 97 So.2d
151 (Fla. App. 1957); Nystrom v. Nystrom. 105 So.2d 605 (Ha. App. 1958).
185. Cellucci v. King-Universal Corp., 106 So.2d 629 (Fla. App. 1958).
Tropicaire Eng'r Serv. Corp. v. Chrysler Airtemp Sales Corp., 97 So.2d 149
App. 1957).
186. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 102 So.2d 729 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA. R. Civ. P.
187. Ibid. Dworkis v. Dworkis, IlI So.2d 70 (Fla. App. 1959). See Fro. R.
P. 52.

149,
Cf.
(Fla.
3.10.
Civ.
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of a case may be referred to an examiner or master regardless of objection

or want of agrecmcnt between the parties. 88
Judgment Cannot Be Based on Personal Observations of Chancellor
A chancellor's findings based upon personal observation not consented
to by one of the parties cannot be the basis for a judgment and is reversible
error unless there is other sufficient evidence of record to support the
judgment.189

Compensation of Masters
The fees of a master in chancery proceedings are set out by statute
and they may now be awarded additional compensation in the discretion
of the court for extraordinary services "including time consumed in legal
research required in preparing and summarizing his findings of fact and
law." The supreme court did not consider a master's fee of $1750
excessive where he had spent in excess of eleven full clays in preparing
his report which showed on its face that "extraordinary services" were
required to produce it.101
Rehearings in Trial Court-Grantingof Timely Petition
The Petition in General: Granted in Discretion of Court
A timely petition in equity for a rehearing is not an appeal but a
part and continuation of the suit. An equity decree is not final and
absolute while a timely and appropriate petition for rehearing is pending
a
s The granting or
or the time for filing the petition has not elapsed1O
188. Powell v. Weger, 97 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1957). See the well.written dissent at
620. The effect of the Slhtcoff case is that in the face of opposition of one of the
parties the special master cannot be authorized to make findings and conclusions of
law together with recommendations as to an entire case without the consent of the
parties. But there is nothing in the case limiting the power of the chancellor in the
matter of appointing an examiner or special master just to take the testimony of the
parties. See Slateoff v. Dezen, 74 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1954) and Stewart v. Mack,
86 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1956). See FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.12, 3.14. The majority opinion
is consistent with the construction given FED. R. Civ. P. 53 which is similar to our
rule and which provides that reference to a master shall be the exception and not the
rule; 19 Arz.Jun. Equity § 371 at 255 (1939).
189. Hammond v. Carlyon, 96 So.2d 219 (Hla. 1957). See Annot., Judges Findings on
Personal Observation, 97 A.L.R. 335 (1935). FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.12.
190. Anderson v. City of Miami, 99 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1958). FLA. STAT. §§ 62.07,
62.071 (1957).
190a. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.16. No rehearing shall be granted unless the petition is
served within 10 days after the reading of the decrees. Cocalis v. Cocalis, 103 So.2d
230 (Fla. App. 1958). Cf. Kent v. Marvin, 59 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1952) (motion for
new trial in law action). Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1957). After
expiration of the ten-day period within which to file petition for rehearing a divorce
decree providing support for children of parties is just as final as any other decree as
to all conditions and circumstances that existed as of the date of the decree; and
chancellor cannot modify support decree or any other decree unless issue of modification
is presented to him in appropriate proceeding and each party is given an opportunity
to be heard on such issue. See also Alford v. Nunez, 104 So.2d 677 (Fla. App. 1958).
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denial of a timely petition for rehearing is within the sound discretion
of the court.W1
Who Should Act Upon the Petition
A petition for rehearing should be acted upon by the chancellor who
entered the prior decree. If it is necessary to utilize another chancellor,
he is without authority to reverse his predecessor if the petition is merely a
re-argument of matters previously considered, but if it presents points
which were clearly overlooked or were not considered which resulted in
an inequitable or erroneous decree, the successor chancellor is within his
authority to act on the merits of the petition.' 2
Process in Behalf of and Against Persons Not Parties-SupportDecrees
A maternal aunt who has been given custody of children of divorced
parents is a proper party to enforce against the husband the provisions
for the child's support contained in the divorce decree.193
SUMMARY AND DECLARATORY JUD MENTS

Summary Judgments and Decrees'130
General Principles
When motion should be granted. A summary judgment or decree
should only be granted when the pleadings, depositions or admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment
or decree as a matter of law.'9 4
191. Cocalis v. Cocalis, 103 So.2d 230 (Fla. App. 1958); Epperson v. Epperson,
101 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1958); Croff G.M.C. Tnicks, Inc. v. Driggers, 101 So.2d 58
(Fla. App. 1958); Burnup v. Bagley, 100 So.2d 622 (1958).
192. Epperson v. Epperson, 101 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1958).
193. Dkves v. Dykes, 104 So.2d 598 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.18.
193a. For an analysis of recent Florida cases involving summary judgment see
Comment. 13 U. NlIL.Ni L. REv. 457 (1959).
194. FLA. R. Ctv. P. 1.36(c). Humphreys v. Jarrell, 104 So.2d 404 (Fa. App.
1958); Williams v. Levine, 103 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1958); Rood Company, Inc. v.
Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 102 So2d 139 (Fla. 1958); Dieas %,.
Associates Loan Co., 99 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1957); Farrey v. Bettendorf. 96 So.2d 889
(Fla. 1957); Pritchard v. Peppercorn & Peppercorn, Inc., 96 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1957);
Parker v. Brice, 96 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1957); Brooker v. Smith, 108 So.2d 790 (Fla. App.
1959); Palov v. Florida Power & Light Co., 107 So.2d 780 (Fla. App. 1958); Rawls v.
Ziegler, 107 So.2d 601 (Fla. App. 1958); Moore v. O'Connor. 106 So.2d 606 (Fla. App.
1958); Seaview Awning Shutters of Miami, Inc. v. E. M. Eisfield, Inc., 106 So.2d 597
(Fla. App. 1958); Buck v. Hardy, 106 So.2d 428 (Fla. App. 1958); Osborne v.
Shell Oil Co., 104 So.2d 670 (Fla. App. 1958); Andrews v. Coatz, 104 So.2d 653
(Fla. App. 1958); Owens v. McKenzie, 103 So.2d 677 (Fla. App. 1958); Kelly v.
Kaufman, 101 So.2d 909 (Fla. App. 1958); Patty v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc.,
101 So.2d 881 (Fla. App. 1958); Cagan v. Eisenstadt, 98 So.2d 370 (Fla. App. 1957);
Bums v. Florida Power & Light Co., 98 So.2d 96 (Fla. App. 1957); Dameron v.
Mittuch, 96 So.2d 826 (Fla. App. 1957); Biltmore Village Inc. v. Bacon, 96 So.2d
594 (Fla. App. 1957).
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Burden on Moving Party. The party moving for a summary judgment
or decree has the burden of proving the lack of any genuine issue as to any
material fact. All doubts are resolvable against the movant by the trial
court and the reviewing court will draw all proper inferences in favor of the
party against whom the motion had been requested. A summary judgment
or decree may not be granted where the movant has failed to show the
lack of a material fact issue or upon the appearance of a material fact
issue.'0 5
Purpose of motion: Function of the trial court. The purpose
behind
summary proceedings is to establish whether there is any genuine issue
of a material fact to be determined and not to try or determine the
factual issues that may arise. Once the salient facts are established beyond
dispute a question of law arises as to whom the judgment should be
awarded and the trial judge must use the established facts as a premise
for his decision. It is the function of the trial court in passing on the
motion to determine whether there is a genuine issue of any material
fact and not to determine any issue of fact.""'
Filing of the motion. A motion for summary judgment may be
filed any time after the expiration of twenty days from the date the action
was instituted and it is proper to grant a summary judgment even though
no answer has been filed, or a pending motion to strike the answer or
portions thereof has not been ruled on.""7
Situations Vherein Summnary Judgment Should Be Cautiously Granted
Negligence Actions. The courts are extremely cautious in granting a
summary judgment in tort actions bccause of the well settled principle
that the question of negligence is ordinarily one to be resolved by a
jury.10 8 Whcn a jury might properly draw varied conclusions from the
195. Ibid.
196. Ibid.
197. Froclich v. Rawlcy, 104 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1958); Olin's. Inc. v. Avis Rental Car
System, Inc., 102 So.2d 159 (Fla. App. 1958) (no answer filed). li.A. R. Civ. P. 1.36(b);
FEn. R. Civ. P. 56. Apparently judgment may be entered at any time during the
proceedings once it is established that no material fact issue exists and only a question
of law remains. Marsh v. Sarasota County, 97 So.2d 312 (Fla. App. 1957). In this
ease decree was apparently entered upon a motion for summary judgment, but the
record does not disclose a formal motion for summary judgment having been made.
The reviewing court does not directly answer the question of whether a summary
judgment can be granted in absence of a motion therefor because appellant failed to
object to such procedure at the trial.
198. Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1957). Patty v. Food Fair Stores, Inc.,
101 So.2d 881, 884 (IFla. App. 1958) "this court does not intend to indicate by
statement in this opinion a desire on our part to discourage or encourage the granting
or denying of summary judgments or decrees. Like any other rule, it can be misused and
abused but on the other hand its use should not be discouraged to the point of
extinction. This we believe has been the view generally expressed by the court of last
resort long before the creation of this court and as we are duty bound to do we follow
and reiterate this view. Palov v. Florida Power & Light Co., 107 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1958)
(sumnary judgment should be sparingly granted so as not to infringe upon constitutional

right to a jury trial); Rawls v. Ziegler, 107 So,2d 601 (Fla. App. 1958); Gordon v.
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record as presented summary judgment should not be granted; such a
situation is generally present where the record tenders an almost typical
intersectional collision case with varied stories as to the circumstances
19
leading to the accident.
[I]ssues of negligence including such related issues as contributory
negligence are ordinarily not susceptiblc of summary judgment
the claimant, but should be resolved in the
either for or against
200
ordinary manner
Cases involving a state of mind. Summary procedures should he
cautiously utilized where one's intent or the wilfullness of a person's
actions is an essential element placed in issue by the pleadings.20 1 The
district court of appeal held that a declaratory action to construe the
terms of a will is not a proper one for summary procedure since such
actions generally raise doubts as to the intention of the testator. Furthermore, the court was not obliged to use summary procedures merely because
all the parties involved so moved and also contended there was no such
' 02
issue involved. 1
Affidavits in Sup port of Motion for Summary Judgment
General consideration given supporting papers: Admissibility. The
party moving for a summary judgment or decree is generally held to a
strict standard, and papers supporting his position are closely scrutinized.
The papers of the opposing party are leniently treated in determining
whether the moving party has satisfied the burden required of him. 'When
an affidavit contains matter which would be incompetent and inadmissible
if testified to at trial the whole affidavit should not be disregarded and
203
the court should consider the competent and admissable portions.
Failure to attach papers to affidavits. The failure to attach papers

to the affidavit which refers to them and which are material to the
cause is a ground for the striking of the affidavits offered. However, papers
referred to in an affidavit are part of the record of the cause even though
not attached thereto, when the reference to them is so explicit so as to
leave no doubt as to their identity or relationship to the affiant's
V0
testimony?
Hotel Seville Inc,

105 So2d 175 (Fla, App. 1958). For negligence cases wherein

sufliarv decrees granted in lower court were reversed see Buck v. Hardy, 106 So.2d 428

(Fla. App. 1958); Kelly v. Kaufman. 101 So.2d 909 (Fla. App. 1958); Kagan v.
Eisenstadt, 98 So.2d 370 (Fla. App. 1957).

199. Weber v. Porco, 100 So.2d 146 (la. App. 1958).
200. Te Florida

court

in

Buck v. Hardy,

106

So.2d 428

(Mia.

App.

1958)

quoting with approval 6 Mooru.i., FEDERAL PRACTICE 2732 (2d ed. 1948).
201. Parker v. Briee, 96 Sn.2d 154 (Fla. 1957) (wilfullness); Owens v. McKenzie,
103 So.2d 677 (Fla. App. 1958) (intent).
202. Pancoast v. Pancoast, 97 So.2d 875 (Fla. App, 1957).
203. Humphrys v. Jarrell, 104 So.2d 404 (Fla. App. 1958); Crovella v. Coebrane,

102 So.2d 306 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(e)(f).
204. Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So.2d 306 (Fla. App. 1958).
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Affidavits not only form of proof acceptable in support of sunmnary
judgment. Although it may be the better practice to support a motion
for summary judgment by proof in the form of affidavits there is no
compulsion to do so if the interested parties elect to submit oral proofs
20 5
and the trial court so permits.

The relative weight between the complaint and counter affidavits filed
in support of motion for summary judgment. Generally, where the plaintiff

fails to present affidavits in support of his complaint, or in the alternative
affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the trial
judge has for his consideration only an unsupported complaint and the
deposition or affidavit of the movant and if the latter reveal no cause
for the complaint it is proper to enter summary judgment for the
defendant. 0 6 The allegations of a sworn complaint will be considered as
against a motion for summary judgment with supporting affidavits if the
sworn complaint meets the requirements of counter affidavits within the
contemplation of rule 1.36(e)

.207

XVWhere affidavits are unavailable in opposition to motion for summary
judgment: Extension of time. Where a party does not present affidavits
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment showing that he could
not "for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition" the court will assume he has gone as far as he can and will
20 8
enter the summary judgment.
A motion for summary judgment should not be granted in those
cases where because of peculiar circumstances a party is unable on short
notice to interrogate witnesses and procure affidavits or depositions in
opposition to the motion asserted by his opponent. In such a situation,
upon written motion filed with supporting affidavits, the trial court should
either postpone the final disposition of the motion for summary judgment
for such a reasonable time as may be necessary for the party to obtain
such proofs, or deny the motion and promptly set the case for trial on
the merits; the denial of the motion for an extension of time would be
209
an abuse of discretion.

205. Hall v. Davis, 106 So.2d 599 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(a)(b).
206. Pritchard v. Peppercorn & Peppercorn, Inc., 96 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1957).
FLA,. R. Civ. P. 1.36(e),
207. Central Bank &Trust Co. v. Davis, 102 So2d 600 (Fla. 1958). See 6 MoORE,
FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 2063 (2d ed. 1948); 3 BARON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE q 1235 (rev. ed. 1958).
208. General Truck Sales, Inc. v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 100 So.2d 202
(Fla. App. 1958). FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.36(f).
209. Caymon v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc., 108 So.2d 641 (Fla. App. 1959).
FtA,

R.Civ. P. 1.36(f). See the well reasoned dissent of Chief Judge Sturgis at 645.

However it should be noted that the facts as stated by the majority and those stated
by the dissent seem to be completely different.

1959]

CIVIL PROCEDURE AND APPELLATE REVIEW

277

Depositions in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.36(c) reads:
judgment or decree sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of any material
fact and that moving party is entitled to a judgment for decree
as a matter of law. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, depositions which were filed but which were never opened, offered
or admitted into evidence could properly be considered by the trial court
on motion for summary judgment.
Case not Fully Adjudicated on Motion for Summary Judgment
A motion for final summary judgment should not be granted even
though the terms of the contract allegedly breached cannot be proven
if the facts brought forth by the plaintiff show that he would have a
different cause of action against the defendant if he had properly pleaded
his case. In this situation the rule governing summary judgments
where cases are not fully adjudicated on the motion should be applied.
The court could properly enter summary judgment as to the attempted
recovery of damages for the breach of the contract and also an order
setting forth conditions under which the plaintiff may amend his
210
complaint.
Declaratory Decrees, Judgments and Orders
The Complaint-GeneralTest of Sufficiency-Purpose
The test of the sufficiency of a complaint in a declaratory proceeding is not whether the complaint shows that the plaintiff
will succeed in getting a declaration of rights in accordance with
his theory and contention, but whether he is entitled to a
declaration of rights at all.2 1'
The legislature has declared the statute to be substantive and remedial; "its purpose is to afford relief from insecurity and uncertainty
with respect to rights, status and other equitable or legal relations; and
is to be liberally administered and construed. ' 21 2 A declaratory proceeding
may be brought to clarify or construe a statute as to which there are
21 .
doubts or uncertainties.
210. Riviera Printing Co. v. Hesslers, Inc., 109 So.2d 778 (Fla. App. 1959).
211. Northshore Realty Corp. v. Gallaher, 99 So.2d 255, 256 (Fla. App, 1957

(approving the quote from Vbite v. Manassa, 252 Ala. 396, 397, 41 So.2d 39
397 (1949).
212. FLA. STAT. § 87.11 (1957). For a list of cases upholding the appropriateness
of declaratory relief to determine a variety of questions see Title & Trust Co. v. Title &
Guar. & Abstract Co. of Sanford, 103 So.Zd 211 at 214 (Fla. App. 1958).
213. City of Miami v. Miami Transit Co., 96 So.2d 799 (Fla. App. 1957).
FLA. STAT. § 87.02 (1957).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIV

Form of the Decree-Type of Relief Available
A declaratory decree, judgment or order of tile circuit court may
be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration
has the force and effect of a final decree. The statute allows a party
seeking such a decree to also request in the same action alternative,
coercive, subsequent or supplemental relief. The complainant must have
a right to institute the suit; e.g., where the party's rights would be
particularly effected by the declaratory decree or lie has an interest in the
21 4
subject matter separate and apart from the general public.
Declaratory Action in Law or Equity-Determinationof Issues of Fact
An action tnder the declaratory decree statute, depending on its
subject matter, may be filed either on the law or the equity side of the
court. If brought in equity it is not transferrable to the law side on the
grounds that there are issues of facts which should be properly determined
by a jury. The statute provides that particular issues of fact which are
appropriate for trial before a jury may be submitted to a jury for determination; but there is nothing in the statute requiring a jury to determine
issues of fact in equity cases and it in no way requires or contemplates a
jury trial merely because the action is one cognizable at law.2 15
Suit for Declaratory Decree Cannot Be Substituted for Available
Appellate Procedure
Florida has accepted the general rule that where a party does not
avail himself of the appellate procedure provided by law to review an
adverse judgment, order or decree, he may not seek to have it altered
or reversed by a suit for declaratory decree. The rule also applies to
orders of administrative boards in proper exercise of their quasi-judicial
powers where appellate procedure is provided, but not followed. 2 "
214. FLA. STAT, § 87.01(l)(2) (1957). Guernsey v. tHaley, 107 So.2d 184
(Fla. App. 1958) (the decree must have a personal effect as opposed to public in
gzeneral): Thomas v. Cilbe, inc., 104 So.2d 397 (Fla. App. 1958); Coast Cities Coaches,

Inc. v. Whyte, 102 So.2d 848 (Fla. App. 1958) (in this case refusal to transfer the
cause to the law side was not error when suit was within purview of the declaratory
judgment act in that the party was in real doubt and disagreement regarding the

construction to be placed upon the contract).
215. FLA. STAT. §§ 87.08, 87.01 (1957).

Coast City Coaches, Inc. v. Whyte,
102 So.2d 848 (Fla. App. 1958); Olin's Inc. v. Avis Rental Car System of Fla., Inc.,
105 So.2d 497 (Fla. App. 1958) (note the court's language here when it says that
the declaratory judgment statute provides for specific issues appropriate for jury trial
to be submitted to jury for determination. It would appear that this is not exactly
correct as the statute says they may be submitted to a jury for determination and
another case definitely says it is not required).
216. Frix v. Beck, 104 So.2d 81 (Fla. App. 1958). For the general rule see Clark v.
Memolo, 174 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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Declaratory Decree: Effect of Another Adequate Remedy
The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude the
issuance of a decree, judgment or order for declaratory relief. The court,
in declaratory proceedings has the power to grant full and complete
2 17
equitable relief.
Summary Decree Possible in Declaratory Action
A summary decree may be obtained in a declaratory action but in
order for the moving party to obtain it, there must be not only an absence
of any genuine issue as to any material fact, but he must be entitled to
the judgment or decree as a matter of law. 2t '
Declaratory]udgments-Res Judicata Only to Issues Actually Adjudged
A declaratory judgment does not merge the cause of action in it and
it is res judicata only to matters actually declared by the judgment. Thus,
where an assignee of a lease sought a declaratory decree, interpreting a
particular clause of the lease, the lessor had the burden of establishing
by extrinsic evidence the affirmative defense that a prior leclaratory decree
on the same clause which was brought by a previous lessee against the
defendant and which had been dismissed with prejudice by consent of the
parties was res judicata. A dismissal of a petition for declaratory decree
by consent of the parties without more is thus not conclusive of the
rights in question.2 10
Supplemental Relief Based on a Declaratory Decree-In General
A party obtaining a declaratory decree may, by petition, seek supplemental relief in a subsequent action brought in the circuit court having
jurisdiction. This subsequent action is a new and distinct adjudication
and the orders rendered therein are appealable. The adverse party is
entitled to reasonable notice and the right to show cause why further
relief should not be granted. The petition for supplemental relief may
be filed after the time for appeal from the declaratory decree upon which
it is based has expired. The order to show cause is not immediately
reviewable upon issuance but only after the trial court has had an opportunity to pass on the merits of the petition or the defenses offered
against it.220
217. FLA. SPAT. § 87.12 (1957). Title & Trust Co. of Fa. v. Title Guar. &
Abstract Co. of Sanford, 103 So.2d 211 (FIa. App. 1958) (replevin was available).
218. Pancoast v. Pancoast, 97 So.2d 875 (Fla. App. 1957). See also Olin's, Inc. v.
Avis Rental Car System of Fla., Inc., 105 So.2d 497 (Fla. App. 1958).
219. Northshore Realty Corp. v. Gallaher, 99 So.2d 255 (Fla. App. 1957) (court
recognizes that consent could be res judicata under certain circumstances but not
under facts of this case).
220. FLA. STAT. § 87.07 (1957). South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, 107 So.2d 30
(Fla. 1958); Thomas v. Cibe, Inc., 104 So.2d 397 (Fla. App. 1958).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIV

Form of supplemental relief. The court in a supplemental proceeding
may grant whatever relief is necessary or proper to effectuate its prior
declaration. The relief granted may be coercive or it may be in the form
22
of a money judgment for damages. '
Service of petition-adjudication-distinctand appealable. A petition
for supplemental relief grounded on a declaratory decree does not have
to be served within the ten-day period applicable to petitions for rehearing,
and an order based on such 2 a petition is an additional and distinct
adjudication and is appealable.
Statutory Note: Declaratory Judgments
Municipality as a party. Section 87.10 of the 1959 Florida Statutes
amends the act so that in any declaratory proceeding involving the
validity of a county or municipal charter, ordinance or franchise, such
county or municipality shall be made a party and shall be entitled to be
heard. If the statute, charter, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be
unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state or the state attorney
of the judicial circuit in which the action is pending shall also be served
22 3
with a copy of the proceedings and shall be entitled to be heard.
STATUTORY-TRIAL PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE

Harmless Error
Harmless Error: General Effect
No judgment will be set aside or reversed for error as to any matter
of pleading or procedure unless upon consideration of the entire record
such error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, "This section
'2 2 4
shall be liberally construed.
Impeachment of Witness-larmful Error
The statutory rule allowing the introduction of prior criminal convictions in order to impeach the creditability of a witness is applicable in
both criminal and civil cases. The refusal to permit such an impeachment of the creditability of the only witness whose testimony was directly

221, Thomas v. Cilbe, Inc., 104 So.2d 397 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA. STAT. § 87.07
(1957).
222. Ibid. The action was brought prior to the effective date of the Florida
Appellate Rules. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.16(a).
223. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-440; FLA. STAT. § 87.10 (1959).
224. FLA. STAT. § 54.23 (1957). Sherwood v. State, Ill So.2d 96 (Vla. App. 1959)

(criminal case); Rubin v. Kapell, 105 So.2d 28 (H-a. App. 1958
Victor

Hotel Owners, Inc. v.

negligence case).

Sperling,

104

So.Zd

120

(Fla. App.

(equity case);
1958)

(civil
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on the causal facts involved in a negligence action was reversible error. 2"
Comment on Failure to 7'estify-Harmful Error

'rhe hanless error statute has no application to the criminal procedure
statute which gives absolute protection to the defendant against any
comment by the prosecuting attorney on his failure to testify in his own
behalf. Any such comment regardless of intent or affect, is reversible
28
error.
Release or Covenant Not to Sue
Personal Injury Within the Statute Includes Invasion of PersonalRights
A release or covenant not to sue as to one tortfeasor for property
damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of any
person, shall not operate to release or discharge the liability of
any other tortfeasor who may be liable for the same tort or
death. (Emphasis added.)
The "personal injury" referred to includes the invasions of individual
rights for which damages arc allowable in an action for malicious
2 27
prosecution.
Release Not to Be Made Known to Jury-Effect
The fact of a release or a covenant not to sue any defendant shall
not be made known to the jury. If at trial the defendant makes it known
to the court that the plaintiff has released any person in partial satisfaction
of the damages sued for, the court shall set off such amount from the
amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would otherwise be
entitled. 22
In one case the appellant introduced such a release into evidence
and then requested the judge to instruct the jury that any recovery in
favor of plaintiff must be reduced by the amount he received from the
released negligent joint tortfcasor. Both the court and the attorneys
were not aware of the instant statute and the court was in error in giving
the requested instructions, but the reviewing court would not allow the
defendant on appeal to complain of the erroneous actions of the trial
29
judge occasioned by the granting of his requests. 1

225. FLA. STAT. §§ 54,23, 90.07, 90.08 (1957). McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565
(Fla. 1957) (this was a negligence action).
226. FLA. STAT. §§ 54.23, 918.09 (1957). MeLendon v. State, 105 So.2d 513
(Fla. App. 1958).
227. FLA. STAT. § 54.28(1) (1957). Adler v. Segal, 108 So.2d 773 (Fla. App.
1959). Cf. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1945).
228. FLA. STAT. § 54.28(2)(3) (1957).
229. Arsenault v. Thomas, 104 So.2d 120 (Fla. App. 1958).
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PART II
FLORII)A APPELLATE, PROCEDURE-THE RULES
AND STATUTS
Effective Date
or civil in nature commenced
All appellate procccdings, whcther criminai
on or after July 1st, 1957 are govcrned by the new Florida Appellate

rules. '0" Appellate proceedings pending in the Suprcme Court on July 1st,
1957 are governed by the formcr Supremc Court rules and any applicable
procedural statutes then in effect, whether such proceedings are retained
by the supreme court or transferred to a district court of appeal under the
provisions of revised article V of the Florida Constitution.2 . These rules
apply equally to the procedure in the supreme court, the district courts
of appeal and the circuit courts when exercising their appellate juris-

diction.232
230. The new Florida Appellate Rules will be hereafter cited as F.A.R. See F.A.R. 1.4,
1.1. Clark v. City of Orlando, 109 So.2d 416 (Fla. App. 1959). Criminal case: Appeal
from municipal court to circuit court filed May 13th, 1958 was not taken within thirty days
as provided by IA. S'rAT. § 932.52(2) (1957). The 90 day period allowed by F.A.R.
6.2 at that time did not apply to appeals from municipal courts to circuit courts. However,
rule 6.1 was amended, effective July 1st, 1958, and makes part 6 of the Florida Appellate
Rules applicable to such appeals. Apparently this would supercede FLA. STAT. § 932.52(2)
(1957) and extend the appeal time from 30 to 90 days. See City of Miami v. Gilbert,
102 So.2d 818 (Fla. App. 1958) (criminal case dichm). Fort v. Fort. 104 So.2d 69
(Fla. App. 1958) (Fla. App. Rule 4.2(a) sopercedes FLiA. STAT. § 59.02(3) as to
appeals from interlocutory orders and decrees in equity by proceedings in the nature of
certiorari. See Author's Comment 31 FLA. STAT. ANN. 33, 34 (Supp. 1958).
231. FL.A. CONST. art. V, § 26(6) as anended 1956. Cleuns, Inc. v. Cline. 105
So.2d 881 (Fla. 1958) (where notice of appeal was before supreme court prior to July 1st,
1957, supreme court will retain jurisdiction of cause pursuant to constitution as amended
in 1956); Carnazzi v. Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, 104 So.2d
727 (Fla. 1958). Florida Hotel & Restaurant Comnm. v. Dowler, 99 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1958)
(involved an appeal from a circuit court order quashing an order of the Florida Ilotel
and Restaurant Commission. Case recognized that FLA. STAT, 509.261 (1955) is no
longer in effect and that appeal could no longer be prosecuted to the supreme court from
judgment of circuit court on petition for certiorari quashing an order of the Hotel and
Restaurant Commission. Armenian Ilotel Owners v. Kullanjian, 96 So.Zd 896 (Fla. 1957).
This cause was before the supreme court on an interlocutory appeal taken by the
appellant from an amended final decree entered by the lower court pursuant to the
mandate of the supreme court rendered in 96 So.2d 146. Jurisdiction to review the
amended final decree oin an interlocutory appeal under F.A.R. 4.2 was assumed by the
court under the policy that where a cause was pending in it prior to the effective date
of revised article V of the constitution all orders, judgments or decrees entered by the
lower court in such cause to effectuate the mandate of this court are reviewable by
this court as a court of prior appellate jurisdiction.
232. F.A.R. 1.1, 1.4. In re Juen's Estate, 105 So.2d 908 (Fla. App. 1958) (proceedings commenced "refer to any proceedings in the appellate court and not in the
trial court.") Appeal of Syracuse University, 105 So.2d 904 (1-a. App. 1958) (under
new article V section V, (c) Florida Cbnstitution and Florida Appellate Rule 4.1
District Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction of appeals from an order of circuit court
sitting as an appellate court. This in effect superccdes FLA. STAT. § 732.15 (1957);
Alliance'for Conservation of Natural Resources ill Pinellas County v. Furen, 104 So.2d
803 (Fla. App. 1958) (circuit court in acting pursuant to a writ of certiorari sits as
an appellate coort and not a trial court). See also Codoio v. Shaw, 99 So.2d 849
(Fla. 1958) (FI.A. STAT. § 475.35 (1957) supercded by Florida Appellate Rules).
ec Author's Comment 31 FLA. STAT. ANN. 33, 34(Supp. 1958).
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Rendition of a Decision
Definition of the Term Rendition
The most important definition in Florida Appellate Rule 1.3 is
probably that given to the term "rendition" since it is the "rendition" of
the judgment decree or ordcr appealed from that starts the running of
the time within which appellate proceedings must be commenced. Also,
the rules provide that a decision must be "rendered" before it can be
2 33
the subject of a writ for certiorari.
An anornolous situation concerning the definition of "rendition" was
presented in Hawley v. Coogan.23 4 The defendants, expressing an intention
to petition the supreme court for a writ of certiorari, petitioned the
district court of appeal to stay issuance of its mandate. They also filed
a petition for rehearing. The then existing definition of "rendition" provided
that a decision was not rendered while a petition for rehearing was pending,
and that a "decision of an appellate court shall not be deemed rendered
until the mandate is issued." Thus, the dilemma; if the appellate court
denied the petition for rehearing the decision would still not be "rendered"
until its mandate was issued and if the court granted the petition to stay
the mandate there would be no "rendered decision" upon which a writ
of certiorari could be based. The rule had inadvertently placed the
defendant in a quandry.
This decision was subsequently negated by the deletion from the
definition of "rendition" of the sentence requiring an appellate court to
issue a mandate before its decision can be considered "rendered."
When a Decision is Deemed Rendered
A judgment, decision, order or decree is rendered when it is recorded
or if recording is not required, then filed. A timely and proper motion
or petition for a new trial, rehearing or reconsideration by the lower court
suspends the date of "rendition" until disposition of such motion or
petition.5
APPELLATE PRocEEDINGS IN GENERAL

Commencement of Appellate Proceedings
Trial Court Cannot Extend Time for Appeal
The time for appeal commences to run from the date that the final
decree is recorded notwithstanding the entry of an order upon stipulation
of the parties amending the effective date of the final decree. A trial

233. F.A.R. 3.2(b) (deals with time allowed to appeal); F.A.R. 4.5 (c) (relates
to certiorari).
234. State v. Coogan, 99 So.2d 243 (Fla. App. 1957).

235. F.A.R 1.3 as amended March 19th, 1958, effective July 1st, 1958.
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court does not have the power to extend, directly or indirectly the time
allowed for taking an appeal.23 6
Effect of Filing Notice and Deposit of the Filing Fee
There is no dloubt that timely and proper filing of the notice of
appeal is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the reviewing court.237 And
under the rule as now existing the filing of the notice of the appeal and
the depositing of the filing fee would appear to be jurisdictional. 238 However,
in Moore v. Murphree,30' 9 a district court of appeal has held that the
combining of the provisions concerning filing of fees and notice of appeal
in the same rule for jurisdictional purposes probably was legislative
inadvertence, thus concluding that the dismissal of an action due to a
party's failure to properly deposit the required filing fee is within the
sound discretion of the reviewing judge and that this discretion should
not allow a rule of procedure to prevent realization of the essential2 ends

of justice where no fundamental rights of the parties are involved.

10h

Payment of Cost by Original Plaintiff
Right to Dismissal for Nonpayment of Costs May Be Waived
The plaintiff must pay all costs taxed against him in a suit up to
the time of the appeal before he will be allowed to appeal. This requirement
is mandatory and upon a proper motion to dismiss because of appellant's
(original plaintiff) failure to pay costs the court is without discretion and
must dismiss the appeal? 0 However, the right to a dismissal of an appeal
for non payment of the costs may be waived. Thus, there was a waiver
where appellee (defendant below) did not file his motion to dismiss until
ten months after the appellant's notice of appeal. The parties had agreed
236. Salinger v. Salinger, 100 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1958) (case
Appellate Rules, FLA, STAT. 59.08 (1957)

was prior to Florida
then was in effect). Trial court may not

grant directly or indirectly an extension of time for taking an appeal. Houck v. Dade
County, 97 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1957). F.A.R. 3.2(d).
237. Ibid. See note 238 infra. State ex relDiamond Berk Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Carroll, 102 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1958) (alleged fact that notice of appeal resulting from a
clerical misprisom was erroneously filed in the wrong court did not authorize district
court of appeal to take jurisdiction of the appeal in view that the original filing of the
notice of appeal in trial court is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate
court). Laloic v. Genral Motors Acceptance Corp., 108 So.2d 497 (Fla. App., 1959).
A motion for new trial, or petition for rehearing upon summary final judgment does not
authorize an attack or review of a summary final judgment in a law action. Filing of
such a motion or petition does not toll or stay appeal from the day of the recording of
the summary final judgment. Method of review of summary final judgment is by
direct appeal.
238. F.A.R. 3.2(d) flock v. Dade County, 97 So.2d 272 (Pha. App. 1957) (the
notice of appeal was filed too late under former SuP. CT. R. 22 and was dismissed
because of the lack of jurisdictional foundation).
239. 106 So.2d 430 (Fla. App. 1958).
239a. Id. at 432.
240. Spector v. Ahrenholz, 99 So.2d 714 (Pla. App. 1958) (this case, however, was
decided under FLA. STAT. 59.09 (1957). F.A.R., 3.2(f).
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to six or seven extensions of time for filing of briefs and even then the
appellee did not file his motion to dismiss the appeal until after the
appellant by stipulation allowed him an extension of the time to file his
brief.

24 1

Failure to Pay Costs Not a Basis For Summary Judgment
The rules authorize the court to stay proceedings when a plaintiff
has failed to pay the costs of a previously dismissed action involving the
same claim. 2 42 This discretion extends only to an abeyance or stay of the

proceedings until the prior costs have been paid or otherwise secured as the
court may direct, and it does not afford a basis for the entry of a summary
judgment.

243

Failure to Pay Costs as to Multiple Defendants
Upon an appeal from a judgment which was adverse to one of two
defendants, the plaintiff may not join the non-appealing defendant where
the costs as to that defendant which were taxed against the plaintiff have
not been paid and the plaintiff fails to assign as error the taxation of such
costs or supersede their taxation; he may not accomplish indirectly that
24
which cannot be done directly.
Basis of Hearing and Determination
General Rules
An appeal is heard and determined on assignments of error and

properly filed briefs and appendices. The record-on-appeal will be referred
to only if necessary to settle material conflicts between the parties. The
appellate court will consider only that which is properly based on the
record-on-appeal.

The appendix to the appellant's brief should contain among other
things a copy of the particular parts of the original record, material to
the points presented, as the appellant desires the court to read.
However, the appellant should be guided by reason in determining
the length of his appendix. He should not include in it the entire recordon-appeal or large and superfluous segments. He should include those
portions of the original record that be considers necessary to demonstrate
the correctness of his position without resort to the record-on-appeal, that
241. Funke v. Federal Trust Co., 99 So.2d 636 (Fla. App. 1958). This case was
decided
under FLA. STAT. 59.09 (1957) which has been incorporated into F.A.R. 3.2(f),
3.3, 3.7 (fp(5), 3.7(h), 3.7(c).
242. -LA. R. Civ. PR. 1.35(d).
243. Martin %.Arrow Cabs, Inc., 107 So.2d 394 (Fla. App. 1958).
244. SuP. CT. R. 29. Villanueva v. Shane, Inc., 96 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1957). The case
overrules as to any inferences contrary to it Thomas Awning Co. v. Morgan, 57 So.2d

427 (Fla. 1952).
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reversible error had been committed below. Matter which is unwicldly or
which appears very frequently throughout the record may be narratively
summarized in the appendix with appropriate references to pages of the

record wherein such matter appears.2 45
Assignments of Error

Appellate requirement of assignments of error-In general. When an
issue is not raised by the pleadings and it does not appear from the record
that the parties expressly or inipliedly consented to a trial of the issue, such
an issue cannot be raised on appeal even if it would have been appropriate
to the facts. '' ' The appellate court will not consider on appeal questions
that had not been raised before the trial court nor properly presented by
assignment of error.2 47 A point will be insufficient for purposes of review
unless a specific assignment of error from which the point argued arose
248
is stated.
Criminal cases - relaxation of the specific assignment ride. It appears
that in criminal cases the appellate courts will relax the rule requiring
that assignment of errors shall clearly and distinctly point out the errors
or grounds relied upon for reversal. Thus, where error was assigned to

the overruling of a motion for new trial, the court considered points
argued on appeal that were fairly raised by such motion even though the
assignment of error failed to detail or point out the grounds relied upon.24 9
Assignments of error should be directed to the specifically alleged
errors of the trial court and not to the final judgment or decree from which
245. F.A.R. 3.7(f) Walton v. City of Clernont, 109 So.2d 403 (Fla. App. 1959)
(it was duty of appellants to include in their appendix such part of original record as
would demonstrate without resorting to the record on appeal that error requiring
reversal had been committed below).
246. Meadows So. Coustr. Co. v. Pezzaniti. 108 So.2d 499 (Fla. App. 1959) (order
overruling finding of master was not reviewable by appeal where transcript of testimony
before master was not included in record on appeal pursuant to specific direction of
appellant); Kaufman v. Bernstein, 100 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1958) (accord and satisfaction);
Cortina v. Cortina. 98 So.2d 334. 337 (Fla. 1957) "it is fundamental that a judgment
upon a matter entirely outside of the issues made by the pleadings cannot stand; and
where, as here, an issue is not presented by the pleadings nor litigated by the parties
during the hearing on the pleadings as made, a decree adjudicating such issue is, at
least, voidable on appeal."
247. Kelly v. Kaufman, 101 So.2d 909 (Fla. App. 1958). Appellees contended that
judgment should be affirmed on basis that contributory negligence of the plaintiff appears
as a matter of law. In this connection, note first, that the answer does not plead that
defense and therefore it was not in issue. Second, court should not assert function of
trial judge and pass upon a matter which it affirmatively appears that trial judge would
not consider.
248. F.A.R. 3.7(f)4, 3.14(b). Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. v. Grady, 99 So.2d 871
(Fla. App. 1958); 6551 Collins Ave. Corp. v. Millen, 97 So.2d 490 (Fla. App. 1957),
cert. denied, 104 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1958); McCann Plumbing Co. v. Plumbing Industry
Program, Inc., 105 So,2d 26 (Fla. App. 1958) (assignments of error specifying only
that a certain decree is contrary to the law and evidence fails to comply with time spirit
of the appellate rules). Miami Investors Syndicate, Inc. v. Johnnie & Mack, Inc., 104
So.2d 617 (Fla. App. 1958) (assigumcnts of error not clearly and distinctly pointing
out alleged errors are inadequate) .
249. F.A.R. 3.5(c) Harrington v. State, 110 So.2d 495 (Fla. App. 1959).
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the appeal is taken. An assignment of error should not be directed to
the verdict but to some action of the court with reference to the matter
complained of as error. An assignment of error directed to a verdict or to
a judgment thereon cannot support questions involving consideration of
the sufficiency or weight of the evidence. These questions are properly
raised by a motion for the new trial or a proper motion for directed
verdict, and the resulting order. Where the assigned error is based on a
ruling on a motion for new trial, the grounds relied on must be pointed
out.250

Assignments of error - extension of filing time - good cause necessary.

An untimely assignment of error is a basis for the dismissal of an appeal.
The appellate court or the lower court, for a good cause, may extend the
time for filing of briefs, appendices and assignments of error, but the rule
as to the latter does not specifically require a showing of good cause in
order for a party to receive such an extension. Nevertheless, the courts
have read the requirement into the rule and a timely motion for an
extension of time to file assignments of error must be supported by a
sufficient reason for the delay and a motion made after the time has
expired must show good cause for the default. Economic hardship is not
25
a good cause for default. '
The sufficiency of assignments of error cannot be challenged by petition

for rehearing. The sufficiency of an assignment of error to support poiits
argued in briefs and before an appellate court will not be considered upon
a petition for rehearing.

2

2

The Record on Appeal
Duties and responsibilitiesof appellant and the court reporter. It is the

appellant's duty to furnish a record of the evidence or other matters upon
which the decree appealed from is predicated. -31 Court reporters are officers
of the court. They are required to report the testimony taken and the
250. F.A.R. 3.7(f)(3)(- ) State v. City of Hialeah, 109 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1959).
"Have all pertinent requirements of the Constitution and laws of the State of Florida
preliminary to and in connection with issuance and sale of said water revenue certificate
been strictly followed? A question of such sweep is not justified tinder our rules and does
not obligate this court to conduct search for error. Furthermore, the point is unsupported
by a proper assignment of error .... . 1 he latter was the way the question on appeal
was framed -aid it did not merit discuission because of its generality or the generality
of the language in which it was framed. See also Humphreys v. Jarrell, 104 So.2d 404,
(Fla. App. 1958). Rule 3.5 F.A.R.
251. Quality Furniture House, Inc. v. General Bond and Disc. Co., 97 So.2d 203
(Fla. App. 1957). Compare the wording of F.A.R. 3.7(d) & 3.5(d).
252. See materials cited note 248 supra.
253. Hall v. Davis, 106 So.2d 599 (Fla. App. 1958) (record did not contain transcript
of proofs in the nature of exhibits and oral testimony presented on motions for summary
decree and court of appeal could not pass upon such questions); Green v. llorisiis,
103 So.2d 226 (Fla. App. 1958) (appellants' points required consideration of depositions
to determine the contentions raised and depositions were not included in the record
transmitted to the appellate court; therefore contentions could not be considered).
F.A.R. 3.6.
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proceedings had in the trial of any civil action upon the request of either
party. He is supposed to transcribe, certify and file his trial notes with the
clerk of the lower court and to supply the appellant with all the copies
ordered by him within thirty days after the filing and service of appellant's
designations. The court may penalize a court reporter for failing to perform
his duties. The appellant has the responsibility of taking timely action to
insure the performance by others of acts necessary to his perfecting a
timely appeal. Thus, where the sole reason given for several extensions of
the time to file the transcript of record was the repeated failure of the
court reporter to perform his duties, the appellant should have brought
him to account before the court. In the absence of such action by the
appellant and his failure to show a good cause for the extensions received,
he will be required to show cause to the court why his appeal should not
be dismissed.25 4 A hearing upon a motion to direct a court reporter to
perform or be subjected to penalty will 'not be had unless he has been
served with the charges and given the opportunity to appear and show
cause.

255

Result of appellant preparing the record on appeal. The presentation
and transmittal of the record on appeal is the duty of the clerk of the
lower court, but the appellant may elect to prepare the record on appeal.
If he does, he need not file directions with the clerk, nor is he required
to serve a designation on his adversary or the portions of the record
which lie has included in the record on appeal. This procedure places an
appellee at a great disadvantage as he is left in the dark as to the contents
of the record on which appellant will base his appeal. Therefore, in such
a situation, although the appellant has not committed any procedural errors
justice requires that the appellee be given an opportunity to supplement
the record as lie may desire, even though the time for filing assignments
of error has expired. 56
Intermediate orders. If a party desires to present to the district court
of appeal a motion for an intermediate order prior to the transmitting of
the record on appeal, lie must transmit to the district court certified copies
of so much of the original papers in the action or proceeding in the lower
57
court as are needed for that purpose.
Allowing argument on issue not contained in record on appeal. In a

recent case, the supreme court entertained argument on an issue not
referred to in the record on appeal. The trial court after oral argument
254. FLA. STAT. § 59.02 (1957); F.A.R. 3.6(j), 3.17, 6.9. Lambert v. State, 105
So.2d 612 (Fla. App. 1958).
255. International Shoe Co. v. Carmichael, 105 So.2d 389 (Fla. App. 1958) (criminal

256. South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Peters, 102 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1958) F.A.R. 3.6(c),
.6(a)
257.(I.F.A.R. 36 k ) . Slaff v. Chapman, 104 So.2d 797 (Fla. App. 1958). Motion
was filed on June 1, 19i8 pursuant to f.A.R. 3.9(c) prior to the effective date of
the amendments to the rules which abolished the motion to affirm.
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had upon request of counsel filed a certification in the supreme court
to the effect that the issue argued had in fact been passed upon by the
lower court. In view of this effort to make the record speak the truth and
the fact that the issue involved was necessary to a determination of the cause
and a finding on it was inherent in the opinion and judgment of the lower
258
court, the supreme court allowed it to be argued on appeal
Appeal upon the original record -omission of appendices. The rule
that "appendices may be omitted if the record on appeal consists of a
certified transcript or stipulated statement of seventy-five pages or less"
is also applicable where the appeal is upon the original record.2 5 9 (Emphasis
added.)
Briefs: Form, Content and Filing
Briefs - form and content. If the brief as filed is carelessly and
negligently drawn as to the form and technical requirements prescribed by
the rules, the district court of appeal may grant a motion to strike the brief
and allow a limited period in which to file a brief complying with the rule or
suffer a dismissal of the appeal.26 0 In one instance the appellant's brief had
no appendix as required by the rules, but the court examined the original
record because of the glaring equity in the appellant's favor. However,
the court noted that had a motion to strike been made, it probably would
2 1
have been granted.
The brief - statement of the case - proper form. A brief containing
a long question which is merely a slanted re-statement of the factual
background of the case and a suggestion that the court erred in its decree
does not comply with the rule which requires "a statement of the case
and of the facts and points involved in a clear and concise manner .. ."262
The brief -abandonment of points not argued. Points not argued in
the briefs will be deemed abandoned but the court may, on its own
initiative take note of jurisdictional or fundamental errors apparent in the
263
record on appeal.

258. 1larrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth,

IIl So.2d

439 (Fla. 1959). F.A.R. 3.6(1).
259. F.A.R. 3.7(i). Thompson v, Food Fair Stores of Fla. Inc,, 107 So.2d 393
(Fla. App. 1958).
260. Axtell v. Lyons, 105 So.2d 610 (Fla, App. 1958) (it will be the policy of the
district court of appeal to insist with more and more emphasis as time goes on, that
the letter as well as spirit of the Florida Apellate Rules be observed). F.A.R. 3.7.
261. \Williams v. Grogan, 100 So,2d 407 (Fla. App. 1958). F.AR, 3.7.
262. Srotkin v. Flavin, III So.2d 483 (Fla. App. 1959). F.A.R. 3.7(f)3.
263. Stanford v. Slate, 110 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1959j; State v. City of North Miami Beach,

108 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1959); In re Coleman's Estate, 103 So.2d 237 (Fla. App. 1958).
In re Weiss' Estate, 102 So.2d 154 (Fla. App. 1958); DeFonce Constr. Co. v. Ewing,
99 So.2d 718 (Fla. App. 1958). Ramsey N.. Aronson, 99 So.2d 643 (Fla. App. 1958).

F.A.R. 3.7(i).
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Briefs - Amnicus Curiae. An attorney may file a brief as amicus curiae

if all parties agree or if the court grants permission upon motion filed
2 4
within eighty days after the filing of the notice of appeal. 0
The Brief -appellee's

duty on appeal. On appeal from dismissal of

25
complaint, appellee has the duty to furnish appellate court with a brief.

Statutory Note: Appellee's Brief, Service

The new version of rule 3.7(b) of the Florida Appellate Rules as
amended June 8, 1959 and effective September 1, 1959 reads as follows:
It shall be the duty of appellee within twenty days after a copy
of appellant's brief has been served upon him to file in the
appellate court the original and one copy of his brief and appendix
and serve a copy thereof upon appellant. Failure of appellee to
file his brief and appendix as required by these rules shall, unless
otherwise ordered by the court prior to the date set for oral
argument, forfeit the right of said appellee to oral argument.
Time allowed for filing of briefs and appendices - extending for good

cause. The Florida Appellate Rules require that the record on appeal be
transmitted to the clerk of the appellate court no later than 110 days
after the filing of the notice of appeal. The appellant must serve the
appellee a copy of his brief at least forty days before the date on which
the record on appeal is due in the appellate court. "6 This latter period
may be extended by motion upon the showing of good cause. A miscalculation of time due to sccrcterial mistakes in the office of a party's
20 7
attorney is not sufficient cause.
Appellant's reply brief: limited to a response to appellee - effect of
appellee's omission of appendix. The appellant may file a reply brief, but

the appendix thereto is limited to such parts of the record as appellant
desires the court to consider inview of the parts presented by the appellee. 26
In Urban v. City of Daytona Beach,26 9D the appellant failed to include
in her appendix on appeal a copy or summary of her depositions which
were considered by the lower court in entering the summary judgment.
Thc appellee filed a brief solely on the ground that due to this omission
the appellant cannot overcome the presumption of correctness which accompanics the actions of a trial court on appeal. Appellee did not include an
appendix in its brief. Appellant promptly filed a reply brief and attached
264. Chacon v. State, 102 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1958) (notice of appeal in present
case was filed 2 yrs. 9 raos. 16 days after the motion). This case was considered under
SUP. CT. R. 36.10 which was effective at the time and under which the brief had to
be timely and with reason for the request.
265. Brown v. Fein, 102 So.2d 830 (Fla. App. 1958). F.A.R. 3.7(b).
266. F.A.R. 3.6(j)(1), 3,7(a).
267, FAR. 3.7(d); Nitsos v. Carlisle, 104 So.2d 144 (Fla. App. 1958); Graham
v. Thornton, 104 So.2d 95 (Fla. App. 1958); Farmer v. State, 104 So.2d 94 (Fla.
App. 1958); Eidson v. State, 101 So.2d 831 (Fla. App. 1958).
268. F.A.R. 3.7(h),
269. 101 So,2d 414 (Fla. App. 1958),
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an appendix containing the previously omitted material. The appellee then
moved to strike the appendix to appellant's reply brief as not within the
scope of appendices authorized and permitted by the Florida Appellate
Rules. The court, in considering this motion, held that the failure of an
appellee to include an appendix with its brief precludes an appellant from
filing an appendix to its reply brief, since such an appendix is allowed
only to meet such parts of the record as presented by appellee's appendix.
eliproper procedure for appellant would have been a motion for leave
to amend her original appendix to include the omitted matter.
Although technically the appellee apparently had the appellant cornered,
the court, desirous of avoiding mere procedural technicalities, allowed the
appellant to vitiate her mistake. The result apparently being based upon
the consent of appellee's counsel, obtained after hearing argument of
counsel, to the entry of an order allowing appellant to amend her original
appendix and allowing appellee to accordingly amend its brief. This result
and the following quotes from the court's opinion present an interesting
challenge to appellate attorneys:
XVe are not here dealing with a mere procedural technicality
which bears no relationship to the merits of the cause. On the
contrary we are callcd upon to pass on a qucstion of compliance
with an essential and indispensible phase of established procedure
governing the appellate process.
While ignorance of the rules alone will not suffice to excuse a
failure to conform the.court is inclined under the circumstances
hcre presented to deny appellee's motion and to consider the
appendix complained of as constituting a part of appellant's
main brief to the same extent as if appellants had properly moved
for permission to amend by adding the deposition. In so doing,
however, we do not intend that this opinion will serve as a precedent for further violations of the rule such ds this, either with
or without consent of opposilg counsel.?70 (Eimphasis added.)
Advancement of Causes
Under the former rule, the only cases entitled to advancement on
the calendar were those involving crimcs, habeas corpus proceedings, appeals
from railroad and public utility commissions, review by certiorari in regard
to workmen's compensation proceedings, cases where the state was the
rcal party in interest, and those so entitled by statute or rule of court. A
motion to advance a cause for final hearing must be complete within
itself, containing appropriate reference or excerpts from the record so that
the court will be able to rule thereon without having to review the entire
27
record. '
270. Id. at 417.
271. Atlas 'Tavel Sev. Inc. v. Morelly, 97 So.2d 496 (Mla. App. 1957). F.A.P.
3.12; Sup. CT. R. 43.
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For the guidance of the bar, we wish to observe that while Florida
Appellate Rule 3.12, governing appeals filed after July 1, 1957,
affords complete latitude to this court to advance causes for final
hearing upon a showing of good cause, the rule will be strictly
construed to the end that litigants shall receive equal treatment,
and only those cases which have traditionally been entitled to
preferential consideration will be taken up out of order. Mere
possibilities or threat of inconvenience or hardship will not justify
preference to any individual suitor upon a
this court in giving
272
crowded calendar.
Petitions for Rehearings in Appellate Court- Generally
A petition for rehearing must be applied for in writing within fifteen
days after filing of the decision or order of the court. This is designed to
bring the litigation to a conclusion and the requirements of the rule are
strictly construed. The filing of a petition for rehearing should not be
considered a routine step in every appellate decision. Its purpose is to call
the court's attention to some fact, precedent or rule of law which it has
inadvertently overlooked. The petition will not be considered if it attempts
to re-brief or re-argue the case; or to raise new points which were not
relied on at the hearing; or to argue with the court as to the correctness
of its conclusions; in fact, the inclusion of any argument in the petition
2
is forbidden . 1
Judgment: Mandate-Attempt to Enjoin Lower Court from

Complying Therewith
Generally where a judgment is reversed it is sent back for entry
of final judgment as directed by the appellate court. If the trial court
refuses or neglects to follow this judgment, the upper court has the
statutory power to enter the judgment which should have been entered
by the lower court. 274 The judgment of a reviewing court when it issues
a mandate is a final judgment in the cause and is directed not to the
parties but to the lower court whose compliance therewith is purely
ministerial and no further action by the litigants is necessary to accomplish
its performance. The appellate court here also may act directly if trial
court does not follow its mandate. " '1 In comparison the equitable power
to restrain judicial proceedings is confined to a restraint of the parties.
"It is not addressed to the court and is in no sense a prohibition on it in
272. Id. at 497.

273. F.A.R. 3,14. Cali v. State, IIl So.2d 703 (Fla. App, 1959)(Not timely);
Chemical Corn Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Frankel 111 So.2d 99 (Fla. App. 1959)
(substantial violation); Sherwoodt v. State, III So.2d 96 (Fla. App. 1959)(substantial
violation); IIarris v. State, 107 So.2d 402 (Mla. App. 1959)(nottimely); State ex rel.
Realty Co. %'.Green, 105 So,2d 817 (Fla, App. 1959)(substantial violation).
274. State ex rel. Peterson v. Weissing, 100 So.2d 373 (Fla. 1958). Wright v. Board
of Pub. Instr,, 100 So.2d 403 (Fia. 1958). FLA, CoN-s'r. art. V, § 4 F.A.R. 4.5.

275. Berger v. Leposky, 103 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1958).
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the exercise of its jurisdiction.."2 761 Therefore, the compliance with a
mandate by the lower court cannot be lawfully prevented by the injunctive
process.
JUDICIAL REVIEW -

ORDERs REVIEWABLE

Judicial Review in General
Proceedings in General
Nature of Proceedings. Appellate review in law or equity is by appeal
except where review by certiorari is permitted by law or by the rules.
Interlocutory orders or decrees in.equity are reviewable only by appeal
and not by certiorari. " ' In an action at law only final judgments are
reviewable by appeal. The appeal must be based upon the final judgment
actually entered and not the motion or order granting or denying such
judgment.2 18 An appellate court may always consider a question of jurisdiction even though raised for the first time on appeal,2 79 but is should
be remembered that where the trial court lacks jurisdiction, the appellate
80
jurisdiction is also lacking.2
Judicial Review: Equitable distribution under workmen's compensation. An order for equitable distribution of a recovery under Vorkmen's
Compensation Act is an appealable final order and therefore not reviewable
28
by certiorari. '
Judicial Review: A single appeal from action brought by husband
and wife may bring up separate judgments. Generally, a single notice of
appeal will not bring up separate judgments for review. However, where
276. Id. at 631, quoting 28 Am. JuR. Injunctions § 191 (1959).
277. F.A.R. 3.1, 4.2. Jones v. Johnson, 98 So.2d 506 (Ila. App. 1957) (order denying
a motion to dismiss complaint should have been brought up for review by interlocutory
appeal and not by petition for writ of certiorari.)
278. Under FA. STAT. 59.02 (1957) only final iudgments are appealable in actions
at taw, except for appeals from rule of court 59.03. appeals from order granting new
trial 59.04, and appeals from order of non-suit 59.05. An order granting a motion to
dismiss a complaint is not a final appealable judgment: Weinmann v. Ligon, 105 So.2d
204 (Fla. App. 1958); lerpel, Inc. v. Pfundston, 104 So.2d 620 (Fla. App. 1958). An
order granting a motion for summary judgment or decrce is not an appealable final
judgment: Brannon v. Johnston, 83 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1955); Elliott v. Lazar, 104 So.2d
618 (Fla. App. 1958); Renuard v. Kirkehy Hotels, Inc., 99 So.2d 719 (Fla. App. 1958).
An order granting motion to dismiss action and to strike the complaint is not a final
judament froa which an appeal will lie: Baker v. Colley, 104 So.2d 473 (Fla. App.
1958). An appeal from an order denying petition for rehearing does not bring the final
decree entered in the cause to the supreme court for review. The appeal should be from
the final decree and not the petition for rehearing. The petition for rehearing presents
no issue for review other than those detennined by the final decree from which no
appeal has been taken: Burnup v. Bagley, 100 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1958); McNarg v.
Hudson, 110 So.2d 73 (Fla. App. 1959); Finley v. Finley, 103 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1958).
An order denying a motion for new trial is not appealable: Means v. Douglas, 110 So.2d
88 (Fla. App. 1959); Koch v. State Road Dept. of Fla., 106 So.2d 426 (Fla, App. 1958);
Denton v. Cummins Diesel Engines of Fla., Inc., 101 So.2d 617 (Fla. App. 1958); Haley
v. Milan, 100 So.2d 643 (Fla. App. 1958).
279. In re Weiss' Estate, 102 So.2d 154 (Fla. App. 1958).
280. In re Coleman's Estate, 103 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1958).
281. Burdines, Inc. v. Drennon, 97 So.2d 259 (Fla. App. 1957).
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a husband and wife join in an action and they receive two favorable
judgments based on a single complaint and a single trial on the same
82
set of facts, a single notice or appeal is adequate for review purposes.2
Judicial Review of Contempt Proceedings. In Pueblo v. State,283 a
Florida appellate court decided that appeal is the proper method to review
contempt procccding. Thc court also concluded that since a contempt
proceeding, whether criminal or civil in nature, did not constitute a
misdemeanor an appeal from a contempt proceeding in the criminal court
of record should be taken to the district court of appeal and not to the
4
circuit court.
Final Judgment Must Be Recorded Before Issuance of Writ of Error
An order granting a motion to dismiss the complaint is not an
appealable final judgment when it is shown that the final judgment on
such order was recorded subsequent to the date of the writ of error. A
writ of error in an action at law purports to be issued on a final judgment,
and if such writ is dated prior to the date that the clerk entered the
judgment sought to be appealed it is ineffectual to bring the judgment
before an appellate court .211
Transfer of Improvident Appeal to Court of Proper Jurisdiction
When an appellate court's jurisdiction is improvidently invoked it
may of its motion or on motion of either party transfer the cause to the
court having proper jurisdiction. - This constitutional provision for the
transfer of a case to the court having jurisdiction applies only where
appellate jurisdiction as distinguished from original jurisdiction of appellate
court has been improvidently invoked; and supreme court, finding itself
without jurisdiction to issue an original writ of prohibition, could not
287
transfer the case to the proper court.

282. North Am. Co. v. Lndahl, 107 So.2d 749 (Fla. App. 1958). As to the
general role see 4a C.J.S. Appeal 6 Error § 593(5) (1957).
283. 109 So.2d 37 (Fla. App. 1959).
284. 'Ilhe criminal court of record being a trial court, appeals therefrom would
be to the district court of appeal, FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(3), unless the action tried
in the criminal court of record was a misdenmeanor which is appealable to the circuit
court, FLTA. CONSr. art. N, § 6(3).
285. llerpel, Inc. v. Pfundston, 104 So.2d 620 (Fla. App. 1958).
286. IF.A.R. 2.1(a)5(d), Carmazzi v. Board of Cty, Comn'rs of Dade Cty, 104
So.2d 727 (Fla. 1958) (transfer); National l)airv Products Corp. v. Odham 100 So.2d
394 (Fla. 1958) (rule supersedes FL.A. STAr. 501'.09 (5), writ was transferred to circuit
court where it would be treated as if it had originally been filed there). See also Evans
v. Carroll, 104 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1958); Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1958);
Sinnamon v. Fowikes, 101 So.2d 375 (1ia. 1958); State v. J.K., 104 So.2d 113
(Fla. App. 1958).
287. State ex rel. Peterson v. \Veissing. 100 So.2d 373 (ila. 1958). FiA. Cosr.
art. V, § 4(2). See also City of Miami Beach v. State ex ret. I'ontailncleao Hotel
Corp., 109 So.2d 599 (H7a. App. 1959).
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Misconception of Remedy- Statute Applicable to
All Appellate Courts

When an appeal in an action is improvidently taken to the supreme
court and certiorari would have been proper, such an appeal will be treated
by the court as a petition for certiorari. 28 8 Although the statute here
involved refers only to the supreme court, it has been held that it also
applies to the district courts and the circuit courts in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction .28 9 Therefore, although an order granting a
motion for a summary judgment and judgment on the pleading is not
a final judgment from which an appeal will lie, it will be received as
though it were on petition for certiorari.2 0 It should be noted that this
was an appeal from an order in equity filed prior to the effective date
of the Florida Appellate Rules and under which interlocutory orders and
decrees in equity can no longer be reviewed by certiorari. Such orders
and decrees may be reviewed on appeal from the final decree in the
petition for a writ of certiorari
cause. -°'1 Note however that an2improvident
92
will not be treated as an appeal.
Reviewable Judgments, Decrees and Orders
Appeals from Orders of Non-Suit
Involuntary non-suit - court's intention to render adverse judgment.
The plaintiff may appeal a non-suit which he necessarily had to take because
of any decision or ruling of the court made during the trial of the cause.
Thus the plaintiff could appeal where he took a judgment of involuntary
non-suit because the court had indicated its intention to direct a verdict
for defendant; the scope of such review is 93similar to that of a review of
a judgment entered after a directed verdict2
Voluntary non-suits - not appealable. Appeals from orders of non-suit
are permissible only by virtue of statute.294 The court of appeals does
not have jurisdiction to review an order granting defendant's motion for

288. FLA.

StAT.

§ 59.45 (1957).

§ 59.45 (1957). Made part of the rules by F.A.R. 1.4, formerly
R. 28. Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1957) involved Sup. C. It. 28),.
Alliance for Conservation of Natural Resources in Pinellas County v. Furen, 104 So.2d
803 (Fla. App. 1958) (an appeal from commission order). Note that under definition
of rule 13, the word "court" means suprene court, district courts of appeal and circuit
coorts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction.
290. Elliott v. Lazar, 104 So.2d 618 (Fla. App. 1958). An equity order in equity
and tinder old rules. Thomas v. Cilbe, Inc., 104 So.2d 397 (Fla. App. 1958) (an equity
order denying supplemental relief). Kissling v. McCarthy, 100 So.2d 434 (Fla. App. 1958)
289.

SUP.

FLA. STAT.

CT.

(order denying post final decree motion for defendant).
291. Jones v. Johnson, 98 So.2d 506 (Fla. App. 1957). F.A.R. 4.2, 3.1.
292. Fort v. Fort, 104 So.2d 69 (Fla. App. 1958). See also Jones v. Johnson,
supra note 291.
293. Adler v. Copeland, 105 So.2d 594 (Fla. App. 1958).
294. FLA. STAT. § 59.05, 54.09 (1957).
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summary judgment on appeal from a voluntary non-suit because 2a9 5voluntary
non-suit is not a final judgment from which an appeal will lie.
Review of Order Granting New Trial
Interlocutory appeal fron order granting new trial only by party
aggrieved. The Florida Statutes permit an interlocutory appeal in a law

action by the party aggrieved from an order granting a new trial. The
trial judge is required to specify the grounds in his order when he grants
a new trial and only the grounds so specified are reviewable on appeal. 2 6
Refusal of trial court to include a Particularground in order- cross-

assignment of error. The trial court should set forth the grounds or reasons
followed in making appealable orders particularly where the ground may
be determinative of the proper appellate form .2 7 The reviewing court
cannot consider a particular ground which the trial court has refused to
include as a basis for its order granting a new trial. Such a refusal cannot
be made the subject of a cross-assignment of error since it would go
beyond the limitations of the statute duthorizing the appeal. 2T
Review of order containing a condition for remittitur. A jury verdict

was returned for plaintiff and the trial court denied defendant's motion
for a new trial on the condition that the plaintiff file a remittitur. Upon
plaintiff's refusal to remit the order by its own terms was converted
into an order granting a new trial, and the plaintiff appealed."" The
order granting a new trial did not recite or specify any grounds on
which it was based as required by the rules, 2 9 and review is limited to
consideration of the grounds so enumerated. However, the condition of
the remittitur indicated that the trial court on its own initiative granted
a new trial on the ground of excessiveness of verdict. The appellate court
was restricted by law to consider only the question of excessiveness as
appearing in the rccord, since any other possible reasons for rejecting
the verdict were not indicated in the order granting the new trial. The
court reluctantly reversed and remanded on the ground that the excessiveness of the verdict did not clearly appear from the record as is necessary
before the trial court can issue this specific type of conditional order.
Discretion of trial court in granting a motion for new trial now
reviewable in Florida-Motion for directed verdict not necessary. "[Tihe

order of a trial judge denying a motion for new trial on the ground that
295. Ramsey v. Aronson, 99 So.2d 643 (Fla. App. 1957).
296. Edwards v. Young, 107 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1958); Kovacks v. Venetian Sedan
Serv., Inc., 108 So.2d 611 (Fla. App. 1959). FLA. STAT. § 59.07 (1957); F.A.R. 2.6(d).

297. State v. Bruno, 104 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1958)
297a. Lockhart v. Friendly Fin. Co., 110 So.2d 478 (Fla. App, 1959); FL. Sn^Ar.
§ 59.07 (4) (1957). See also Leonetti v. Boone, 74 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1954).
298. Kovacks v. Venetian Sedan Serv. Inc., 108 So.2d 611 (Fla. App. 1959)
STAT. §
FLA,
FLA. STAT. §

FLA.

299.

59.07 (1957).
It. Civ, P, 2.6(d).

59.07(4) (1957).

FLA.

STAT.

§ 59.07(4). FA. R. Civ. P. 2.6(d);
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the verdict of the jury is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
is reviewable in the appellate courts of this state on an appeal from the

final judgment, even though no motion for directed verdict was made by
the appellant. . . ." (Emphasis added.) This result is contrary to the
federal practice under which the question of the sufficiency of the evidence
can be considered on appeal only by interposing a motion for directed
verdict at the close of all the evidence8 00
Review of order for new trial where granted as to one issue and denied
as to another issue in the same cause. An order granting a new trial on

the issue of damages implicitly sets aside and vacates that portion of the
judgment entered on that issue. The denial of a motion for a new trial
on the issue of liability renders that portion of the judgment a final
one from which an appeal will lie, even though a motion for a new trial
as to the issue of damages was granted.301
Review of an order on a petition for rehearing. An order on a petition

for rehearing in chancery is not subject to review if it is necessary in
considering the correctness of the order to examine the final decree from
which no appeal has been taken. Thus, to raise the merits of a final
decree the notice of appeal should be directed to the final decree and
not the order based on a petition for its rehearing.3 0 2 The filing of a
timely petition for rehearing by a party's adversary suspends as to all
parties the time to appeal from the original decree until the court
3 3
0
disposes of it.
A party on an appeal from an order on a petition for rehearing
cannot attack a final decree from which he has not appealed. This
recognizes the fact that an appeal may be taken from a part of a final
decree, but that an appeal from a part does not bring the reminder
30 4
of the decree before the reviewing court.
300. Ruth v. Sorensen, 104 So.2d 10, 15 (Fla. 1958); Chomont v. Ward, 103 So.2d

635 (Fla. 1958). FLA. STAT. § 59.06(1) (1957): FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.7; FED. R. Civ.

1. 50. For federal position see Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 220 F.2d 82, 85
(8th Cir. 1955). A federal appellate court "can only consider the question of tile
sufficiency of the evidence when that has been made a question of law and this can
only be done by interposing a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the
evidence." See also Kessler v. Schonbrun, 102 So.2d 639 (Fla. App. 1958). The
decision in Ruth v. Sorensen, supra on the point involved overrules Southwestern Lumber
Co. v. Roberts, 99 So.2d 875 (Fla. App. 1958); Lee County Oil Co. v. Marshall,
98 So.2d 510 (Fla. App. 1957); 6551 Collins Avenue Corp. v. Millen, 97 So.2d 490
(Fla. App. 1958). See also Lindsay v. McClaughlin, 311 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App. 1958)
which mis-interpreted the Florida law on point.
301. Wise v. Jacksonville Gas Corp., 97 So.2d 704 (Fla. App. 1957).
302. Klemenko v. Klemenko, 97 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1957). See also Burnup v. Bagley,
100 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1958).
303. Ibid. See Ganzer v. Ganzer, 84 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1956).
304. Burnnp v. Bagley, 100 So.2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1958) (see concurring opinion).
The appeal was from the order modifying the final decree and not from the final
decree. 'lI'e decision found support in ilollywood, Inc. v. Clark, 153 Fla. 501, 15 So.2d
175 (1943) which was an appeal from an amendment to a final decree previously
entered. The FED. R. Civ. P. 73(b) expressly authorizes an appeal from a part of a
final decree. Of course, an appeal from the final decree takes with it the decree as
amended and all its parts, but an appeal from a part takes with it nothing more.
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Review of arbitration proceedings and orders. The court will not
review the findings of fact contained in a statutory arbitration award
and it may not be set aside for any erroneous application of law but only

on grounds of fraud, corruption, gross negligence or misbehavior of the
umpire or one or more of the arbitrators 30 5
SPECIAL AND EXI'RAORDINARY

PROCEEDINGS

Interlocutory Appeals
In General
Interlocutory orders or decrees in equity and orders or decrees entered
after final decree are reviewable by appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory order in a law action may be taken only as to questions of venue
or jurisdiction over the person3 06' For example, an interlocutory appeal may
le taken from an order overruling a motion to dismiss on grounds of
venue in a law action. 3 7 Interlocutory appeals are not reviewable by
certiorari except when it clearly appears no adequate and complete remedy
would be available to petitioner by an appeal after final judgment. Thus,
where a trial court acts without, and in excess of, its jifrisdiction or its
order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may cause

material injury throughout the subsequent proceedings, the remedy by appeal
would be inadequate.308
Examples: Improper and Proper Interlocutory Appeals
Improper: Statutory condemnation proceedings. Interlocutory appeals
are not permitted in actions at law except in respect to orders relating
305. FrLA. STAT. §§ 57.01, 57.07 (1957); Merritt-Chapnman & Scott Corp. v. State
Road Dept., 98 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1957); National Hotel, Inc. v. Koretzy, 96 So.2d 774
(Fla. 1957).
306. F.A.R. 4.2, 3.2(b). Boucher v. Pure Oil Co., 101 So.2d 408 (Fla. App. 1958);
Pullman Co. v. Fleishel, 101 So.2d 188 (Mia. App. 1958) (there is no authority which
authorizes the granting of certiorari to review an order denying summary judgment in
an action at law); Schutzer v. City of Miami, 99 So.2d 729 (Fla. App. 1958) (granting
of defendants's motion for directed verdict is not a final judgment on which an appeal
will lie); Renard v. Kirkbee Hotels, Inc., 99 So.2d 719 (Fa. App. 1958): In accord
with federal decisions which have held that an order granting motion to dismiss a
complaint but not actually dismissing it is not a final decision within the meaning of
the rules and therefore is not appealable, see Turnbull v. CYR, 184 Fed.2d 117 (9th
Cir. 1958). See also Ramsey v. Aronson, 99 So.2d 643 (Fla. App. 1958). (court did not
have jurisdiction to review order granting motion for summary judgment on appeal
and voluntary nonsnit inasmuch as voluntary nonsuit was not a final judgment from
which an appeal would lie).

307. Peterson v. Kirk, 103 So.2d 656 (Fla. App. 1958). See also Central & So. Fla.
Flood Control Dist. v. Dupuis, 109 So.2d 596 (Fla. App. 1959) (the scope of an
interlocutory appeal is limited to review of order appealed),
308. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (la. 1958). h'IleSupreme Court reviewed
an order by certiorari requiring defendant to answer a question on discovery as to the
limits of his liability insurance, and because of his refusal to comply they further ordered
that the defendant's answer to the complaint be stricken and that he be adjudged in
default. Pullman Co. v. Fleishel, 101 So.2d 188 (la. App. 1958). Boucher v. Pure
Oil Co., 101 So.2d 408 (Fla. App. 1958).
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to venue or jurisdiction over the person and since statutory proceedings
are generally treated as actions at law an interlocutory appeal is not
permitted from a statutory condemnation proceeding.309
Proper: Child custody and support orders - alimony orders. The proper
and faster procedure for review of an order directing confinement for the
violation of a child support order or orders involving the modification of
custody or divorce decrees is by an interlocutory appeal rather than an
appeal from the order treated as a final order?' 0 Also, it is now the
proper method to review a post decree order relating to alimony instead
31
of by a writ of certiorari. '
Interlocutory Appeal by Municipality- A Stay Without Supersedeas
rihe Florida Statute providing that the filing of the notice of appeal
by a municipality shall stay the cxecution or performance of the judgment,
decree, or order appealcd from without the necessity of a supcrsedeas bond
also applies to interlocutory appeals in chancery. " 12
Review of Administrative Boards and Agencies
All appellate review of the rulings of any commission or board shall be
by certiorari as providul by the Florida Appellate Rules."',
In board hearing the circuit court acts as an appellate court 1 4 and
thus its judgments, decrees or orders are not appealable to the district
court; but the district court may review same by certiorari.3' 5
309. FIA. STAr. ch. 74 (1957); I.A.I. 4.2. Wilson v, Jacksonville Expressway
Auth., 110 So.2d 707 (Fla. App. 1959).
310. F.A.R. 4.2. Dykes v. Dykes, 104 So.2d 598 (Fla. App. 1958); Epperson v.
Epperson, 101 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1958).
311. F.A.R. 4.2 (a). Fort v. Fort, 104 So.2d 69 (Fla. App. 1958) (in view of
provision in this role for appeals of decrees entered after final decree divorced husband
was not entitled to writ of certiorari to review post decree order relating to alimony.
This superseded statutes on point; FLA. STAT. 59.02 (3) (1957). Formerly interlocutory
orders were reviewable by certiorari and an improvident appeal was treated as a writ
of certiorari. Schucrnan v. Shamas, 97 So.2d 314 (Fla. App. 1957); Connolly v.
Conolly, 86 So2d 167 (Fla. 1956); Haley v. Millan, 100 So.2d 643 (Fla. App. 1958)
(appeal from denial of new trial); Kissing v. McCarthy, 100 So.2d 434 (Fla. App. 1958).
312. F.A.R. 4.2. City of North Miami v. Engel, Ill So.2d 90 (Fla. App. 1959);
FLA. STAT. § 59.14(1)" (1957). The statute is applicable upon the rule announced
in City of Miami v. Lewis, 104 So.2d 70 (Fla. App. 1958) although the appeal there
was from a final judgment at law whereas the case at bar is an interlocutory appeal
from an order in chancery.
313, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Marshall, 106 So.2d 212 (Fla. App. 1958) (workmnen's
compensation proceeding). National 1)airy Products Corp. v. Odham, 100 So.2d 394
(Via. 1958) (Fla. Milk Commission); Codomo v. Shaw, 99 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1958):
Florida Industrial Commission ex ref. Special Disability Fund v. Nat'l Trucking Co., 107
So.2d 397 (Fla. App. 1958) (Fla. Industrial Commission); Swope v. Coryell, 107 So.2d
153 (Fla. App. 1958); Sullivan v. Mayo, 106 So.2d 4 (Fla. App. 1958); Anderson v. Florida Real Estate Commission); Alliance for Conservation of Natural Resources in Pinellas
County v. Furen, 104 So.2d 803 (VIa. App. 1958) (County Water and Navigation
Control Authoritv): Ace Del. Serv. v. Boyd, 100 So.2d 417 (ia. 1958) (Railway and
Public Utilities Commnission).
314. Codomo v. Shaw, 99 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1958).
315. Pinellas County v, F'oren, 104 So.2d 803 (Fla. App. 1958).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL..

XIV

Validation of Bond Proceedings
Allowable Issues in Bond Validation Proceedings
A bond validation proceeding should be used only to decide issues
going directly to the power to issue the securities and the validity of
such proceedings; collateral issue should never be injected into such
proceedings. a' 0
Approval of Freeholders Not Necessary Where Subject Matter
Is Essential to Governmental Existence
A county's petition for validation of certificates of indebtedness issued
to finance the cost of repairs and additions to the courthouse and jail,
and which did not constitute an obligation nor pledge the credit of the
county, was held not to require approval by vote of the freeholders of
the county as required by the Constitution for the issuance of bonds,
because the courthouse and jails are essential to the existence of the
27
government body.3

Extraordinary Writs"118
Constitutional Writs
Writ to preserve subject matter of Pending litigation. The Constitution
of Florida grants to the supreme court, the district courts of appeal and the
circuit courts the power to issue all writs necessary or proper to the
complete exercise of their jurisdiction. These constitutional writs may be
316. State v. City of Miami, 103 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1958). A proceeding to validate
water works system bonds of the City of Miami wasn't available to decide collateral
questions involviug the rights of I)ade County 'to acquire part of the waterworks
system of the city or to take any action affecting the operation thereof or whether
such waterworks system property outside the city was exempt from state taxation.
FLA. STAT. § 75.08 (1957).
317. State v. County of Santa Rosa, 105 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1958). FLA. CoNs'.
art. IX, § 6.FrA STAT. § 75.01 (1957).
318. Certain sections of the Florida Appellate Rules involving extraordinary writs
have been amended as of June 8, 1959, effective September 1st, 1959. They are: Rule
4.5(a) (l)-all applications and original proceedings in the supreme court and district
courts of appeal for extraordinary writs authorized by the Constitution shall be made as
the rules thereafter provide. Rule 4.5(a)(5). This is an amendment to the rule
providing that at least five days notice shall be given to the adverse party of intention
to apply for the issuance of any writ mentioned in this rule. 4.5(c)-The biggest
addition to the new rules has taken place in the section of the rules dedicated to
certiorari proceedings, wherein a detailed statement of the procedure to be followed
in taking certiorari from the district court of appeal to the supreme court has been
stated. The court has more or less codified all the prior statutes, rules, constitutional
sections and case law involving certiorari proceedings into this section. It has taken
the proceedings contained within the particular rule involving certiorari proceedings in
general and has made it apply specifically to certiorari proceedings moving from the
district courts of appeal to the supreme court. An important addition to this section
of the rule would appear to be that if the court decides to entertain proceedings on
the petition, oral argument will be had. Rule 7.2 dealing with the forms for the
petition for writ of certiorari has also been amended. It is suggested that these amendments
be read carefully by both the student and the practicing attorney.
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issued only as to a cause over which the court is properly exercising
jurisdiction.' " Thus, a district court can grant a writ to preserve the
subject matter of a controversy pending the decision of an appeal where
the granting of such a writ is "necessary" and "proper" to complete
the exercise of its jurisdiction. This drastic writ should not be granted
except in extreme urgency as where it appears that appellant will suffer
irreparable damage during the interim between the entry of appeal and
the final decision of the appellate court 320 It should be noted that the
circuit courts may issue constitutional writs in aid of proceedings properly
before them in the exercise of original jurisdiction as well as in the
32 1
exercise of the granted appellate jurisdiction.
Granting of writ by appellate court before appeal is actually taken.
Although there are no Florida cases directly on point, it has been intimated
that the Florida courts would probably follow the federal courts and
recognize an appellate court's power to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction,
"not only after appeals have been filed but prior to the filing of such
appeals in aid of appellate jurisdiction which is only potential and
32 2
incipient."
3 23

Certiorari

Certiorari from district court to supreme court-general procedure.
A decision of a district court of appeal may be reviewed by the supreme
court by certiorari when (1) it affects a class of constitutional or state
officers or (2) decides a question which the district court certifies to be
of great public interest, or (3) it is in direct conflict with a decision of
another district court or with the supreme court on the same point of
law. A condition precedent to the consideration or granting (by the
supreme court) of a petition for certiorari is the filing of a timely petition
for rehearing and a notice of intention to petition for certiorari. This
notice of intention stays the mandate of the district court until the
expiration of the time allowed for filing for certiorari, or until the supreme
court rules on the petition for certiorari.
The stay of the court's mandate under these circumstances is automatic,
there being absolutely no discretion allowed to the district court in this
319. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, §§ 4(2), 5(3), 6(3). Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Gay,
68 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1953).
320. Engel v. City of North Miami, Ill So.2d 92 (Fla, App. 1959). This
was a mandamus action brought to compel the city to repeal resolution for transfer of
police functions to county government and to make provisions for continuing the realtors,
police officers of city, in city's employ and in the present rank or grade. City failed
to disclose that under circumstances of case it was either necessary or proper to complete

exercise of jurisdiction of court on appeal that writ of drastic character prayed for
should be issued.
321. City of North Miami v. Engel, 109 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 1959).

322. City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Fontainbleau Hotel Corp., 109 So.2d
599, 601 (Fla. App. 1959). E.g., United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 334 U.S.
258 (1947).
323. See rule amendments discussed in note 318 supra,
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instancea 2 'i'iie petition for certiorari must lbe filed in the supreme court
within sixty days from the rendition of the decision, order, judgment or
dccrcc sought to be reviewed; it is the date of the rendition or entry of
the order, judgment or decree and not the date of its filing that is material
in this computation. If a party files a notice of intention to petition for
certiorari he is subject to penalties if he fails to actually file such a
petition. 3251 A decision of the district court is not decmcd to be recorded
if a petition for rehearing has been filed until the court disposes of said

petition. These filing requirements arc jurisdictional.
Certiorari not available when appeal is available. Certiorari is not
available to review a judgment which may be reviewed by appeal,. 2 Thus,
an interlocutory order at law granting a sunma"ry judgment only as to
32 7
question of liability is not reviewable by certiorari:
Certiorari-conflict of decisions. The supreme court has granted
certiorari to review a conflict between a decision under review and one
of the supreme court decisions cven though there was no conflict between the
decision under review and the prior decisions of the supreme court relied
28
on by the court of appeal to support its judgment 1

324. F.A.R. 4.5(c)(6). City of Miami Beach v. State ex tel. Fontainebleau Hotel
Corp., 111 So.2d 437 (Ha. 1959); City of Miami Beach v. State ex Tel. Fontainebleau
Hotel Corp., 109 So.2d 24 (Fla. App. 1959).
325. F.A.R. 4.5(c)(6), 4.5(c) (1). Schutzer v. City of Miami, Ill So.2d 94
(Fla. App. 1959) (petition had not been filed, mandate, which had been withheld
during period in which certiorari should have been filed would be ordered to issue
and defendant would be required to pay damages in the amount of $50. Russom v. State,
109 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1959) (supreme court held that where more than 60 days had
elapsed between date of denial of petition for rehearing of judgment of district court
of appeal affirming defendant's conviction, and filing of application for certiorari in
the supreme court dismissed defendant's petition for certiorari; the requirement being
jurisdictional). Atkinson v. State, 109 So.2d 581 (Fla. App. 1959) (should be filed
prior to denial of hearing; i.e., notice of intention to apply to court for writ of certiorari);
Meeks v. Kohten, 109 So.2d 46 (Fla. App. 1959) (notice of intention to apply to
supreme court for writ of certiorari not being filed within time provided by F.A.R.
4.5(c)(6) this court has lost jurisdiction of said cause and it is ordered that the
pleadings herein mentioned be and they are hereby stricken from the record); Christopher
v. Oliver, 103 So.2d 240 (Fla. App. 1958) (untimely filing). See Central Truck Lines
Inc. v. Boyd, 106 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1958) (involves time for filing and FLA. S-rAT.
§ 59.08 (1957), supreme court held that while petition for certiorari sought review
of order denying petition to re-open proceedings order attacked was original order which
had been granted more than 8 months prior to the date of petition for certiorari and the
suprenIe court was without jurisdiction under applicable statutes and rules 60 days
after entry of order).
326. Hastings v. Osius, 104 So.2d 21 (Flia. 1958). The court has often held that
a writ of certiorari "will not be granted" when tbere is a plain, adequate and complete
remedy by appeal, but whether the right to appeal existed does not appear to be clear.
The case is unique in that the court granted certiorari to review the discretion of the
court of appeals in granting certiorari when the jurisdiction of the court of appeals
to grant certiorari was not involved. The effect of the holding is that it ought not have
granted certiorari because an appeal was available.
327. Gamble v. Ilalman. 102 So.2d 638 (Fla. App. 1958). See also cases cited
note 306 nipra.
328. Bilingham v. Thiele, 109 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1959) (overruling anything to the
contrary in Ward v. FaOde, 154 FIa. 383, 17 So.2d 691 (1944).
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Conflict of decisions- refusal to dismiss an appeal not a decision
reviciable by certiorari. In another case a writ of certiorari was sought
on the grounds that the district court of appeal in refusing to dismiss
an appeal on jurisdictional grounds rendered a "decision" ill direct conflict
with a decision of the supreme court. ' The supreme court denied
certiorari because such an order of the district court was not a "decision"
within the meaning of the constitutional provision applicable to certiorari,
but the court noted that the denial was without prejudice to petitioner
to apply for a writ of prohibition.
Certiorari- the order must be final. A county judge's order revoking
the returns of guardians and discharging them as incompetent and setting
for hearing the question of whether the guardian had committed defalcations
is not a final order so as to permit the filing of petition for certiorari in
the circuit court prior to the hearing set by the county judge. 3
statutory proceedings control the rules. The
Certiorari-special
procedure prescribed by the Duval County Teachers Tenure Act requiring a
petition by the teacher for writ of certiorari to be filed within ten days from
discharge is a "special statutory proceeding" and therefore the form, content,
procedure and time for pleading prescribed in such act control where a
conflict exists over the terms of the 1954 horida Rules of Civil Procedure
which allow a general sixty day period for the filing of a petition for
certiorari. 3 3 '
Certiorari- Service of brief in response to certiorari. The respondent
to a petition for writ of certiorari is required to file an opposing brief
and servc a copy of it upon the petitioner within twenty days after he
has been served with a copy of petitioner's brief.3 3 2
Mandamus
In general. An original proceeding in mandamus which named the
State Motor Vehicle Commissioner as respondent and alleged that rights
given by statute to petitioner were being denicd him by respondent typifies
the type of proceeding that falls within the jurisdiction of the supreme
court as indicated by the Florida Constitution which provides that the

329. Diamond Berk Ins. Agency v. Goldstein, 100 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1958) (petitioners
contended that the district court of appeal lacked jurisdiction because appellants filed
notice of appeal in district court instead of the trial court. See also Counne v. Saffan,
87 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1956).
330. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v, Davis, 97 So.2d 715 (Fla. App. 1957).
FMA. R. Cw. P. 2.17. FL.A. CoNsT. art. V, § 9. l%.A. S'rAr. § 746.14 (1957).
331. FL. R. Civ. P. 2.17. Htarley v. Board of Pub. Instr., 103 So.2d Ill (Mla. 1958).
FLA. STAT. § 230.01 (1957). FLA. R. Civ. P. A.
332. 3 Woolin & Son, Inc. v. McKain, Ill So.2d 475 (Fla. App. 1959). F.A.R.

4.5(c)( ).
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supreme court may issue writs of mandamus when a state commission
33
authorized to represent the public generally is named as respondent. 3
Existence of legal right to writ. A petition for a writ of mandamus
requiring a county board of education to award petitioner a contract as a
"contract teacher" was improperly dismissed on the ground that it failed
to show a clear legal right to the writ, because it was legally sufficient
of an
and made out a prima facie case which justified the issuance
34
alternative writ and a disposition of the cause on the merits,.
Prohibition
Prohibition- right of direct appeal to supreme court necessary. The
supreme court has the authority to issue writs of prohibition to the district

courts and to trial courts only when questions are involved upon which
a direct appeal to the supreme court is allowed as a matter of right.
There is no such limitation on district or circuit courts.335
Allegations of error by lower court insufficient prima facie case. A
rule of prohibition should issue only to restrain an inferior court from
acting without authority of law or from exceeding their powers. Allegations
contained in a suggestion applying for a writ of prohibition that the
lower court has committed error is insufficient to establish the required
prima facie case necessary for the issuance of a rule to show cause, or
ultimately, a writ of prohibition? 3 Prohibition will not issue against a
judge who has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter in the
absence of a showing that he proposes to exceed his jurisdiction in any
respect. 3 7
Quo Warranto
A real interest in subject matter necessary. A private citizen without
any apparent real interest in a corporation is not entitled to institute
proceedings for the state challenging the corporate existence without
permission of the attorney general to use his name. 3 8
Proper procedure to have land excluded from boundaries of a municipality. An injunction is not the proper method to restrain a municipality
333. State ex tel.
Wedgworth Farms, Inc. v. Thompson, 101 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1958).
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(-2). See also City of Miami Beach v. State ex Tel.
Fontainebleau
Hotel Corp., 109 So.2d 599 (Fla. App. 1959).

334. Irawick v. Board of Pub. Instr. 110 So.2d 86 (Fla. App. 1959). FiA. R.
Civ. P. 2.19.
335. Fla. Const. art. V, §§ 4(2), 5(3), 6(3). See State ex telPeterson v. Weissing,
100 So.2d 373 (Fla. 1958).
336. F.A.R. 4.5(d) State ex tel Fla. R.R. & Pub. Utilities Comm'n. v. Taylor,
104 So.2d 745 (Fla. App. 1958); See State ex tel.Schwarz v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 137,
194 So. 313 (1940); Curtis v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 853, 132 So. 677 (1931).
337. State ex rel. Josephson v. Revels, 100 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1958).

338. Washington County Kennel Club, Ine. v. State ex telMcAllister, 107 So.2d
176 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.20. FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (1957).
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from exercising jurisdiction and control over the plaintiff's land. Quo
\Varranto is the proper remedy to have plaintiff's land excluded from
the territorial limits of a municipality.-33
Certified Questions
Nature of Answer Sought

A certified question will not be answered if it is not determinative
of the cause and the certifying court has both the power and controlling
precedent to adjudicate the question the answers to which can be reviewed
on appeal if necessary. 40
Certified Question as a Basis for Certiorari

The certification of a question as one of great public interest constitutes
a sufficient predicate on which a party may petition the supreme court
4t
for a writ of certiorari to re-examine its decision in another case.3
Supersedeas on Appeal - Injunctions
Supersedeas on Appeal
Discretion of the trial court. There is no abuse of discretion by a

chancellor in denying a supersedeas to an appellant where he obviously
believes that the appellee is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
subject matter of the litigation. 4 2 The trial court did not abuse its discretion
indenying a wife's petition to stay her husband's Florida divorce proceedings pending the outcome of her subsequently brought New York divorce
action or in refusing to grant a supersedeas on the wife's interlocutory appeal
3 43
from said order of denial.
Municipalities: exclusive authority to require supersedeas bond in

appellate court. The filing of a notice of an appeal by the state or any
of its political subdivisions in a purely official capacity automatically stays
the execution or performance of the judgment appealed without the
necessity of a supersedeas bond unless one is expressly required by the

appellate court. Also the injunction chapter of the Florida Statutes provides
339. Caldwell v. Losche, 108 So.2d 295 (Fla. App. 1959). FLA. STAT. ch. 80 (1957);
FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.20. See also 74 C.BS. Quo Warranto § 4 at 181 (1951).

340. F.A.R. 4.6; Chapman v. Slaff, 101 So.2d 413 (Fla. App. 1958)
341. Walker v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. of Baltimore, 101 So.2d 437 (Fla.
App. 1958). Question of whether surety on official bond furnished by deputy sheriff
was liable in damages for unlawful acts of deputy sheriff done under color of his office,
as distinguished from acts done by virtue of his office, was one of great public interest
warranting certification of question to supreme court. Court held him liable as to
latter acts and nut former type. Chief Judge Sturgis dissented in this case as to the
petition for certification being granted because he felt the subject before the supreme
court was moot and authorities supporting decision were sound and that decision did
not have the constitutional importance prescribed by certificate.
342. F.A.R. 5.1; Froelich v. Rowley, 102 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1958). SuP. CT. RULE 19.
343. F.A.R. 5.10, 5.1. Linguanti v. Linguanti, 96 So.2d 906 (Fla. App. 1957).
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in effect that a trial court is without authority to require a municipality
to post any bond upon any injunction or appeal 44 Since a municipality
is a political subdivision of the state this former statute in effect modifies
the latter and creates an exclusive authority in the reviewing court to
require supersedeas of a municipality appealing in a purely official
capacity, 45
Statutory Note - Injunction: Bond
Injunction - Trial court may require state or political subdivision to

post bond. Note the effect of the following statute passed by the 1959
legislature on the immediately prcceding paragraphs: "When any injunction
is issued upon complaint of the state or any officer, agency or political
subdivision thereof, the court may in its discretion, having due regard to
the public interest, require or dispense with the requirement of a bond
with or without surety and conditioned as the circumstances may make

cqui table.

'' 0

Bond Vhen Judgment is for Recovery of Money not Secured

Excessiveness. Where a judgment or dccree is from a money judgment,
the appellant is entitled as a matter of right to a stay upon the posting
of a properly conditioned bond. Where a money judgment is for $55,000
a supersecleas bond in the sum of $110,000 is excessive and should be
"
reduced to approxinately $60,000.- 7
Liability of surety. A superseceas bond on appeal from a money
judgment shall be conditioned to satisfy the judgment contained in the
final decree or any modification not increasing its amount. The surety
on such an appcllate bond is liable to the extent of the terms of his
obligation and no further. Thus, where a judgment on appeal is affirmed
in part and reversed in part and the cause is remanded with directions
for an accounting upon which a just decree should be entered, tie forth-

coning decree would itself be subjcct to appellate review and the partial
affirmance of the original decree is ineffective to mature the obligation
48
of the surety on the existing superscdcas bond.3
Surety - liability for attorneys fees. A surety on a supersedeas bond
is not liable for attorneys fees incurred on the appeal in tie absence of
344. See statutory note material in text accompanying note 346 infra.

345. City of Miami v. Lewis, 104 So.2d 70 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA. STAT. §
59.14(2)(3) (1957) (express power); F,. S.v, § 64,04 (1957) (general power).
City of Miami Beach v. State ex ret Fontainebleau Hoatei Corp., 109 So.2d 599
(Fla. App. 1959). For the purpose of this statute the appellate court is that court to
which the appeal or intended appeal is to be taken.
346. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-58,

347. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Canz, 111 So.2d 91 (Fla. App. 1959).
F.A.R. 5.3(a), 5.7, 5.10.
348. Kulhanjian v, Moomiian, 105 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1958). F.A.R. 5.7.
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a provision therefor, or an express contractual provision. However, the

amount placed by appellant with the surety to indemnify him is considered
principal of the appellant and the attorneys fees may be deducted from
that amount as long as the reduction in the deposit is not detrimental
to the surety.3"0
Injunctions
Procedure necessary to enjoin execution on a law judgment. An equity

court will not enjoin the execution of a law judgment where the procedures
for the issuance of the injunction are not properly followed. The statutory
proceedings required for the issuance of an injunction include the filing
of a complaint praying its issuance; and where a proceeding at law is
sought to be enjoined it shall issue only on motion to the court after
reasonable notice of such motion is served on the adversary and after
the posting of a sufficient bond by the movant 50
Injunction-to presen,e subject nutter of pending mandamus action.

It is within the power and discretion of the circuit court to enter an
injunction order to maintain the status quo of the subject matter of a
pending mandamus action until its determination in that court. However,
once the court reaches a decision in the mmadamus action, the injunction
issued in aid of the mandamus jurisdiction is automatically terminated and
in the event of an appeal, any other necessary order in the aid of jurisdiction
would have to be made in the appellate court."'"
PART III
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Tim COURTS OF FLORIDA
The Courts in General: Effect of Repealing Jurisdictional Authority
If a statute which creates the jurisdiction of a court is repealed or
otherwise nullified, the jurisdiction of that court falls and this is so even
as to pending causes, unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause.
349. F.A.R. 5.7. Smith v, Smith, 100 So,2d 391 (Fla. 1958). See Larson v.
Higginbotham, 66 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1953); Htardwick Trust Co. v. Dodge, 117 Vt. 73,

84 A. 2d 583, 37 A.L.R. 2d 523 (1951) (majority view).
350. FLA. S'LA'r. §§ 64.01, 64.02. 64.03 (1957). Se also FLUkv R. Civ. P. 3.19.

City of Miami Beach v. Greater Miami Hebrew Academy 108 So.2d 50 (Fla. App. 1959)
(This was a suit to enjoin enforcement of zoning ordinance as to lots purchased by
plaintiff in single-family resident district); Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Kaplan, 108
So.2d 503 (Fla, App. 1959) Tenant's action for injooctive relief and damages growing
out of alleged breach of lease by landlord. '['his ease involved lease to a tenant who
was a doctor and he claims exclusive right to operate medical offices in landlord's hotel
and also reference right. 'Webb v. Cregory, 105 So.2d 183 (Fla. App. 1958) (suit for
an injunction of the execotion of a judgment granted by civil court of record).

351. City of North Miami v. Engel, 109 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 1959).
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This rule is also applicable when a jurisdiction dependent upon a statute
adopted as a rule of court is extinguished by another rule of court. 5sa
The Supreme Court
General Review Policy

The power of the supreme court to review decisions of the district
court of appeal is limited and strictly prescribed. The new rules intend
that review by the district courts of appeal in most instances should be
final and absolute. The theory being that the supreme court is to act as

the supervisory body of the judiciary, exercising appellate power when
essential to the settlement of issues of public importance
and for the
32
preservation of uniformity of principle and practice
Supreme Court - Review by Appeal
Direct appeal - construction vs. application of constitutional provision.

A direct appeal to the supreme court is authorized from a final decree
construing a controlling provision of the Florida or federal constitution, or
passing on the validity of a state statute. The final decree assaulted must
constitute a construction as distinguished from an application of a controlling constitutional provision. A municipal ordinance is not a state
statute as used in constitutional provision authorizing direct appeals to
the supreme court.3 53
Direct appeal where decision on validity of a statute inherent in decree
of trial court. The supreme court assumed jurisdiction of an appeal where
it was inherent in the opinion and judgment of the trial court that the
validity of a state statute was passed upon even though such fact did

351a. State ex relArnold v. Revels, 109 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1959). See De ]a Rama
S. S. Co. v. United States, 344 U. S. 386 (1952).
352. F.A.R. 2.1 (5); FLA. CoxsT. art. V, § 4(2); FLA. STAT. ch. 25 (1957).
See Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1958); Sinnanon v. Fowlkes, 101 So.2d 375
(Fla 1958).
353. State v. Bruno, 107 So.2d 9 (Fa. 1958) (supreme court will entertain an
appeal when constitutionality of state statute is involved); Armstrong v. City of Tampa,
106 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1958) (a municipal ordinance is not a state statute as used in
constitutional provisions authorizing direct appeals to the supreme court); Cannazzi
v. Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, 104 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1958) (where
property owner contended his property was being taken away without just compensation
and the court found that if a property right in a plaintiff did not exist it therefore
became unnecessary to apply the constitutional provisions and thus no construction or
interpretation of the constitution was involved); Milligan v. Wilson, 104 So.2d 35
(Fla. 1958); Evans v. Carroll, 104 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1958) (where examination of
record before supreme court revealed that constitutional questions posed are merely
colorable and unrelated to the particular facts involved, no substantial basis is presented
for direct appeal from trial court to supreme court as a matter of right). F.A.R.
2.1 (a)(5), 2.1 (b). FLA, CONST. art. V, § 4; DECLARAToN or, RicivTs § 1; Dade County v.
Kelly, 99 So,2d 856 (Fla. 1957) (case involved interpretation of the Dade County
Home Rule Amendment to the Florida Constitution). F.A.R. 2.1 (a) (5) (a); FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 4.
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was no specific ruling upon
not appear in the record-on-appeal and there
54
courtA
lower
the
of
decree
final
the
in
it
Effect of failure to raise part of decree declaring a statute unconstitu-

tional. The supreme court has refused to accept jurisdiction of an appeal
even though the final decree did declare a statute invalid. The appellant
failed to raise that aspect of the decree and instead raised the points that
the trial judge was without jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality.
of the statute and that his adversaries were estopped to raise the question.
By failure to raise the constitutional point which would have given the
supreme court jurisdiction, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned
it and the case will not be considered even though it appears to be within
5m
the jurisdiction of the supreme court because of the trial court's ruling 1
Supreme Court-Review by Certiorari
In general. Review by certiorari is limited to where the reviewing party
shows that there is a direct conflict on the same point of law either among
the districts or with the supreme court, 5 6 or the decision affects a class
of constitutional or state officers or is one certified by the district court to
be of great public interest. A city police officer is not a "constitutional or
state officer" within the terms of the applicable statutes of the constitution.5
The supreme court may also issue writs of certiorari to commissions established by law.
Certiorari denied when available elsewhere. Also, the supreme court
will not ordinarily issue a writ of certiorari to review the rulings of an
administrative board while a court of inferior jurisdiction also has the
power to do so. The petition in such a case will be transferred to the
proper court where it will be treated as if it had originally been filedPa ' 8
354. Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., Ill So.2d
439 (la. 1959). FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2). Cf. State v. Bruno, 107 So.2d 9
(Fla. 1958); State v. Bruno, 104 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1958). See text material to
note 258 supra.
355. P.A.R. 2.1(a)(2), 2.1(a)(5)(d). City of Miami v. Steckloff, Ill So.2d

446 (Fln. 1959).

356. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2). F.A.R. 2 .1(a)(5)(b). Sinnamon v. Fowlkes,
101 So.2d 375 (P1a. 1958); Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1958); Diamond
Berk Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Goldstein, 100 So.2d 420 (Vla. 1958). See also In re Weiss'
Estate, 106 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1958); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 462 (1959). Lake v. Lake,
103 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1958). (Supreme court would not examine the record to determine
whether district court's per curiarn opinion conflicted with other supreme court
opinions where it did not appear from restricted examination required in certiorari

proceedings). City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 111 So.2d
437 (Fla. 1959). Billingham v. Tuiele, 109 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1959) (certiorari granted
conflict present). Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Branham, 104 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1958) (no
conflict shown). Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 18 So.2d 752 (Fla. App. 1959)
(writ decreed no prima facie showing of conflict).

357. Haken v. City of Miami Beach, 108 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1959).
358. F.A.R. 2.1(a)(5)(b); National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Odham, 100 So.2d 394
(Fla. 1958) (supersedes FLA. STAT. § 501.09(5) (1957); writ was transferred to
circuit court where it would be treated as if it had originally been filed there.
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Thus in Codomo v. Shaw, 5 ' the supreme court upon determining
that the circuit court could entertain a review by certiorari of an order of
the Florida Real Estate Commission, refused to assume jurisdiction and
transferred the petition to that court.
Power to Issue All Writs Necessary to Complete Exercise of
Jurisdiction- Mandamus- Prohibition

The supreme court may issue writs of mandamus when "a state officer,
board, commission or other agency authorized to represent the public
generally

. . .

is named as respondent.

.

."360

The rules authorize the court

to issue writs of prohibition to commissions established by law and to
lower tribunals "when questions are involved upon which a direct appeal
to the supreme court is allowed as a matter of right." It may also issue
'all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction." 3 8 '
Apparently, combining these two powers the supreme court took jurisdiction
of a prohibition proceeding to prevent a circuit court from taking jurisdiction
of a mandanius proceeding. The original litigation had been before the
supreme court and the instant proceeding involved a question relating to
the enforcement of the mandate it (the supreme court) had issued in
02
the prior case.3
Statutory Note-

Supreme Court Review of Commission Orders

Review of Workmen's Compensation Orders. This 1959 amendment
of the Florida Statutes provides that the review of compensation orders
of the Industrial Commission after July 1, 1959 shall be by the supreme
court rather than the district court of appeal.103
Review of Florida Real Estate Commission Orders. Appellate review
of the Florida Real Estate Commission shall be by certiorari to the district
court, or when permitted, to the supreme court as provided by the
Florida Appellate Rules or by law.""'
The District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Appeals from Trial Courts
Juvenile court is a trial court. All appeals from trial courts must be
taken to the district court of appeal unless under the constitution the
359. 99 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1957).
360. l'LA. CONsr. att. V, § 4; F.A.R. 2.1(a)(5)(b). State ex relWedgworth
Farms, JIc. v. Thimpsou, 101 So.2d 381 (lia. 1958),
361. F.A.R. 2.1(a)(5), 21(b), 2.1(e).
362. State ex tellosephson v. Revels, 100 So.2d 813 (Pha. 1958) (writ denied;
judge had iurisdiction aid there was 11o showing that hc iutended to exceed his
jurisdiction il any respect),
363. FLA. STAT, §§ 440.25(4)(c), 440.27(1) (19591.
364. Fla. laws 1959, ch. 59-197; YA. S'rAr. § 475.35 (1959).
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appeal may be taken directly to the supreme court or to a circuit court.3 5
The district court of appeal, of its own motion, may dismiss an appeal
not prosecuted in accordance with the appellate rules. 6 " A review of an
order of a circuit court reversing a juvenile court -order was sought by
certiorari in the district court of appeals. The district court granted
certiorari and quashed the order of the circuit court. The court held that
a juvenile court for appellate purposes is a trial court and that the circuit
courts no longer had jurisdiction to hear such cases on appeal due to the
new constitutional provision which vests such appellate jurisdiction in
67
the district courts of appeal.
Appeal from civil courts of record. The statutory jurisdiction in the
circuit courts to entertain appeals from civil courts of record has also
been repealed and is now constitutionally within the jurisdiction of the
38
district court of appeal.
Trial Court as Final Appellate Court

-

Possible Review by Certiorari

A decision of a trial court in the exercise of its authorized final
appellate jurisdiction may be reviewed by certiorari within established limits
to correct a departure from essential requirements of law, but not to pass
generally on the correctness of the ruling on the merits. 3 9
The Circuit Courts
Administrative Boards and Agencies - Review by Appeal
The statutory right of appeal from administrative boards and agencies
to the circuit courts has been repealed because the language enabling
the legislature to provide for the final appellate jurisdiction of the circuit
courts has been eliminated from the Florida Constitution. 370 The legislature
may still provide for the original jurisdiction of the circuit courts. The
constitution now provides that the district courts "shall have such powers
t3
of direct review of administrative action as may be provided by law.' "
The Florida Appellate Rules provide that "all appellate review of the
365. F.A.R. 2.2; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(3).
366. Carson v. Aluminum Prod., Inc., 106 So.d 864 (Fla. App. 1958). But see
Kirby v. State, 107 So.2d 197 (Fla. App. 1958) (criminal action was technically
subject to dismissal due to improper appellate procedure but court did not dismiss
due to plaintiff's poverty and lack of counsel).
367. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(3), contains jurisdiction of district court of appeal;
art. V, § 6(3), contains jurisdiction of circuit courts; art. V, § 4(2), contains
jurisdiction of supreme court. FLA. STAT. § 39.14 (1957) which did authorize appeal
in this situation to the circuit court is now invalid. ScC In re C.E.S., 106 So.2d 610
(Fla. App. 1958) (juvenile court is a trial court); State v. J. K., 104 So.2d 113
(Fla. App. 1958).

368. Rosenblum %.Boss, 101 So.2d 596 (Fla. App. 1958) (case nullified FLA. STAr.
§ 33.11 (1957).

FLA. CONST. art. V, Sec. 5(c) as amended 1956.

369. State v. Katz, 108 So.2d 60 (Fla. App. 1959).
370. Codomno %.Shaw, 99 So.2d 849 (Fi. 1958) (for example, FLA. SrA'r. § 475,35
(1957) repealed by the rules).
371. FLA. CONST, art. V, § 5(3).
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shall be by certiorari as provided
rulings of any commission or 8board
12
by the Florida Appellate Rules."
Court of Final Appellate Jurisdiction from Criminal Court of
Record - CertiorariNot Allowed

Circuit courts have final appellate jurisdiction of all misdemeanors tried
in the criminal court of record. Certiorari can not be used to effectuate an
unauthorized appeal thereof to the district courtA37
Method of Determining Number of Judges for Each Circuit
In an advisory opinion to the governor, the supreme court stated
that for the purposes of determining the population of a judicial circuit
and the number of judges authorized for such circuit, the population
counts of a single county under a special census may be combined with
the population count under874the last proceeding regular census of other
counties in a judicial circuit.
Jurisdiction to Enjoin Private Corporations
The circuit court has jurisdiction to enjoin and restrain (private)
care institutions as petitioned for by the
corporations from operating child
75
Department of Public Health' 1
Review of Charge to Jury: Unassailable Discretion
The circuit courts, when sitting as appellate tribunals have an unassailable discretionary power in deciding whether or not to review charges
made to the jury when no objections were interposed at trial.N76
Jurisdiction: Conflict with County Judge's Courts as to Real Property
The circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in all actions
involving the titles or boundaries of real estate.877 The county judge's
courts have jurisdiction of the settlement of estates and other matters
and duties usually pertaining to courts of probate. 378 There is a great
deal of uncertainty in the law as to the extent of a county judge's jurisdiction
to construe and effectuate its decree in regard to real property in view
of the constitutional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to circuit courts in
actions involving title to realty.""
372. F.A.R. 4.1.
373. See note 369 supra.
374. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 96 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1957).
375. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Galilean Children's Home, 102 So,2d 388
(Fla. App. 1958).

376. Townsend v. State, 97 So.2d 712 (Fla. App. 1957).

377. FLA. CONST. art. V, . 6(3).
378. FLA. COxST. art. V, . 7(3).
379. See In re Feldman's Estate, 109 So.2d 107 (Fla. App. 1959); In re Weiss'
Estate, 102 So.2d 154 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. denied, 106 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1958).
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County Judge's Court

Jurisdiction: Cannot Determine Validity of Deeds
County judge's courts are statutory courts of limited jurisdiction within
which is the power to construe and determine the validity of wills. However,
this does not include the power to incidentally determine in such litigation
the validity of deeds or the satisfaction of a mortgage allegedly executed
by the decedent and delivered during his lifetime since the circuit courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction of actions involving title to realty. 8 0
Jurisdiction to Assign Dower: Lack of Such Power in Circuit Courts
The county judge's courts have the primary jurisdiction to assign dower
and the circuits courts do not have such jurisdiction except as an incident to
the granting of full relief in a suit cognizable in equity. Even if the
pleading alleges facts entitling the pleader to equitable relief on some other
grounds, a court of equity does not have the power to assign dower
independent of any other relief1 where the proofs fail to establish a basis
38
for such other equitable relief.
Civil Court of Record
Affirmative Equitable Relief Not Available
In the civil court of record, equitable defenses must be urged by
way of defense and not affirmatively since it is a statutory court of limited
3 82
jurisdiction which does not possess equitable powers.
Jurisdiction:Actions for Removal of Tenants
A summary proceeding for removal of a tenant may be brought in
the civil court of record as well as the county judge's court and the
statutory procedures originally enacted for such proceedings in the latter
38 3
court also apply to the former court.
Statutory Note: Civil Court of Record
A 1959 amendment to the Florida Statutes abolishes the civil courts
of record in all counties having a population of not less than 300,000
inhabitants and not having home rule under the constitution upon the
380. In re Coleman's Estate, 103 So.2d 237 (Fla.

App. 1958)

(this case was

decided before the constitutional amendments of 1956). FLA. STAT. §§ 36.01, 36.02
(1957). Also see FLA, STAT. §§ 733.02, 732.01, 732.41 (1957); FLA. CONST. art. V,
. 6(3), art. V 4 7.
381. Coleman v. Davis, 106 So.2d 81 (Fla. App. 1958).
382. FLA. STAT. §§ 33.02, 33.14 (1957). Klein v. C.F.C. Corp., 103 So.2d
120 (Fla. App. 1958).
383. FLA. STrAT. §§ 33.14, 83.21. 83.27 (1957). Placid York Co. v. Calvert Hotel,
Inc., 109 So.2d 604 (Fla. App. 1959) (the statutory procedure for appeal from the
now extinct county courts does not apply). FLA. STAT. § 83.38 (1957).
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retirement, resignation, disability or expiration of the present term of
office or death of the judge of any such court. It also provides for the
transfer of eases pending in such civil courts upon their abolition and
the procedure to be followed therefor. The act further provides that all
cases not so transferred within one year from the date such civil court of
record is abolished shall be deenied abated for want of prosecution and
38 4
dismissed without prejudice.

Justice of the Peace Courts
Statutory Note: Justice of the Peace Courts

Jurisdiction: landlord and tenant proceedings. A 1959 amendment to
the chapter of the Florida Statutes dealing with the Justice of the Peace
courts and their jurisdiction provides:
In all counties in the state having a population of more than
four hundred thousand (400,000) according to the latest official

state-widc decennial census, every justice of the peace court shall
have concurrent jurisdiction in all cases at law relating to landlord
and tenant, wherein the matter in controversy does not exceed,
exclusive of interest and cost, the sum of one hundred dollars
($100.00) .385
Tin, JuDcEs

Disqualification of a Judge
Suggestion of Disqualification
Distinction of effect between suggestion of disqualificationand affidavits
of prejudice. A judge may, by his own order, disqualify himself from
presiding over any pending cause upon the filed suggestion of any party
to the cause or that of any person interested in the subject matter of
the litigation. The suggestion for disqualification must allege the grounds
for disqualification and set out facts in their support. A judge will automatically disqualify himself if the tnith of the suggestion is apparent
from the record, or upon the filing by a party to the cause of a properly
supported affidavit that he will not receive a fair trial due to the prejudice
or bias of the presiding judge."' 8
A motion to transfer an appeal entitled "affidavit of prejudice" which
was not properly verified was treated as a suggestion for disqualification.
The motion was denied 8 7 since its truth did not appear on the face
of the record and its only ascertainable ground was that the appellant
would prefer another court.
Laws 1959, ch, 59-516;
;84. FlIa.
385. Fla. Laws 1959, ch, 59-284;

386.

FLA. STAT.

FLA. STAT.
LA. STAT.

§§ 38.02, 38.10 (1957).

§ 33.00] (1959).
§ 37.011 (1959).

387. Ibid. Ilscavne Associates, Inc. v.Carson, 104 So.2d 871 (Fla. App, 1958) (motion
failed to set out facts nor does itallege grounds for disqualification contained in
sections 38.02 of Fla. Stat.j; Shotkin v. Rowe, 100 So.2d 429

(Fla. App. 1958).
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Testing legal sufficiency of the affidavit of prejudice. The trial judge,
in ruling upon an affidavit of prejudice may test its legal sufficiency but
cannot consider its truth and veracity. The test of sufficiency is whether or
not the affidavit shows that the party making it fears he will not receive
a fair trial at the hands of the judge; it is the state of mind of the affiant
and not that of the judge that is determinative. If the affidavit meets the
test the judge niust retire himself from the case. Thus a judge who
expressed his belief during the trial that the defendant Was a liar and
did not deserve to be put on probation was in error in refusing to disqualify
himself upon the defendant's affidavit of prejudice and he was subsequently
without authority to act upon defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.3 8
Impeachment of Judge - Disbarment Proceedings
The Florida Constitution provides that a judge can be removed from
office only by impeachment. The Board of Governors of the state bar
does not have authority to challenge a judge's conduct as an attorney
prior to the time lie became a judge as long as he remains a duly qualified
and acting judge. The disbarment proceedings would not directly remove
a judge from office but would eventually lead to it indirectly; the state
bar will not be allowed to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.38 9
Statutory Note: Judges
Disqualification of party - but not by reason of being a citizen of a
municipality involved in suit. This 1959 amendment to the Florida Statutes
relates to the disqualification of judges, providing for his disqualification
when lie is a party to the suit. Any act done or attempted to be done by
any judge so disqualified, whether done inadvertently or otherwise shall
be null and void and of no effect. "No judge shall be disqualified for
sitting in trial of any suit of which any county or municipal corporation
is a party by reason that such judge is a resident or taxpayer of such
county or municipal corporation."' 100
Judge's Power to Punish - Contempt Proceedings
"Any act which is calculated to interfere with, hinder or obstruct the
proper flow of justice may be a contcmpt."' aDi In Florida every court has
the statutory power to punish contempts against the court. The common
law rule that in cases of indirect or constructive contempts a sworn

by

388. Crosley v. State, 97 So.2d 181 (Fla. App. 1957)
389. FLA. CoNsi. art. 5 .§ 1, 13, 17, 18, 23. In re

(criminal case).
Proposed Disciplinary Action

Fla. Bar against circuit judge, 103 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1958).

390. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-43; FLA. STAT. . 38.01 (1959).
391. Dodd v. State, 110 So.2d 22, 25 (Fla. App. 1959). See Contempt of Court
in Florida. 9 MNIAM L.Q. 281 (1955).
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general denial by the alleged contemptor was conclusive and entitled him
to a discharge has been superseded by a statute providing that whether
the contempt be direct, indirect or constructive the court shall proceed
to hear and determine all questions of law and fact. The punishment
for contempt to be imposed by a justice of the peace is limited to a $20
fine or twenty-four hours imprisonment. There is no such monetary or
time limitation as to imprisonment for contempt imposed on the other
30 2
Florida courts.
Tin ATTORNEYS
Jurisdictionto Discipline
The people by approving revised Article 5 of the Florida Constitution
as of July 1st, 1957 eliminated whatever statutory or inherent disciplinary
power over attorneys that the circuit courts had previously held. The
legislature was divested of any legislative control in this area. The revised
judicial article of the constitution vested the supreme court with exclusive
jurisdiction in matters involving the admission and discipline of attorneys.
However, the supreme court by rule of court has given back to the circuit
court of the judicial circuit in which the accused attorney's office is
located its pre-existing statutory power of discipline. These proceedings
are subject to supervision and review by the supreme court.393
Foreign Attorneys Practicing in Florida Courts
An appeal filed by a foreign attorney is subject to dismissal in the
absence of an order granting permission to such attorney to act in the
cause based upon his showing that he met the requirements of94the rule
respecting practice by foreign attorneys in the courts of Florida?
Statutory Note: Attorneys
Solicitation of Legal Business

This is a 1959 act which makes the solicitation of legal business
a misdemeanor and provides other punishment for such activities by any
person, his agent or employee. The act describes in detail those procedures
which shall constitute solicitation of legal business?9 5

392. Dodd v. State, 110 So.2d 22 (Fla. App. 1959) (plaintiff's attorney attempted

to induce a defendant to give periured testimony); Puelo v. State, 109 So.2d 39
(Fla. App. 1959); FLA. STAT. § 38.22 (1957).
393. State ex rel Arnold v. Revels, 109 So,2d I (Fla. 1959), FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 23; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3(e), as amended by rule of court May 9, 1958. This rule
adopted FIA. STAT. §§ 454.24-454,32 (1955) except those parts therein conflicting
with rule 13(e) which were deemed superceded thereby.
394. F.A.R. 2.3(b); Great Southern Trucking Co. v. Standard Wholesale Grocery
Co., I10 So2d 507 (Fla. App. 1959).
395. Fla, Laws 1959, ch. 59-391.
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Suit or Litigation Promoted by Bribery, Etc.
This is a 1959 act which prohibits the use of valuable consideration
in connection with the stirring up of strife and litigation or influencing
courts to bring suit or seek professional legal advice. The act details what
action constitutes such an act and describes the penalties therefor.""
Prohibition on Business of Budget Planning Not Applicable to Attorneys
Only active practicing Florida attorneys are exempt from the prohibitions imposed on "budget planning"5 3 7 by the 1959 Florida legislature.3 8
COURT COSTS AND

ArORNEYS FEES

Court Costs
The Florida Appellate Rule 3.16(b)
"All costs including appellate costs shall be taxed in the lower court
pursuant to law."
Court Costs: Premium on Surety Bond-Municipal Court Proceedings
The Florida Statutes which provide that if costs are awarded to a
party in any "civil cause" the reasonable premiums paid on surety bonds
may be taxed as part of the costs, do not apply to proceedings of a
municipal court which are quasi-criminal in character. A city's prosecution
for the violation of an ordinance is such a quasi-criminal proceeding and
the city is not liable in an unsuccessful prosecution of such a proceeding
for the fee paid by the defendant for a supersedcas bond. 9
Expense of Court Reporter - Depositions
"The court may in its discretion allow as taxable costs in a civil action
expense of the court reporter for per diem transcribing proceedings of the
court and depositions." 40°0 An item of cost of $173.25 covering the. amount
paid by the defendant to the court reporter for taking the plaintiff's
deposition was not excessive and was properly taxed against the plaintiff
396. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-381.
397. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-345 at § 1. "The term "budget planning" as used

in this act shall mean the act of entering into a contract by any person, firm, corporation
or association with a particular debtor by the terms of which contract the debtor
agrees to deposit periodically with such person, firm, corporation or association a specified
sum of money and said person, firm, corporation or association agrees to distribute said
sum of money among specified creditors of the debtor in accordance with an agreed
plan for which service the debtor agrees to pay a valuable consideration."
398. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-345.
399. City of Miami v. Gilbert, 102 So.2d 818 (Fla. App. 1958). FLA. STAT. § 58.08
(1957).
400. FLA. STAT. § 58.13 (1957).
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upon the defendant's victory, where the deposition was used extensively
40 t
at trial and for cross examination.
Attorneys Fees
Award of Attorneys Fees Within Discretion of Appellate Court
The new Florida Appellate Rules provide that attorney fees, if any
are allowable, shall be awarded by the appellate court in which the
services were rendered, lle award of such fees is within the discretion
of the court and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys
fees where the attorney failed to file a brief as required by the rules in
402
response to a petition for certiorari.
Attorneys Fees-Power to Award Even Though Court Has No
Jurisdiction Over the Controversy
The petitioner sought the reversal of an award of attorneys fees
contained in an order by which the supreme court denied a writ for
certiorari for lack of jurisdiction. Thie general principal that a court which
lacks jurisdiction should refuse to determine any other rights of the
parties was held answered by the elementary proposition that a tribunal
always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. The court concluded therefore that counsel was not in fact contending for fees for
services rendered in proceedings over which the court had no jurisdiction,
but rather for services in connection with obtaining a determination of the
preliminary issue which the court certainly had jurisdiction to decide. 40 a
Attorneys Fees - Not a Charging Lien on Realty

The supreme court has held that in the absence of statutory authority
or an express contract or an implied agreement arising out of special
equitable circumstances, an attorney is not entitled to the imposition of a
charging lien on the real estate of the debtor property owners for legal
04
services rendered for them in relation to such property.

401. Wilson v. Rooney, 101 So.2d 892 (Fla. App. 1958).
402. McArthlur v. McArthur, 106 So.2d 73 (1958); Woolin v.McKain, Ill So.2d

4 754 Fla, App. 1959). F.A.R, 3.16(c).
4b3. Sun Ins. Co. v.Boyd, 105 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1958). See also 21 C.J.S. Courts

§ 118 (1959).

404. Billingliam v.Thicle, 109 So.2d 763 (V7a. 1959). This is the majority rule
as reflected in 5 AjuR. Attorney at Law § 238 (1959); 7 C.J.S. Attorney and
Client § 228(c) (1959).

